Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency

Abstract

Nietzsche believes that we do not know our own actions, nor their real motives. This belief, however, is but a consequence of his assuming a quite general skepticism about introspection. The main aim of this paper is to offer a reading of this last view, which I shall call the Inner Opacity (IO) view. In the first part of the paper I show that a strong motivation behind IO lies in Nietzsche’s claim that self-knowledge exploits the same set of cognitive capacities as well as the same folk-psychological framework involved in outward-directed mind-reading. In the second part I turn to Nietzsche’s view of agency and argue that he sees a fundamental discrepancy between the conscious attitudes we have introspective access to, on the one hand, and the subpersonal processes and states occurring at the unconscious level of the drives, on the other hand.     

Nietzsche's Pluralism about Consciousness

In this paper I argue that Nietzsche's view on consciousness is best captured by distinguishing different notions of consciousness. In other words, I propose that Nietzsche should be read as endorsing pluralism about consciousness. First, I consider the notion that is preeminent in his work and argue that the only kind of consciousness which may fit the characterization Nietzsche provides of this dominant notion is self-consciousness (^Sconsciousness). Second, I argue that in light of Nietzsche's treatment of perceptions and sensations we should conclude that he takes each of such state types to involve a specific kind of consciousness which differs from ^Sconsciousness. I label these two additional kinds of consciousness perceptual consciousness (^Pconsciousness) and qualitative consciousness (^Qconsciousness), respectively. I conclude the paper with some remarks on how, in Nietzsche's picture, these three different kinds of consciousness might relate.     

Max Scheler,cousin of disjunctivism

Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler’s case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide.     

An incomplete gallery: machines, cognition, and nonlinearities

In this communication, some issues related to the old but still open question, on how far the development of cognitive processing in artificial machines can go, are discussed. A selected gallery of images derived from laboratory experiments are presented. The incompleteness of the gallery is as that in the definition of what we mean as cognitive processing.     

An incomplete gallery: machines,cognition, and nonlinearities

In this communication, some issues related to the old but still open question, on how far the development of cognitive processing in artificial machines can go, are discussed. A selected gallery of images derived from laboratory experiments are presented. The incompleteness of the gallery is as that in the definition of what we mean as cognitive processing.     

The assessment of subjective visual vertical: comparison of two psychophysical paradigms and age-related performance

Perception of the subjective visual vertical (SVV) is usually assessed by asking to subjects, in complete darkness, to adjust the position of a luminous rod that is variably tilted (i.e., by the method of adjustment [ADJ]). Conversely, the two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) method requires subjects to categorize, as tilted either clockwise (CW) or counterclockwise (CCW), stimuli that are presented on a computer screen and are variably tilted from vertical. In this study, we aimed to compare the results of these two methods and investigate age-related effects on the SVV. SVV was assessed in 102 healthy individuals, 50 women and 52 men, with a mean age of 45.7 (range 20–91), using both ADJ (ten trials, initial 1°, 2°, 4°, 8°, or 12° bar tilts both CW and CCW) and 2AFC (120 stimuli with a 1°–32° variable tilt). Also, 50 of the subjects performed the ADJ test twice, with different bar lengths. We estimated bias and threshold for the two methods, and found that neither measure differed across the methods. Age was a significant predictor of threshold (2AFC, R ² = .141; ADJ, R ² = .190; p < .001), implying lower sensitivity with increasing age. Moreover, the ADJ method showed a significant increase of bias when the initial tilt was farthest from vertical, whereas the rod length was irrelevant. SVV measures obtained with the ADJ and 2AFC methods were comparable, but the latter measures were more resistant to artifacts that might affect the measurement. The lower sensitivity found in older persons may have an influence on their ability to interact with the environment and may contribute to impairment of postural control.     

What’s Going to Happen to Me? Prognosis in the Face of Uncertainty

Topoi - Reasoning in medicine requires the critical use of a clinical methodology whose validity must be evaluated as well as its limits. In the last decade, an increasing amount of evidence has...     

Collective intentionality and socially extended minds

There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner.     

Laboratory of functional neuroelectrical imaging and brain–computer interfacing at Fondazione Santa Lucia

The laboratory of functional neuroelectrical imaging and brain–computer interfacing at Fondazione Santa Lucia is based on the joint work of researchers with a bioengineering and clinical neurophysiology background. The activity is mainly devoted to two aims: the non-invasive investigation of the motor cortical function under physiological and pathological conditions, through the development of advanced processing methods of the electroencephalographic signals; the development of a real-time EEG-based brain–computer interface (BCI) and the study of its use as an aid to enhance (or even to allow) the functional independence of persons with different degrees of motor disability.