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Synthese - Veritism, the position that truth is necessary for epistemic acceptability, seems to be in tension with the observation that much of our best science is not, strictly speaking, true when... 相似文献
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Various scientific theories stand in a reductive relation to each other. In a recent article, we have argued that a generalized
version of the Nagel-Schaffner model (GNS) is the right account of this relation. In this article, we present a Bayesian analysis
of how GNS impacts on confirmation. We formalize the relation between the reducing and the reduced theory before and after
the reduction using Bayesian networks, and thereby show that, post-reduction, the two theories are confirmatory of each other.
We then ask when a purported reduction should be accepted on epistemic grounds. To do so, we compare the prior and posterior
probabilities of the conjunction of both theories before and after the reduction and ask how well each is confirmed by the
available evidence. 相似文献
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Models and fiction 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Roman Frigg 《Synthese》2010,172(2):251-268
Most scientific models are not physical objects, and this raises important questions. What sort of entity are models, what is truth in a model, and how do we learn about models? In this paper I argue that models share important aspects in common with literary fiction, and that therefore theories of fiction can be brought to bear on these questions. In particular, I argue that the pretence theory as developed by Walton (1990, Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge/MA) has the resources to answer these questions. I introduce this account, outline the answers that it offers, and develop a general picture of scientific modelling based on it. 相似文献
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We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of
intertheoretic reduction. The alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive
philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments. 相似文献
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Roman Frigg 《国际科学哲学研究》2003,17(1):43-57
The aim of this article is twofold. Recently, Lewis has presented an argument, now known as the "counting anomaly", that the spontaneous localization approach to quantum mechanics, suggested by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber, implies that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. I will take this argument as the starting point for a discussion of the property structure of realist collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics in general. At the end of this I present a proof of the fact that the composition principle, which holds true in standard quantum mechanics, fails in all realist collapse interpretations. On the basis of this result I reconsider the counting anomaly and show that what lies at the heart of the anomaly is the failure to appreciate the peculiarities of the property structure of such interpretations. Once this flaw is uncovered, the anomaly vanishes. 相似文献
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The philosophy of simulation: hot new issues or same old stew? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Computer simulations are an exciting tool that plays important roles in many scientific disciplines. This has attracted the
attention of a number of philosophers of science. The main tenor in this literature is that computer simulations not only
constitute interesting and powerful new science, but that they also raise a host of new philosophical issues. The protagonists in this debate claim no less than that simulations call into question our philosophical understanding
of scientific ontology, the epistemology and semantics of models and theories, and the relation between experimentation and
theorising, and submit that simulations demand a fundamentally new philosophy of science in many respects. The aim of this
paper is to critically evaluate these claims. Our conclusion will be sober. We argue that these claims are overblown and that
simulations, far from demanding a new metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and methodology, raise few if any new philosophical
problems. The philosophical problems that do come up in connection with simulations are not specific to simulations and most
of them are variants of problems that have been discussed in other contexts before.
An erratum to this article can be found at 相似文献
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