Theoretical functions in physical science

The aim of this paper is to give an account of theoreticity which captures the preanalytic conception of a theoretical function, which is precise and yet which expresses what is significant about theoretical functions. The point of departure for this account is a recent discussion of the topic by Balzer and Moulines. On the basis of criticism of this discussion and on the basis of an examination of laboratory measurement, an account of theoreticity is proposed.I am grateful to the members of the philosophy seminar at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, to Barbara Davidson and particularly to Wolfgang Balzer and this journal's referee for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Quantities in quantum mechanics

The problem of the failure of value definiteness (VD) for the idea of quantity in quantum mechanics is stated, and what VD is and how it fails is explained. An account of quantity, called BP, is outlined and used as a basis for discussing the problem. Several proposals are canvassed in view of, respectively, Forrest's indeterminate particle speculation, the "standard" interpretation of quantum mechanics and Bub's modal interpretation.     

Proportionality, Just War Theory and Weapons Innovation

Just wars are supposed to be proportional responses to aggression: the costs of war must not greatly exceed the benefits. This proportionality principle raises a corresponding ‘interpretation problem’: what are the costs and benefits of war, how are they to be determined, and a ‘measurement problem’: how are costs and benefits to be balanced? And it raises a problem about scope: how far into the future do the states of affairs to be measured stretch? It is argued here that weapons innovation always introduces costs, and that these costs cannot be determined in advance of going to war. Three examples, the atomic bomb, the AK-47 and the ancient Greek catapult, are given as examples. It is therefore argued that the proportionality principle is inapplicable prospectively. Some replies to the argument are discussed and rejected. Some more general defences of the proportionality principle are considered and also rejected. Finally, the significance of the argument for Just War Theory as a whole is discussed.     

A Note on the Definition of “Dual Use”

While there has been much interest in this topic, no generally accepted definition of dual use has been forthcoming. As a contribution to this issue, it is maintained that three related kinds of things comprise the category of dual use: research, technologies and artefacts. In regard to all three kinds, difficulties are identified in making clear distinctions between those that are and are not dual use. It is suggested that our classification should take account of actual capacities and willingness to make use of these objects for ‘bad ends’ and not the mere possibility that this could be done, and here three ‘contextual factors’ are identified. A (provisional) definition is proposed that takes account of threats and risks.     

Relation of perceived health with psychosocial variables in elderly osteoarthritis patients

Self-perceived health is related to physical health status and frequently assessed in research on elderly persons. The association of perceived health with sociodemographic, psychological, social functioning, and physical functioning variables was examined in 86 elderly osteoarthritis patients. Psychological well-being (especially depression and anxiety), size of household, physical activity, and education were the most important predictors of self-perceived health (R = .70). Poor perceived health may suggest problems in elderly patients in several psychosocial areas, but good perceived health does not rule out psychosocial problems.     

Explanation and the quantum state

This paper argues that there are good reasons to adopt a non‐reductive account of states when it comes to quantum mechanics. That is to say, it is argued that there are advantages to thinking about states as sui generis, as reducible to classes of values of quantities, when it comes to the quantum domain. One reason for holding this view is that it seems to improve the prospects for explanation. In more detail, it is argued that there is an “explanatory shortfall” in the quantum domain owing to the failure of value definiteness. To remedy this situation, two proposals are put forward about the nature of the quantum state: Proposal A, that the quantum state is the only first‐order property of quantum systems, Proposal B, that the quantum state is one first‐order property among many. These proposals seem equally good.