“John thinks that Mary thinks that…” attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children

Understanding of second-order belief structures by 5- and 10-year-old children was assessed in acted stories in which two characters (John and Mary) were independently informed about an object's (ice-cream van's) unexpected transfer to a new location. Hence both John and Mary knew where the van was but there was a mistake in John's second-order belief about Mary's belief: “John thinks Mary thinks the van is still at the old place”. Children's understanding of this second-order belief was tested by asking “Where does John think Mary will go for ice cream?” Correct answers could only be given if John's second-order belief was represented, since all shortcut reasoning based on first-order beliefs would have led to the wrong answer. Results suggested unexpected early competence around the age of 6 and 7 years, shown under optimal conditions when inference of second-order beliefs was prompted.     

Relationships between time of day,day of the week,and positive mood: Exploring the role of the mood measure

This study examined the relationship between time of day, day of the week, and two measures of positive affect (PA). According to previous research and the circumplex model of affect, one scale was designed to assess the activation component of PA, and the other one measured the pleasantness aspect. Subjects rated their mood three times a day for 7 consecutive days. Consistent with our hypotheses, PA-Pleasantness showed a peak on the weekend, whereas PA-Activation remained stable throughout the week. Regarding time of day, maximum PA-Activation was reached in the afternoon. In contrast, the Pleasantness component of PA increased from morning to evening. Implications of these results as well as other findings concerning the differential content of PA measures are discussed regarding the fact that a certain scale is most appropriate and maximally valid for representing certain aspects of affective experience.We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the associate editor, Robert A. Baron, for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.     

Depth of nontarget processing in an attention task

Two studies examined the effect of the sensory discriminability of targets from nontargets on depth of nontarget processing. Subjects shadowed target words that were binaurally presented with coincident nontarget words. Targets and nontargets were spoken in the same male voice under low sensory discriminability and in male and female voices, respectively under high sensory discriminability. Across the two studies, depth of nontarget processing was assessed in three ways: extent to which shadowing accuracy was disrupted by a semantic overlap between targets and nontargets, expenditure of capacity (reaction time to subsidiary light signals), and nontarget recall. All three possible measures of depth of nontarget processing decreased as sensory discriminability increased. The data support the assumption of multiple-loci theories of attention that nontargets can be perceptually inhibited; they contraindicate the assumption of late-selection theories that perceptual processing is automatic and irrepressible.     

Instructions Moderate the Relationship between Creative Performance in Figural Divergent Thinking and Reasoning Capacity

In this study with within-subject design, the “be-creative effect” was investigated using three instructions in figural divergent-thinking tasks: Besides a be-fluent instruction, a be-creative instruction, and a be-creative instruction combined with strategies were applied. In addition, reasoning ability as part of fluid intelligence, self-reported creative ideation, current motivation after reading the instructions, and task-related interest were assessed. Multilevel analysis applying random-intercept-constant-slope models found significant main effects of the instructions on creative performance and fluency. Both be-creative instructions yielded a rise in creative performance in divergent thinking tasks with additional improvement due to supporting strategies. The be-fluent instruction enhanced the quantity of ideas but decreased creative performance. Task-related interest turned out to be a better predictor of creative performance than the self-estimated expected interest prior to working on the task. Moreover, the relationship of creative performance and reasoning ability was moderated by instruction, with no relationship with a be-fluent instruction and small to moderate positive effects with both instructions emphasizing creative ideas.     

Author Index Volume 108, 2002

Authors Index

Author Index Volume 108, 2002     

Pseudoname learning by German-speaking children with dyslexia: evidence for a phonological learning deficit

In 2 experiments, German-speaking dyslexic children (9-year-olds) showed impaired learning of new phonological forms (pseudonames) in a variety of visual-verbal learning tasks. The dyslexic deficit was also found when phonological retrieval cues were provided and when the to-be-learned pseudonames were presented in spoken as well as printed form. However, the dyslexic children showed no name-learning deficit when short, familiar words were used and they also had no difficulty with immediate repetition of the pseudowords. The dyslexic children's difficulty in learning new phonological forms was associated with pseudoword-repetition and naming-speed deficits assessed at the beginning of school, but not with phonological awareness and visual-motor impairments. We propose that the difficulty in learning new phonological forms may affect reading and spelling acquisition via impaired storage of new phonological forms, which serve as phonological underpinnings of the letter patterns of words or parts of words.     

Coping with threat and memory for ambiguous information: testing the repressive discontinuity hypothesis

Two studies examined the influence of coping dispositions (repression, sensitization, and nondefensiveness) and anxiety on the encoding and memory representation of ambiguous threat-related stimuli. In Study 1, memory was tested shortly after encoding. Study 2 contrasted immediate and delayed testing. Repressers showed evidence of "mixed" affective reactions to ambiguous stimuli at encoding, accompanied by weak memory representation of potentially threatening implications of these stimuli. In contrast, sensitizers and anxious individuals manifested a processing bias in favor of threatening implications of ambiguous stimuli. Influences of coping on memory were most pronounced for delayed testing. Anxiety influences on memory were weak. An expectancy-based account of individual differences in processing ambiguous stimuli is discussed.     

Construct validity of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 in clinical samples

Using two clinical samples of patients, the presented studies examined the construct validity of the recently revised Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3). Confirmatory factor analyses established a clear three-factor structure that corresponds to the postulated subdivision of the construct into correlated somatic, social, and cognitive components. Participants with different primary clinical diagnoses differed from each other on the ASI-3 subscales in theoretically meaningful ways. Specifically, the ASI-3 successfully discriminated patients with anxiety disorders from patients with nonanxiety disorders. Moreover, patients with panic disorder or agoraphobia manifested more somatic concerns than patients with other anxiety disorders and patients with nonanxiety disorders. Finally, correlations of the ASI-3 scales with other measures of clinical symptoms and negative affect substantiated convergent and discriminant validity. Substantial positive correlations were found between the ASI-3 Somatic Concerns and body vigilance, between Social Concerns and fear of negative evaluation and socially inhibited behavior, and between Cognitive Concerns and depression symptoms, anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, and subjective complaints. Moreover, Social Concerns correlated negatively with dominant and intrusive behavior. Results are discussed with respect to the contribution of the ASI-3 to the assessment of anxiety-related disorders.