Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases

According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access to normative properties. We argue that underlying this objection are several specific problems, rooted in the different types of mental states to which emotions may respond, that the sentimental perceptualist must tackle for her view to be successful. We argue, moreover, that the problems can be answered by filling out the theory with several independently motivated yet highly controversial commitments, which we carefully catalogue. The plausibility of sentimental perceptualism, as a result, hinges on further claims sentimental perceptualists should not ignore.

     

Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?

“Frankfurt-style cases” (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because (i) our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners (CIs) are inconsistent (we accept that the mere presence of CIs is enough to make us gain but not lose responsibility-underwriting capacities), and (ii) this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental states and capacities. In response to this challenge, we argue that (i) there is no inconsistency in our intuitions about cases involving CIs, as soon as we draw the comparison properly, and that (ii) intuitions about such cases do not rest on an internalist prejudice, but on a more basic distinction between two kinds of dispositions. Additionally, we discuss some methodological issues that arise when comparing intuitions about thought experiments and end with a discussion of the implications of our argument for the reliability of intuitions about FSCs.     

Executive and attentional contributions to Theory of Mind deficit in attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)

Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children has been associated with attentional and executive problems, but also with socioemotional difficulties possibly associated with deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM). Socioemotional problems in ADHD are associated with more negative prognoses, notably interpersonal, educational problems, and an increased risk of developing other psychiatric disorders that emphasize the need to clarify the nature of their ToM deficits. In this study, we hypothesized that ToM dysfunction in children with ADHD is largely attributable to their attentional and/or executive deficits. Thirty-one children with ADHD (8–12 years, IQ > 85) and 31 typically developing (TD) children were assessed using executive functions (inhibition, planning, and flexibility) and attentional tasks, as well as two advanced ToM tasks (Reading the Mind in the Eyes and Faux Pas) involving different levels of executive control. Children with ADHD performed more poorly than TD children in attentional, executive function, and ToM tasks. Linear regression analyses conducted in the ADHD group indicated that inhibition scores predicted performance on the “Faux Pas” task the best, while attention scores were the best for predicting performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. When controlled for inhibition and attentional variables, ToM performance in children with ADHD was actually similar to TD children. Contrarily, controlling for ToM scores did not normalize performance for inhibition and attentional tasks in children with ADHD. This unidirectional relationship suggests that deficits in the EF and attentional domains are responsible for ToM deficits in ADHD, which therefore may contribute to their socioemotional difficulties.     

Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love

Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes our love for them appropriate, just as being fearsome is what makes our fear of certain situations appropriate. I finally propose a general account of this property which avoids the major problems facing the extant accounts of reasons for love.     

Characteristics of a French African Caribbean Epidemiological Psychiatric Sample with a History of Suicide Attempt

Research on vulnerability factors among ethnic groups, independent of primary psychiatric diagnosis, may help to identify groups at risk of suicidal behavior. French African Caribbean general psychiatric patients (N = 362) were recruited consecutively and independently of the primary psychiatric diagnosis. Demographic and clinical characteristics and lifetime history of suicide attempts were recorded. Sixty‐five patients (18%) had a history of at least one suicide attempt. Presence of professional qualifications, children, poor social contacts, treatment with benzodiazepine at inclusion, and poor treatment compliance were all associated with a lifetime history of suicide attempts.     

The Effects of Cognitive and Affective Program Involvement on Cognitive and Affective Ad Involvement

Advertisers attempt to create ads which gain the attention and involvement of their audience. These advertisements may be primarily cognitively or affectively involving. Similarly the programs in which the ads are embedded may be primarily cognitively or affectively involving. Does the type of program involvement affect involvement with ads? Building on previous research (Mc-Clung, Park and Sauer 1985; Park and McClung 1986) a study is presented which suggests that cognitive involvement in ads (particularly cognitive ads) suffers from an overload effect when the ads are placed in cognitively involving programs while affective involvement in ads is enhanced by a priming effect when the ads are placed in affectively involving programs.     

Orthographic and Morphological Masked Priming Effects in Arabic: Evidence from Lexical Decision Task in Children with and Without Dyslexia

In this study, we conducted a lexical decision test using masked priming paradigm to examine the morphological and orthographic priming effects in word recognition. Morphologically related word pairs can be derivational, sharing the same root or not (pseudo derivational). However, the orthographically related pairs share the same letters in different positions. Two groups of native Arabic-speaking children (N?=?57) from grade 4 and 5 participated in this study: typical readers (n?=?39) and dyslexic readers (n?=?18). To examine whether a potential morphological priming effect is driven by semantic or orthographic properties of shared morphemes, we compared prime-target pairs with derivation morphology and pseudo-derivation word related pairs. Between groups comparisons showed that a priming effect occurred only in typical readers. Comparisons between conditions revealed that a priming effect only occurred for accuracy in derivational morphology. No priming effect occurred in reaction times (RTs) between groups or conditions. These results provide evidence for root-based word recognition in Arabic children and give support to semantically rather than orthographically driven lexical access.     

Gender-specific common nouns: Sex differences in self-use

Males and females completed questionnaires on self-esteem and on their use, applied to themselves, of (a) girl/boy, (b) gal/guy, (c) lady/gentleman, and (d) woman/man in 10 situations. Terms chosen did not vary with self-esteem or with psychiatric vs nonpsychiatric status. Older subjects preferred lady/gentleman and woman/man. Females seldom chose gal, and used it less often than males used guy. Both sexes chose girl/boy most in negative situations. Females used girl more than males used boy in self-praise situations. Females preferred both sexes to think of them as ladies. Males preferred females to think of them as gentlemen and thought that term most complimentary, but preferred males to think of them as men. These results are discussed in terms of societal sex roles.The authors wish to thank Gary Leonardson, Ph.D., and Nancy Henley, Ph.D., for their aid in completing this study.     

"Getting Along" and "Getting Ahead" as Motives for Self-Presentation: Their Impact on Advertising Effectiveness

This research takes a multidimensional approach to the study of self-presentation by employing scales which measure protective and acquisitive motives for self-presentation termed getting-along and getting-ahead respectively (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). The getting-along and getting-ahead motives for self-presentation are found to be positively related to the effectiveness of different types of image ads, supporting the hypothesis that consistency between the appeal type and the underlying motivation for self-presentation is positively associated with ad effectiveness.