Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction

We studied transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. We found that the interpersonal relation between two players during and across two games influence development of reciprocal trust and transfer of learning from one game to another. We show that two types of similarities between the games affect transfer: (1) deep similarities facilitate transfer of an optimal solution across games; (2) surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer depending on whether they lead players toward an optimal or sub-optimal solution in the target game. Learning an optimal solution in a context of interdependence between players is associated with development of reciprocal trust, which in turn mediates transfer of learning across games. The results can be used to inform the design of training exercises to develop strategic interaction skills.     

The effect of practice on n–2 repetition costs in set switching

Inhibition in set switching is inferred from so-called n–2 repetition costs: slower response times to ABA sequences compared to CBA sequences (where A, B, and C are arbitrary labels for different tasks). These costs are thought to reflect the persisting inhibition of task A when it was disengaged recently (as is the case in an ABA sequence). In this study we were interested in whether more inhibition may be required when the tasks are relatively novel. To this end, we examined the effect of practice on the n–2 repetition cost in nine participants across five experimental sessions, with 1222 trials performed in each session. The results show a clear reduction in the n–2 repetition cost, being altogether absent from the final sessions. Such a reduction is predicted by both: (a) a recent computational model of the n–2 repetition cost (Grange, Juvina, & Houghton, 2013) due to the gradual strengthening of task-related memory elements with practice to the point where inhibition has less impact; and (b) prior work showing smaller n–2 repetition costs with greater cue–target association strength (Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 2009). In this paper, we integrate these two theoretical derivations by extending our computational model, which fit the current data—at the mean level, block level, and individual-subject (i.e., individual differences) level—well.     

The dark side of cognitive illusions: When an illusory belief interferes with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge

Cognitive illusions are often associated with mental health and well‐being. However, they are not without risk. This research shows they can interfere with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge. During the first phase of the experiment, one group of participants was induced to develop a strong illusion that a placebo medicine was effective to treat a fictitious disease, whereas another group was induced to develop a weak illusion. Then, in Phase 2, both groups observed fictitious patients who always took the bogus treatment simultaneously with a second treatment which was effective. Our results showed that the group who developed the strong illusion about the effectiveness of the bogus treatment during Phase 1 had more difficulties in learning during Phase 2 that the added treatment was effective.     

A Schutzian Perspective on the Phenomenology of Law in the Context of Positivistic Practices

The paper outlines Schutz’s phenomenology of law in the context of the transformation of positivistic practices in a post-totalitarian society. His major contribution is seen in the disentanglement of social phenomena from any form of naturalness by incorporating the dimension of meaning and interpretation into them. This philosophical gesture is made possible by renouncing any theory of transcendent ground(s) of a pre-formed order (Section 1) and leads to an interpretive concept of law, in which the reciprocity of perspectives play the major role. The conclusions are pointing toward a phenomenological concept of law able to take our freedom seriously. Presented as the Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture at the meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS), Chicago, 2007, and co-sponsored by the American Philosophical Association (APA) and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (CARP). I am grateful to Lester Embree and Nicoleta Szabo for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.     

Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience

Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.     

Categorical Ontology of Levels and Emergent Complexity: An Introduction

An overview of the following three related papers in this issue presents the Emergence of Highly Complex Systems such as living organisms, man, society and the human mind from the viewpoint of the current Ontological Theory of Levels. The ontology of spacetime structures in the Universe is discussed beginning with the quantum level; then, the striking emergence of the higher levels of reality is examined from a categorical—relational and logical viewpoint. The ontological problems and methodology aspects discussed in the first two papers are followed by a rigorous paper based on Category Theory, Algebraic Topology and Logic that provides a conceptual and mathematical basis for a Categorical Ontology Theory of Levels. The essential links and relationships between the following three papers of this issue are pointed out, and further possible developments are being considered.