Gestural communication of the gorilla (Gorilla gorilla): repertoire, intentionality and possible origins

Social groups of gorillas were observed in three captive facilities and one African field site. Cases of potential gesture use, totalling 9,540, were filtered by strict criteria for intentionality, giving a corpus of 5,250 instances of intentional gesture use. This indicated a repertoire of 102 gesture types. Most repertoire differences between individuals and sites were explicable as a consequence of environmental affordances and sampling effects: overall gesture frequency was a good predictor of universality of occurrence. Only one gesture was idiosyncratic to a single individual, and was given only to humans. Indications of cultural learning were few, though not absent. Six gestures appeared to be traditions within single social groups, but overall concordance in repertoires was almost as high between as within social groups. No support was found for the ontogenetic ritualization hypothesis as the chief means of acquisition of gestures. Many gestures whose form ruled out such an origin, i.e. gestures derived from species-typical displays, were used as intentionally and almost as flexibly as gestures whose form was consistent with learning by ritualization. When using both classes of gesture, gorillas paid specific attention to the attentional state of their audience. Thus, it would be unwarranted to divide ape gestural repertoires into ‘innate, species-typical, inflexible reactions’ and ‘individually learned, intentional, flexible communication’. We conclude that gorilla gestural communication is based on a species-typical repertoire, like those of most other mammalian species but very much larger. Gorilla gestures are not, however, inflexible signals but are employed for intentional communication to specific individuals.     

Great ape gestures: intentional communication with a rich set of innate signals

Animal Cognition - Great apes give gestures deliberately and voluntarily, in order to influence particular target audiences, whose direction of attention they take into account when choosing which...     

Vocal–gestural combinations in infant bonobos: new insights into signal functional specificity

Animal Cognition - Comparing the communicative abilities of humans and great apes is a commonly used research strategy to understand the evolutionary foundation of modern human language. The...     

Can lemurs learn to deceive? A study in the black lemur (Eulemur macaco)

Deceptive behavior in primates has been the focus of a number of studies. Nevertheless, such abilities have never been demonstrated in prosimians. The authors' goal was to analyze possible deception in lemurs according to a paradigm used with simians. Three black lemurs were trained to communicate about the location of a hidden reward with a cooperative trainer. Afterward, when a 2nd trainer and lemurs competed to gain access to the reward, each subject differentially adapted its learned behavior to the context. Their performances with the cooperative trainer remained stable while they showed various behavioral adjustments when faced to the competitive trainer: 1 subject refused to participate, another preferentially withheld information, and the 3rd sometimes pointed deceptively to obtain the reward.     

Why do gorillas make sequences of gestures?

Great ape gestures have attracted considerable research interest in recent years, prompted by their flexible and intentional pattern of use; but almost all studies have focused on single gestures. Here, we report the first quantitative analysis of sequential gesture use in western gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), using data from three captive groups and one African study site. We found no evidence that gesture sequences were given for reasons of increased communicative efficiency over single gestures. Longer sequences of repeated gestures did not increase the likelihood of response, and using a sequence was seldom in reaction to communicative failure. Sequential combination of two gestures with similar meanings did not generally increase effectiveness, and sometimes reduced it. Gesture sequences were closely associated with play contexts. Markov transition analysis showed two networks of frequently co-occurring gestures, both consisting of gestures used to regulate play. One network comprised only tactile gestures, the other a mix of silent, audible and tactile gestures; apparently, these clusters resulted from gesture use in play with proximal or distal contact, respectively. No evidence was found for syntactic effects of sequential combination: meanings changed little or not at all. Semantically, many gestures overlapped massively with others in their core information (i.e. message), and gesture messages spanned relatively few functions. We suggest that the underlying semantics of gorilla gestures is highly simplified compared to that of human words. Gesture sequences allow continual adjustment of the tempo and nature of social interactions, rather than generally conveying semantically referential information or syntactic structures.     

Great ape gestures: intentional communication with a rich set of innate signals

Great apes give gestures deliberately and voluntarily, in order to influence particular target audiences, whose direction of attention they take into account when choosing which type of gesture to use. These facts make the study of ape gesture directly relevant to understanding the evolutionary precursors of human language; here we present an assessment of ape gesture from that perspective, focusing on the work of the “St Andrews Group” of researchers. Intended meanings of ape gestures are relatively few and simple. As with human words, ape gestures often have several distinct meanings, which are effectively disambiguated by behavioural context. Compared to the signalling of most other animals, great ape gestural repertoires are large. Because of this, and the relatively small number of intended meanings they achieve, ape gestures are redundant, with extensive overlaps in meaning. The great majority of gestures are innate, in the sense that the species’ biological inheritance includes the potential to develop each gestural form and use it for a specific range of purposes. Moreover, the phylogenetic origin of many gestures is relatively old, since gestures are extensively shared between different genera in the great ape family. Acquisition of an adult repertoire is a process of first exploring the innate species potential for many gestures and then gradual restriction to a final (active) repertoire that is much smaller. No evidence of syntactic structure has yet been detected.     

Transfer of self-control in black (Eulemur macaco) and brown (Eulemur fulvus) lemurs: choice of a less preferred food item under a reverse-reward contingency

When presented a choice between two food-type arrays of equivalent size under a reverse-reward contingency, black (Eulemur macaco) and brown (Eulemur fulvus) lemurs transposed their self-control abilities, acquired in a previous experiment, to significantly select the less-desired food item in order to gain access to the more desired one. However, when presented with the choice between two different food-type arrays in which the amount of the less desired food array was larger than the more desired one, large individual differences were revealed: Some subjects established a consistent rule favoring quality or quantity, whereas others exhibited various point of trade-off. These results show that lemurs seem to manage the task considering not only food quantity but also food quality.     

Time preferences in long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and humans (Homo sapiens)

Rosati et al. (Curr Biol 17(19):1663–1668, 2007) found in a self-control test in which choice was between a smaller, immediately delivered food and a larger, delayed food, that chimpanzees preferred the larger reward (self-control); humans, however, preferred the smaller reward (impulsivity). They attributed their results to a species difference in self-control. In Experiment 1, monkeys (long-tailed macaques) were exposed to a self-control task in two conditions: where the food was hidden under differently colored bowls and where it was visible. When these two conditions were compared, choice shifted from greater preference for the impulsive alternative in the hidden condition to greater preference for the self-control alternative in the visible condition. Additionally, in both conditions, preference shifted from self-control to impulsivity over sessions. These results were explained in terms of the reversed-contingency effect (a propensity to reach for more over less when rewards are visible) and not to a capacity for self-control. In Experiment 2, humans that demonstrated preference for more over less in choice preferred the impulsive alternative when choice to either alternative was followed by the same intertrial interval—a preference that accelerates trial rates relative to preference of the self-control alternative. When trial rates were equated so that neither choice accelerated session’s end, humans demonstrated self-control. These results suggest that Rosati et al.’s demonstration of impulsivity in humans was due to participants’ desire to minimize session time.     

Can brown lemurs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Eulemur fulvus</Emphasis>) learn to deceive a human competitor?

In the present study we asked whether lemurs could learn to manipulate information in order to deceive a human competitive trainer. Four brown lemurs were trained to communicate about the location of a hidden reward to a cooperative trainer, who rewarded the subject if he indicated the baited bowl. Next, a competitive trainer was introduced who kept the reward for himself if the subject indicated the baited bowl. In a first experiment, sessions were randomly assigned to be with either the cooperative or competitive trainer. No subject was able to show an efficient tactic with both trainers. In a second experiment, the participation of the two trainers was randomized across the trials for each session. When trials were mixed, one subject significantly chose baited location when interacting with the cooperative trainer, and reliably increased his choices of the unbaited location when presented with the competitive trainer. As with most other primate species tested under the same paradigm, associative learning may explain deceptive pointing by lemurs in this study.