The Concept of Dreaming: On Three Theses by Malcolm

In his monograph Dreaming (1959), Normal Malcolm puts forward the following three theses:
(1) The temporal location of dreams as taking place in one's sleep is not an empirical fact, but determined by grammar.
(2) This grammatical determination does not allow dreams a precise date in physical time.
(3) Dreams do not consist of mental occurrences.
I argue that (1) is indeed perfectly true, whereas (2) is false; (3) is not borne out by Malcolm's verificationist main argument, although it can be shown to be largely true for other considerations.     

Including a Spiritual Dimension in Family Therapy: Ethical Considerations

The inclusion of a spiritual dimension in family therapy theory and clinical practice may well be viewed as an important professional challenge of the nineties. Following a working definition of terms, this paper explores the ethical complexities inherent in operationalizing a spiritual orientation in therapy in light of the following principles adopted from medical ethics: Respect for clients' autonomy, safeguarding clients' welfare, protecting them from harm, and treating them justly and honestly.     

Variation in aggressive behavior and anatomo-physiological correlates generated by crowding without physical contact in the house mouse

Behavioral, physiological (i.e., endocrine), and anatomical consequences of crowding in mice were studied in a situation where animals were in auditory, visual, olfactory, and tactile contact but restrained from full physical interactions, to prevent overt aggression. Males that cohabited with females undisturbed by neighboring conspecifics showed greater propensity to attack same-sex intruders and had higher plasma testosterone levels than did their “crowded” counterparts, that is, males cohabiting with females and housed adjacent to other male/female pairs. In this respect, the latter animals resembled submissive males. However, a significant increase in weight of androgen-dependent target organs (i.e., seminal vesicles and preputial glands) was found in crowded males. These data indicate that despite the observed inhibition of social aggression these males are not physiologically comparable (homologous) to male mice that experienced defeat and the stress of submission during fighting. The intriguing possibility that different conversion pathway of testosterone are accelerated, as a result of social communication, in males living in these two environments and the behavioral implications of these possibilities are discussed. Finally, the parental behavior of crowded animals, although not freely interacting with each other, was disrupted, causing a marked decrease in reproductive success. In this situation a high incidence of infanticide of their offspring by both parents was observed, whereas this behavior was virtually absent in non-crowded male/female pairs.     

Can I Have Your Pain?

In the so‐called private language argument, Wittgenstein argues both against the alleged epistemological privacy of sensations and against their alleged ontological privacy, that is, the common view that somebody else cannot have my pain. A prominent proponent of the claim of sensations' ontological privacy was Gottlob Frege, whose position has recently been defended by Wolfgang Künne. This paper reconsiders Wittgenstein's objections to ontological privacy and attempts to defend Wittgenstein's position against Künne's Frege‐inspired arguments.