On the Rational Resolvability of Deep Disagreement Through Meta-argumentation: A Resource Audit

Topoi - Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the normalcy of our discourse—to the extent that discourse is not normal disagreements occurring in it...     

Arguing at Cross-Purposes: Discharging the Dialectical Obligations of the Coalescent Model of Argumentation

The paper addresses the manner in which the theory of Coalescent Argumentation [CA] has been received by the Argumentation Theory community. I begin (section 2) by providing a theoretical overview of the Coalescent model of argumentation as developed by Michael A. Gilbert (1997). I next engage the several objections that have been raised against CA (section 3). I contend that objectors to the Coalescent model are not properly sensitive to the theoretical consequences of the genuinely situated nature of argument. I conclude (section 4) by suggesting that the resolution to the dispute between Gilbert and his objectors hinges on the outcome of several foundational theoretical questions identified over the course of the paper.     

An investigation of the relationships between problem solving strategies, representation and memory

There has been considerable debate in recent years about the status of “imagery” in problem solving. The present experiment attempts to show that while subjects may employ representational strategies when they first encounter a class of problems, they abandon such strategies as they gain experience with the problems. It does this by asking subjects to answer unexpected questions which are based upon the information which they have just used to solve a problem. The hypothesis, which is supported by the results, is that increasing experience with problems will be paralleled by a decreasing ability to answer unexpected questions. The experiment also shows that such effects are not attributable to a build-up in proactive interference.     

Transition structure versus commitment in sequential subjective probability revision

When Ss revise subjective probabilities, in the light of new evidence, a common finding is that they are conservative with respect to Bayes' theorem; revisions are too small. One kind of hypothesis to account for this is ‘model specific’, assuming a breakdown in an otherwise potentially Bayesian process. The other kind assumes that statistically irrelevant, task-specific information is processed. An example of the latter is the commitment hypothesis, assuming a commitment building up to the indications of early evidence, causing Ss to lag behind Bayes' theorem in their later judgements. Evidence is presented suggesting that Ss are not necessarily sensitive to mere sub-sets of a sequence, but that this form of suboptimality may result from overall sequence structure; specifically from a bias against long runs of like evidence. This would fit with findings from other areas of research, and would suggest that there is a general form of suboptimality operating which is relevant to all sequential processing tasks.     

An experimental treatment using verbal punishment with two preschool stutterers

A multiple base-line experimental treatment was conducted with two preschool stuttering children. Each child conversed 20 min with the experimenter for 20 sessions. Treatment consisted of the presentation of the verbal stimulus “slow down” contingent upon a stuttering response. The percentage of words stuttered by both children decreased during the treatment sessions. Probe tape recordings conducted in each child's home revealed a decrease in stuttering frequency.     

Modeling Corroborative Evidence: Inference to the Best Explanation as Counter–Rebuttal

Corroborative evidence has a dual function in argument. Primarily, it functions to provide direct evidence supporting the main conclusion. But it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. This paper argues that the bolstering effect of corroborative evidence is legitimate, and can be explained as counter–rebuttal achieved through inference to the best explanation. A model (argument diagram) of corroborative evidence, representing its structure and operation as a schematic pattern of defeasible argument is also supplied. In addition to explaining the operation and theoretical foundation of corroborative evidence, the model facilitates the correct analysis and guides the evaluation (assessment and critique) of corroborative evidence as it occurs in argument.     

Getting Out in Front of the Owl of Minerva Problem

Argumentation - Our meta-argumentative vocabulary supplies the conceptual tools used to reflectively analyse, regulate, and evaluate our argumentative performances. Yet, this vocabulary is...     

The importance of belief in argumentation: belief,commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion

This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion. I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning. Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.     

On the Priority of Agent-Based Argumentative Norms

This paper argues against the priority of pure, virtue-based accounts of argumentative norms [VA]. Such accounts are agent-based and committed to the priority thesis: good arguments and arguing well are explained in terms of some prior notion of the virtuous arguer arguing virtuously. Two problems with the priority thesis are identified. First, the definitional problem: virtuous arguers arguing virtuously are neither sufficient nor necessary for good arguments. Second, the priority problem: the goodness of arguments is not explained virtuistically. Instead, being excellences, virtues are instrumental in relation to other, non-aretaic goods—in this case, reason and rationality. Virtues neither constitute reasons nor explain their goodness. Two options remain for VA: either provide some account of reason and rationality in virtuistic terms, or accept them as given but non-aretaic goods. The latter option, though more viable, demands the concession that VA cannot provide the core norms of argumentation theory.