Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

On the intricacies involved in the study of similarity judgments: comment on Ritov, Gati, and Tversky

The purpose of this comment is to point out some potential pitfalls in the study of similarity judgments, particularly with regard to comparison of similarity judgments between modalities. These are discussed in the context of the article by Ritov, Gati, and Tversky (1990).     

Making sense of ‘on denoting’

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided.     

Calibration of probability assessments by professional blackjack dealers, statistical experts, and lay people

The question addressed in this study is whether experts are better calibrated than lay people. We investigated how well people are calibrated when they assess the probabilities of card combinations in the game of blackjack. Three groups of subjects were used: professional dealers, statistical experts, and control subjects. The results showed that experience and statistical expertise do not make people better calibrated in this task. It is argued that the concept of calibration is not wholly appropriate to describe the obtained deviations from the normatively correct responses. This is illustrated by a discriminant analysis performed on the signed deviation scores, which resulted in an almost perfect separation of the three groups, although they were overlapping with respect to calibration.     

On the reciprocity of proximity relations

The degree of reciprocity of a proximity order is the proportion, P(1), of elements for which the closest neighbor relation is symmetric, and the R value of each element is its rank in the proximity order from its closest neighbor. Assuming a random sampling of points, we show that Euclidean n-spaces produce a very high degree of reciprocity, $\text{P(1) ≥}\text{1}\text{2}$, and correspondingly low R values, E(R) ≤ 2, for all n. The same bounds also apply to homogeneous graphs, in which the same number of edges meet at every node. Much less reciprocity and higher R values, however, can be attained in finite tree models and in the contrast model in which the “distance” between objects is a linear function of the numbers of their common and distinctive features.     

The linear utility model for optimal selection

A linear utility model is introduced for optimal selection when several subpopulations of applicants are to be distinguished. Using this model, procedures are described for obtaining optimal cutting scores in subpopulations in quota-free as well as quota-restricted selection situations. The cutting scores are optimal in the sense that they maximize the overall expected utility of the selection process. The procedures are demonstrated with empirical data.     

Risk perception of a chronic threat of terrorism: Differences based on coping types,gender and exposure

High levels of risk perception of terrorism (RPT) may impair an individual's quality of life and welfare. To understand the mechanisms responsible for RPT, this study investigated the association of gender and coping styles with individual differences in two key elements of RPT: perceived control and perceived vulnerability. A convenience sample of 400 Israelis (181 men and 219 women) filled out questionnaires on sociodemographic background, RPT and coping. Employing a multidimensional approach for coping, we divided participants into four coping types: problem-focused (n = 65), emotion-focused (n = 70), mixed (n = 122) and minimal (n = 142). The results indicate that problem-focused coping is associated with higher levels of perceived control than other types of coping and mixed coping is associated with higher levels of perceived vulnerability than other coping strategies. Also, interactions between gender and exposure to terrorism contributed to understanding the differences in perceived control. The discussion addresses gender differences in RPT and coping in the context of traditional gender roles. The study concludes with implications for risk management and therapeutic interventions regarding high levels of fear of terrorism.