Choking under pressure and working memory capacity: When performance pressure reduces fluid intelligence

Recent findings (Beilock & Carr, 2005) have demonstrated that only individuals with a high working memory capacity (WMC) “choke under pressure” on math problems with high working memory demands. This suggests that performance pressure hinders those who are the most qualified to succeed, because it consumes the WMC they usually rely on to achieve superior performance. This puts into question the use of performance in high-pressure situations as a means of distinguishing individuals with lesser or greater WMC potentials. While addressing several limitations of past research, we offer evidence that such choking (1) occurs only in individuals with high WMC, because of their anxiety-ridden perceptions of high-stakes situations, and (2) is not confined to tasks involving acquired skills and knowledge, but encompasses fluid reasoning abilities or intelligence (Gf). These findings have strong implications for assessments of people’s intellectual capacities in academic, clinical, work, and research settings.     

Les comportements d'évaluation dans les systèmes éducatifs: INFLUENCE D'UNE CATÉGORISATION ETHNIQUE SUR LA NOTATION DE PRODUCTIONS SCOLAIRES

Dans le cadre de l'étude expérimentale des comportements d'évaluation mis en ?uvre dans les systèmes éducatifs et à partir de concepts de la psychologie de la perception, les auteurs rapportent une expérience qui met en évidence l'influence d'une catégorisation ethnique des élèves sur l'évaluation de leurs productions scolaires. Un měme devoir est noté différemment selon que le nom patronymique de l'élève qui est censé l'avoir effectué a une ((consonance française)) ou au contraire une ((consonance étrangère)). Mais les effets enregistrés diffèrent selon les évaluateurs concernés, qui ont été distingués selon des dimensions similaires à celles différenciant les élèves dont ils devaient évaluer les productions.     

How does preference reversal appear and disappear? Effects of the evaluation mode

Preference reversal is a systematic change in the preference order between options when different response methods are used (e.g., choice vs. judgment). The present study focuses on procedures used to elicit preferences according to an evaluability hypothesis. Two experiments compared joint vs. separate evaluations and explicit vs. non‐explicit joint evaluations. Subjects had to express preferences between high‐variance gambles (HVGs) and low‐variance gambles (LVGs) either by choosing one gamble to play in a lottery or by assigning gambles minimum selling prices. We show that HVGs are preferred in both choice and pricing conditions when gambles are evaluated separately, and LVGs are preferred in both choice and selling conditions when gambles are evaluated in pairs: i.e., when the evaluation mode is held constant, classic preference reversal disappears. These results support the evaluability hypothesis, and suggest that preferences depend on whether subjects are allowed to compare the options they are asked to choose from or judge, independently of the nature of the scale (i.e., attractiveness vs. minimum selling price) they are required to adopt. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selective attention in social phobia and the moderating effect of a concurrent depressive disorder

Studies using the modified Stroop colour naming task have provided results consistent with the hypothesis that social phobia is associated with an attentional bias towards negative social-evaluative words. However, these results could also have arisen as a consequence of non-attentional processes. For this reason, the present study uses a modified version of MacLeod et al.'s (J. Abnorm. Psychol. 95 (1986) 15) dot-probe task, which provides a more direct measure of attention. Patients with social phobia (n=28), patients with social phobia and a concurrent depressive disorder (n=33), and non-patients (n=40) were presented with word pairs each consisting of a neutral word and a threat word. The results indicated that patients with social phobia show an attentional bias towards social-threat words while non-patients tend to avoid social-threat words. Patients with social phobia and a concurrent depressive disorder behaved like non-patients, indicating that concurrent depression abolishes the attentional bias. Physical threat words were also included in the study. The main analysis indicated that social phobia is also associated with an attentional bias to physical threat. However, a post hoc analysis (which requires replication) suggested that the physical threat bias might have arisen because some social phobia patients also had another anxiety disorder in which physical concerns are likely to have been prominent. Overall, the results emphasise the importance of assessing comorbidity when investigating attentional biases.     

Intergroup alliances and rejections within a protest movement (analysis of the social representations)

Studied the development of a student protest movement which, after an initial success, rapidly declined. Opinion surveys were conducted simultaneously with an analysis of the social representations which our population (i.e. male and female university students) held about itself, its potential partners and the proposed strategies. For this latter method, different words related to the protest movement were used as stimuli for a free association task. Similarities between dictionaries were analysed according to Johnson's clustering method and Kruskal's multidimensional scaling method. The structure of social representations allows us to explain the lack of success of the protest movement in terms of intergroup differentiation: the students refused an alliance with the leaders of the movement and rejected their strategies because they progressively defined them and their culture as foreign to and incompatible with themselves. The concept of social representation is discussed in light of the findings.     

Interaction with a high-versus low-competence influence source in inductive reasoning

Literature on inductive reasoning shows that when testing hypotheses, people are biased toward the use of confirmatory strategies (P. C. Wason, 1960). In the present article, the authors presented 2 studies showing how people use confirmation and disconfirmation strategies during actual interaction in problem solving. Study 1 showed that participants were able to learn to use disconfirmation when confronted with a low-competence, nonthreatening partner. When the partner was high in competence (thereby threatening the participant's competence), participants used confirmation, even when the partner used disconfirmation. In Study 2, the authors aimed at generalizing the aforementioned results by exploring the hypothesis that disconfirmation stems from the possibility of diverging from norms. Participants who were confronted with the violation of a conversational norm used a high proportion of disconfirmation, whatever the source of influence. When there was no violation but there was a low-competence partner, the proportion of disconfirmation was high; when there was no violation but there was a high-competence partner, the proportion of disconfirmation was low. The authors discussed the interpersonal functions of confirmation and disconfirmation.     

Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning

This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which it occurs. The theory predicts several phenomena of reasoning about absolute probabilities, including typical biases. It correctly predicts certain cognitive illusions in inferences about relative probabilities. It accommodates reasoning based on numerical premises, and it explains how naive reasoners can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes's theorem. Finally, it dispels some common misconceptions of probabilistic reasoning.     

Prolegomena of a Logic of Causality and Dynamism

We present in this article a new logical system inspired from linear logic. This system is designed in order to express causality and dynamism. The cut elimination theorem holds for this logic. Examples of applications are given.     

Le renversement de préférence… renversé !

Preference reversal (PR) occurs when pairs of lottery gambles are evaluated under two different conditions: to choose the gamble preferred to play and assign minimum selling price to each gamble. The preference order is then reversed from one condition to another: while it receives the lowest selling price, the gamble less risked is preferred in condition of play. Many times replicated, this result is considered as a cognitive bias. Recent research suggests that it could be related only to the procedure used to present the gambles (i.e., the evaluation mode): either by pair (joint evaluation or JE) in condition of play, or one by one (separate evaluation or SE) in the pricing task. Then, by reversing the evaluation mode in each condition, PR should be reversed, as it is shown in this study: although the phenomenon still occurs when subjects evaluate gambles in the classical paradigm, we observe an inversion of PR when they have, on the one hand, to play in SE, and on the other hand, to sell in JE. Furthermore, an analysis not often used in this literature provides new elements, which can attest to the cognitive mechanisms underlying the phenomenon: by recording the online information (self-paced display time paradigm) we show the effect of an anchoring and adjustment process when riskiest gambles are preferred.