The Value of Choice and the Choice to Value: Expanding the Discussion about Fetal Life within Prochoice Advocacy

In this essay, I provide evidence that a new generation of prochoice advocates wishes to move away from defending abortion rights via the view that fetal life has little or no value (for example, as Mary Anne Warren does in her “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”) and toward a more complex view of abortion rights. This newer view simultaneously grants that fetuses are more than simply “clumps of cells,” that they are, to some extent, entities that possess some degree of value, and also that women still have the right to decide whether they wish to continue a pregnancy (for example, as can be found in the writings of Rosalind Hursthouse, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Margaret Olivia Little). Prima facie, this may sound like an impossible task—an instance of “having your cake and eating it too”—but I will show throughout my paper that, and how, such a task can indeed be accomplished.     

Attachment representations in mothers of preterm infants

The aim of the study was to assess attachment representations in mothers of preterm infants using the Working Model of Child Interview (WMCI) at the 12 months of the infant's corrected age. In addition, the relation between WMCI representation categories and the Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale score at 6 months of the infant's corrected age was studied. There were 38 mothers of preterm infants (<1500 g or <32 gestational weeks) and 45 mothers of full-term infants. The results showed no differences between the study groups in the distribution of the three main representation categories (balanced, disengaged and distorted). However, there were qualitative differences in representations between the groups. Furthermore, maternal depression symptoms were associated with distorted representation category. We suggest that despite the qualitative differences in the mothers’ representations, mothers of preterm infants are as likely to form balanced attachments with their infants as mothers of full-term infants.     

Rethinking Roe v. Wade: defending the abortion right in the face of contemporary opposition

In 2008, many states sought to pass Human Life Amendments, which would extend the definition of personhood to encompass newly fertilized eggs. If such an amendment were to pass, Roe v. Wade, as currently defended by the Supreme Court, may be repealed. Consequently, it is necessary to defend the right to an abortion in a manner that succeeds even if a Human Life Amendment successfully passes. J.J. Thomson's argument in "A Defense of Abortion" successfully achieves this. Her argument is especially strong when one considers that her central thesis-that one person's right to life does not entail the right to use another's person's body for continued sustenance-is pervasive in legal policies in the U.S.A.     

Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research

One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails that human embryos should not be disaggregated to obtain pluripotent stem cells for hESCR. Given that human embryos are Kantian persons from the time of their conception, killing them to obtain their cells for research fails to treat them as ends in themselves. This argument assumes two points that are rather contentious given a Kantian framework. First, the argument assumes that when Kant maintains that humanity must be treated as an end in itself, he means to argue that all members of the species Homo sapiens must be treated as ends in themselves; that is, that Kant regards personhood as co-extensive with belonging to the species Homo sapiens. Second, the argument assumes that the event of conception is causally responsible for the genesis of a Kantian person and that, therefore, an embryo is a Kantian person from the time of its conception. In this paper, I will present challenges against these two assumptions by engaging in an exegetical study of some of Kant's works. First, I will illustrate that Kant did not use the term "humanity" to denote a biological species, but rather the capacity to set ends according to reason. Second, I will illustrate that it is difficult given a Kantian framework to denote conception (indeed any biological event) as causally responsible for the creation of a person. Kant ascribed to a dualistic view of human agency, and personhood, according to him, was derived from the supersensible capacity for reason. To argue that a Kantian person is generated due to the event of conception ignores Kant's insistence in various aspects of his work that it is not possible to understand the generation of a person qua a physical operation. Finally, I will end the paper by drawing from Allen Wood's work in Kantian philosophy in order to generate an argument in favor of hESCR.     

Revisiting the argument from fetal potential

One of the most famous, and most derided, arguments against the morality of abortion is the argument from potential, which maintains that the fetus' potential to become a person and enjoy the valuable life common to persons, entails that its destruction is prima facie morally impermissible. In this paper, I will revisit and offer a defense of the argument from potential.     

Exposure-based cognitive behavior therapy for anxiety related to asthma: A feasibility study with multivariate baseline design

In the presence of asthma, the risk of having an anxiety disorder is increased twofold. The few trials conducted on cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) for anxiety and asthma have mainly targeted panic disorder, and with mixed results. Experimental laboratory research indicates that increased anxiety may lead to hypervigilance toward asthma. Hence, fear and avoidance associated with increased anxiety due to asthma may be an important treatment target. A treatment that learn participants to differentiate between anxiety and asthma through gradual exposure to situations that risk triggering anxiety for asthma may be a possible avenue. As a first step to investigate this issue further, we developed a 10-week exposure-based CBT protocol for anxiety related to asthma and tested it in six participants using multivariate baseline design with repeated assessments throughout treatment. All participants reported satisfaction with treatment, as well as subjective overall improvement after treatment. Visual analysis, using graphs over each individual's trajectory, as well as potential efficacy on group level analyzing standardized mean change, indicated improvements in important outcomes. We conclude that exposure-based CBT is feasible and may improve anxiety related to asthma. Further investigation under randomized controlled trial conditions is warranted.