The child verbal competence effect in court: a comparative study of field investigative interviews of children in child sexual abuse cases

The purpose of this study is to compare field investigative interviews of children (FIIC) with three different legal outcomes in child sexual abuse cases: (i) insufficient evidence to proceed (IEP); (ii) convictions; or (iii) acquittals by the court. One hundred FIIC were divided into one of the three outcome possibilities. Amongst the female interviewees older than 10 years, there were no cases of acquittals and the convicted cases were over-represented. The children's response to open questions was found to be the main difference between the three FIIC outcomes. The responses to these open questions were 1.9 and 2.3 times longer in the convicted cases compared to acquittals and IEP. Possible explanations for the result are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Medical ethics in Norway: Modern medicine — Traditional morality

In Norway, by tradition a Lutheran country, the puritan ethics of a “moral minority” has a strong influence on the development and manifestations of medical ethics. Those who exert this influence are found primarily among politicians, the clergy, and, last but certainly not least, among nurses and doctors. The focus of interest is not so much on problems of bioethical moral theory or the teaching of bioethics to students, but very much on attitudes and policies with regard to substantive issues traditionally regarded in Norway as burning bioethical issues, such as: medical research ethics, abortion, prenatal diagnosis, euthanasia, definitions of death, and reproductive technologies.     

Premature conclusions about the signal-to-noise ratio in structural equation modeling research: A commentary on Yuan and Fang (2023)

In a recent article published in this journal, Yuan and Fang (British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 2023) suggest comparing structural equation modeling (SEM), also known as covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM), estimated by normal-distribution-based maximum likelihood (NML), to regression analysis with (weighted) composites estimated by least squares (LS) in terms of their signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). They summarize their findings in the statement that “[c]ontrary to the common belief that CB-SEM is the preferred method for the analysis of observational data, this article shows that regression analysis via weighted composites yields parameter estimates with much smaller standard errors, and thus corresponds to greater values of the [SNR].” In our commentary, we show that Yuan and Fang have made several incorrect assumptions and claims. Consequently, we recommend that empirical researchers not base their methodological choice regarding CB-SEM and regression analysis with composites on the findings of Yuan and Fang as these findings are premature and require further research.     

Digital daydreaming: Introducing the spontaneous smartphone checking scale

Smartphones are a ubiquitous part of many people's lives, but little is known about their impact on everyday thought processes. Here we introduce the spontaneous smartphone checking scale (SSCS)—which measures the tendency to direct attention toward one's smartphone, unpreceded by external prompts (e.g., notifications, or alerts) and with no specific conscious goal in mind, as a parallel to mind-wandering directed toward internal thoughts. The SSCS showed good psychometric properties and construct validity. It separated from measures of daydreaming and mind-wandering by not loading on dimensions related to self-consciousness, reflection, and rumination, but instead loading highly on a factor associated with other aspects of digital communication and concerns about public appearance on social media. This suggests that spontaneous smartphone checking serves different mental and social functions than internally generated spontaneous thought processes. We discuss possible long-term effects of spontaneous smartphone checking taking up time for internally generated spontaneous thoughts.     

The knower and the known

This paper is a presentation and discussion of Spinoza's view on the knower, or the mind, as an agent. The knower is on his view to be regarded as an active or generative complex cognitive experience. Imagination, reason and intuition are the cognitive principles. On account of their intrinsic relation to “the first law of nature”, that of selfpreservation, together with the thesis of the mind as constituted by ideas or knowledge, these principles function at the same time as moral principles. Consequently, it makes sense to speak of an individual's moral attitude toward everything be knows. A discussion of imagination, reason and intuition mainly as cognitive principles is followed by some concluding remarks on the cognitive and moral relation between human beings: To know another human being is to know his knowledge. The moral attitude of individuals to each other is a function of their mutual knowledge of knowledge.     

Is visual attention automatically attracted by one’s own name?

Subjects were presented with briefly exposed visual displays of words that were common first names with a length of four to six letters. In the main experiment, each display consisted of four words: two names shown in red and two shown in white. The subject’s task was to report the red names (targets), but ignore the white ones (distractors). On some trials the subject’s own name appeared as a display item (target or distractor). Presentation of the subject’s name as a distractor caused no more interference with report of targets than did presentation of other names as distractors. Apparently, visual attention was not automatically attracted by the subject’s own name.     

Referenzsemantik in der Partnermodellierung

How can we explain that an assertion on something perceived can be understood in the same manner by somebody who cannot perceive that scene? This problem bases the interest in computational linguistics in how listener modeling could possibly be harmonized with reference semantics. Mental images substituting real perception appear as a way out. The architecture of the listener model has to be adapted to the creation and use of such pictorial data structures. Furthermore, the relation between the latter and a verbal (i. e., propositional) representation must be understood. The resulting architecture of a listener model with reference semantics can be employed to solve communicational problems from three general classes in a better way, as is demonstrated by an example implementation.     

Reply to William R. Ferrell’s paper “A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination”

Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model and our subjective distance model belong to the same family of Thurstonial models. The subjective distance model is limited to sensory discrimination with the method of constant stimuli and rooted in such notions as discriminal dispersion and sense distance. Ferrell’s model is intended to be wider in scope and to apply to both cognitive and sensory tasks. Both models need supplementary assumptions to predict calibration phenomena. The point of departure for us is the fact that the model predicts under-confidence under “guessing” and the empirical finding that people are about 100% correct when they report “absolutely certain.” Ferrell makes assumptions about cutoffs on the decision variable. The respondent is assumed to adjust or not adjust cutoffs according to “cues to difficulty.” We disagree with Ferrell’s claim that the hard-easy effect is explained by the respondent’s failure to adjust cutoffs sufficiently when there is a change in level of difficulty, and argue that this amounts to little more than a translation of the hard-easy effect into the lingua of Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model. Our argument is that the hard-easy effect is a consequence of the post hoc division of items according to solution probability. In addition, error variance may contribute to regression effects that enlarge the hard-easy effect. Finally, in contrast to Ferrell’s position, we regard inference (cognitive uncertainty) and discrimination (sensory uncertainty) as different psychological processes. An understanding of calibration in these two areas requires separate models.