The Interpretation of Anaphoric Noun Phrases Time Course, and Effects of Overspecificity

Two experiments investigated the interpretation of anaphoric noun phrases, and in particular those thatcould only be linked to their antecedents via knowledge-based inferences. The first experiment showed that much of the inferential processing was carried out as the anaphoric noun phrase was read, although there was some indication that inferential processing continued to the end of the clause. The second experiment attempted to establish why anaphoric noun phrases that are more specific than their antecedents cause problems. It showed that the difficulty did not lie in adding the extra information carried by the anaphor to the representation of the referent. Rather, we suggest, putting extra information in the anaphoric noun phrase disrupts the process of linking that noun phrase to its antecedent.     

Believability and syllogistic reasoning

In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the "filtering" of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an effect at the other two loci. In experiments 1 and 2 subjects drew their own conclusions from syllogisms that suggested believable or unbelievable ones. In the third experiment they evaluated conclusions that were presented to them. The data show that beliefs both affect the examination of alternative models and act as a filter on putative conclusions. We conclude by showing how some types of problem and some problem contents make the existence of alternative models more obvious than others.     

Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

Book reviews

Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A case study and implications. Oxford University Press. Pp. 187. ISBN 0-19-852129-4. £19.50.

Humphreys, G. W. & Riddoch, M. J. (1987). to see but not to see: A case study of visual agnosia. Hove and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. Pp. 124. ISBN 0-83677-064-9. £12.95.

Downing, J. A. (1988). Advances in psychology: Cognitive psychology and reading in the USSR. Amsterdam: North Holland; Elsevier Science Publishers. Pp. 471. ISBN 0-444-70374-8. $108.00.

John Beech & Ann Colley (Eds.) (1987). Cognitive approaches to reading. Chichester: John Wiley. Pp. xii + 315.

James Wertsch (Ed.) (1985). Culture, communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 379. ISBN 0-521-25214-8. £27.50 (Hardback).

Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press. Pp. xiii, 1-171. ISBN 0-262-06106-6.

Richardson, K. (1988). Understanding Psychology. Milton Keynes: The Open University Press. Pp. 114. ISBN 0-335-09842-8. Paperback £7.95.

Stanovich, Keith E. (Ed.) (1988). Children's reading and the development of phonological awareness. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Pp. 177. ISBN 0-8143-1909-2. $20.00.

Allport, A., MacKay, D.G., Prinz, W., & Scheerer, E. (Eds.), (1987). Language perception and production: Relationships between listening, speaking, reading, and writing. London: Academic Press. Pp. xiii + 497. ISBN 0-12-052750-2. £32.00

Light, L. L. & Burke, D. M. (eds.) (1988). Language, Memory and Aging. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 280. ISBN-0-521-32942-6. £27.50

Friedman, S.L., Scholnick, E.F., and Cocking, R. R. (1987). Bleuprints for thinking: The role of planing in cognitive development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xv + 559. ISBN 0-521-25605-4. £40.00.     

Implicit causality bias in English: a corpus of 300 verbs

This study provides implicit verb causality norms for a corpus of 305 English verbs. A web-based sentence completion study was conducted, with 96 respondents completing fragments such as “John liked Mary because...” The resulting bias scores are provided as supplementary material in the Psychonomic Society Archive, where we also present lexical and semantic verb features, such as the frequency, semantic class and emotional valence. Our results replicate those of previous studies with much smaller numbers of verbs and respondents. Novel effects of gender and its interaction with verb valence illustrate the type of issues that can be investigated using stable norms for a large number of verbs. The corpus will facilitate future studies in a range of areas, including psycholinguistics and social psychology.     

Doesn’t see,doesn’t know: is anticipatory looking really related to understanding or belief?

Clements and Perner (Cognitive Development, 9 (1994), 377–397) reported that children show understanding of a story character’s belief in their anticipatory looking responses before they show this in their answers to test questions. According to Clements and Perner the anticipatory looking responses provide evidence of implicit understanding of belief. This paper examines the possibility that the anticipatory looking measure is indicative of (a) children using a seeing = knowing rule, i.e. children linking not seeing with ignorance rather than a sensitivity to belief, or (b) a tendency to associate the protagonist with the left‐hand container. Thirty‐two children aged between 2 years 11 months and 4 years were told a false belief story similar to that used in Clements and Perner (1994) except that three containers were used instead of two. The protagonist first looks inside the middle box but then puts the object in the left‐hand box. In his absence, a second character moves the object unexpectedly to the right‐hand box. If children’s anticipatory looking was based on sensitivity to belief then they should have looked clearly to the left‐hand box. If it was based on an association bias or sensitivity to the character not knowing then they should have looked equally to the left‐hand and middle boxes. The results were consistent with the former prediction suggesting that children’s anticipatory looking responses may indeed be governed by an implicit sensitivity to belief.     

Selective Retention of Information about the Superficial Form of Text: Ellipses W ith Antecedents in Main and Subordinate Clauses

Elliptical verb phrases must be interpreted indirectly, using a representation of the surface form of nearby (usually preceding) text. We used this fact to demonstrate the different availability of superficial representations of the two clauses in main-subordinate pairs. The acceptability of a later ellipsis was reduced when it took its meaning from a main clause that was followed by a subordinate clause, as compared with other combinations. In addition, positive acceptability judgements were made more quickly (1) when the antecedent clause was subordinate, rather than main, suggesting that the superficial form of a subordinate clause is more important, and (2) when the antecedent was in the immediately preceding clause, rather than two clauses back. These results support the idea that the surface form of subordinate clauses is selectively retained until the corresponding main clause has been read, but the surface form of a main clause is not retained after it has been interpreted.