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1.
D.M. Armstrong has objected that the dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that if this objection succeeds against dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious. 相似文献
2.
This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into
a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal
processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the
original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late pre?mption
and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.
相似文献
Toby HandfieldEmail: |
3.
Toby Handfield 《The Philosophical quarterly》2004,54(216):402-419
Necessitarian accounts of the laws of nature meet an apparent difficulty: for them, counterlegal conditionals, despite appearing to be substantive, seem to come out as vacuous. I argue that the necessitarian may use the presuppositions of counterlegal discourse to explain this. If the typical presupposition that necessitarianism is false is made explicit in counterlegal utterances, we obtain sentences such as 'If it turns out that the laws of nature are contingent, then if the laws had been otherwise, then such and such would have been the case', which are non-vacuous and very often true. This goes a long way towards resolving the difficulty for necessitarianism. 相似文献
4.
Toby Handfield 《Synthese》2008,160(2):297-308
This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears
the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks
and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those
which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and antidotes are a major obstacle to
a conditional analysis of dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be successfully analysed by the conditional
analysis of dispositions. This result is of importance for those who think that the fundamental properties might be dispositions
which lack any distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties, if they exist, can be analysed by simple
conditionals and that they will not be subject to ceteris paribus laws. 相似文献
5.
The spectrum argument purports to show that the better-than relation is not transitive, and consequently that orthodox value theory is built on dubious foundations. The argument works by constructing a sequence of increasingly less painful but more drawn-out experiences, such that each experience in the spectrum is worse than the previous one, yet the final experience is better than the experience with which the spectrum began. Hence the betterness relation admits cycles, threatening either transitivity or asymmetry of the relation. This paper examines recent attempts to block the spectrum argument, using the idea that it is a mistake to affirm that every experience in the spectrum is worse than its predecessor: an alternative hypothesis is that adjacent experiences may be incommensurable in value, or that due to vagueness in the underlying concepts, it is indeterminate which is better. While these attempts formally succeed as responses to the spectrum argument, they have additional, as yet unacknowledged costs that are significant. In order to effectively block the argument in its most typical form, in which the first element is radically inferior to the last, it is necessary to suppose that the incommensurability (or indeterminacy) is particularly acute: what might be called radical incommensurability (radical indeterminacy). We explain these costs, and draw some general lessons about the plausibility of the available options for those who wish to save orthodox axiology from the spectrum argument. 相似文献
6.
Toby Handfield 《The Philosophical quarterly》2001,51(205):484-494
An objection to dispositional essentialism has been that it yields an implausible semantics for counterfactuals if determinism happens to be true. I claim that an adequate remedy to this objection would be to endorse the metaphysical possibility of 'law-abiding miracles', i.e., uncaused spontaneous events. This proposal entails that determinism de jure is meta-physically impossible; I argue that this is not a serious disadvantage. I discuss consequences of the proposal for the logical form of laws, and consider a possible objection to the proposal on epistemic grounds. 相似文献
7.
Toby Handfield 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2014,89(3):584-604
If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods. 相似文献
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9.
Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise.
He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that
has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt
cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt
devise - e.g. the addiction - is intrinsic to the agent. 相似文献
10.
Toby Handfield 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(1):81-85
Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is—with minor modification—compatible with essentialism. 相似文献