Interactions between area and numerosity

Summary The concept of filled area, i.e. the impressionistic ensemble of parts of a stimulus field occupied by dots, is used to account for various kinds of numerosity illusions due to perceptual interaction between a number of dots and their spatial arrangement. A measure of filled area is derived from a model for the perceptual clustering of dots on the basis of relative proximity. It is shown that the quantified concept of filled area successfully predicts illusion data from earlier studies. Subsequently, a two-alternatives forced-choice numerosity experiment is reported, the data of which gave further evidence of the predictive power of the filled-area hypothesis. Our approach is discussed with respect to spatial features of dot stimuli that might be in rivalry with the filled-area factor in numerosity-estimation tasks.     

On the psychometric properties of the Maudsley Marital Questionnaire (MMQ): Evaluation of self-ratings in distressed and ‘normal’ volunteer couples based on the dutch version

The current preliminary study presents data on reliability and validity of the Maudsley Marital Questionnaire (MMQ), a short 20-item scale which was designed to assess degree of favourableness of attitude towards one's own marriage. The MMQ contains three scales related to marital, sexual and general life adjustment, whose composition was initially based on those of analogue scales of the Structured and Scaled Interview to Assess Maladjustment (SSIAM). In addition to providing substantial support for an almost perfect similarity between hypothetical and empirical MMQ dimensional representations, findings, based on self-ratings of 125 volunteer couples from the community and 50 distressed couples, demonstrated that the MMQ scales have high internal consistency, sufficient test-retest reliability and validity and are only slightly correlated with social desirability.     

Patterns of interocular transfer of visuomotor coordination reveal differences in the representation of visual space

Acquisition and interocular transfer of adaptation to optical transformations of input were examined in strabismic and orthotropic subjects. Distinct patterns of behavior were displayed by three groups: strabismic alternating suppressors, strabismic and orthotropic constant suppressors, and orthotropes with normal binocularity of vision. It is suggested that these behaviors result from the way in which visual space is represented in each group, an outcome of the pattern of use of the eyes during early development. The conditions for modification of the representation of visual space appear to parallel those for initial acquisition.     

Expressivity results for deontic logics of collective agency

We use a deontic logic of collective agency to study reducibility questions about collective agency and collective obligations. The logic that is at the basis of our study is a multi-modal logic in the tradition of stit (‘sees to it that’) logics of agency. Our full formal language has constants for collective and individual deontic admissibility, modalities for collective and individual agency, and modalities for collective and individual obligations. We classify its twenty-seven sublanguages in terms of their expressive power. This classification enables us to investigate reducibility relations between collective deontic admissibility, collective agency, and collective obligations, on the one hand, and individual deontic admissibility, individual agency, and individual obligations, on the other.

     

The association between risky decision making and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptoms: A preregistered assessment of need for cognition as underlying mechanism

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is related to suboptimal decision making in experimental tasks and to real-life risk-taking behavior (RTB) such as substance abuse and unsafe traffic conduct. In this preregistered study, we tested whether these associations are mediated by need for cognition—the extent to which one tends towards, and enjoys, analytical thought. In a large sample of young adults (N = 463, M_age = 19.7 years), we tested whether need for cognition mediated the association between self-reported ADHD symptoms on the one hand and decision-making strategy complexity on an experimental gambling task and self-reported real-life RTB on the other hand. Preregistered confirmatory analyses indicated first that ADHD symptoms were positively associated with real-life RTB, but the association was not mediated by need for cognition. Second, ADHD symptoms were not related to decision-making strategy complexity, and need for cognition was not a significant mediator. Explorative analyses revealed that (a) need for cognition was associated with higher decision-making accuracy and slower reaction time; (b) need for cognition was related to inattentive but not to hyperactive/impulsive ADHD symptoms; (c) need for cognition was associated with health-related RTB but not interpersonal RTB; and (4) only the association between inattention and health-related RTB was mediated by need for cognition. We conclude that need for cognition is not a mediator in the association between ADHD symptoms and RTB. Additionally, we conclude that neither ADHD symptoms nor need for cognition predict decision-making strategy complexity. Implications for both future research and clinical practice are discussed.     

Backward inhibition as a means of sequential task-set control: evidence for reduction of task competition

Endogenously initiated transitions between tasks are associated with inhibition of the attentional set for the task preceding the transition, as demonstrated by slowed reactions to a task most recently switched away from (U. Mayr & S. W. Keele, 2000). Using an altered methodological approach, the authors found that this backward inhibition counteracts perseverative tendencies when switching to a new task in that it selectively reduces interference exerted by the preceding task set. The reduction of interference was dependent on endogenous preparation for the new task and did not occur for unpredictable task switches or for task switches that were precued without information about the identity of the new task.     

Four empirical tests of Unconscious Thought Theory

According to Unconscious Thought Theory, people make better decisions after unconscious than after conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006a). Unconscious Thought Theory yields four specific predictions. First, an exact replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006a) study should indicate that unconscious decisions are superior to conscious decisions. Second, decisions should improve with duration of conscious thought. Third, unconscious decisions should be superior to conscious decisions, even if unconscious decisions are deliberated while having access to information. Fourth, unconscious decisions should be based on a weighting strategy. We report results of four studies, featuring 480 participants, that yield no evidence in favor of these predictions. Therefore our findings cast doubt on Unconscious Thought Theory and its advice to base decisions on unconscious thought. The results of our studies suggest that it is better to base decisions on conscious thought while having access to information.