Capacity and contextual constraints on product activation: Evidence from task-irrelevant fact retrieval

Three experiments tested the limiting conditions of multiplication facts retrieval in a number-matching task (LeFevre, Bisanz, & Mrkonjic, 1988). By presenting two digits as cue and by requiring participants to decide whether a subsequent numerical target had been present in the pair, we found interference when the target coincided with the product of the cue digits. This was evidence for obligatory activation of multiplication facts. Also, we showed that multiplication facts retrieval occurred even in the absence of any arithmetic context (i.e., a multiplication sign between the cue digits) and did not require processing resources (i.e., the process met the capacity criterion of automaticity; Jonides, 1981), whereas manipulation of the spatial relation between the two operands (cue digits) negatively affected retrieval. The present work appears to be unique in the context of previous similar studies on mental calculation, which invariably adopted an arithmetic task as the primary demand. We identify this difference as the reason for the failure of all previous studies in revealing independence of multiplication facts from attentional resources. Furthermore, we suggest the application of a contextual definition of automaticity to this kind of retrieval, given the fact that it might depend both on association strength and on contextual setting variables.     

The Embodied Penman: Effector‐Specific Motor–Language Integration During Handwriting

Several studies have illuminated how processing manual action verbs (MaVs) affects the programming or execution of concurrent hand movements. Here, to circumvent key confounds in extant designs, we conducted the first assessment of motor–language integration during handwriting—a task in which linguistic and motoric processes are co‐substantiated. Participants copied MaVs, non‐manual action verbs, and non‐action verbs as we collected measures of motor programming and motor execution. Programming latencies were similar across conditions, but execution was faster for MaVs than for the other categories, regardless of whether word meanings were accessed implicitly or explicitly. In line with the Hand‐Action‐Network Dynamic Language Embodiment (HANDLE) model, such findings suggest that effector‐congruent verbs can prime manual movements even during highly automatized tasks in which motoric and verbal processes are naturally intertwined. Our paradigm opens new avenues for fine‐grained explorations of embodied language processes.     

Paradoxes of moral reparation: Deontic foci vs. circumstances

Conclusion The distinction between deontic focus and deontic circumstance is obvious and essential to the understanding of our reasonings about obligations, permissions, rights, and wrongs. Here we have dealt with the basics. These basics must be developed into a full deontic logic. Fortunately, such a comprehensive deontic logic that includes identity, quantification over individuals, and quantification over properties has already been proposed, and applied to the interpretation of legal texts. It should be an excellent basis for Feldman's intriguing and promising idea of world utilitarianism.     

Optic aphasia, optic apraxia, and loss of dreaming

A 47-year-old man with a left temporo-occipital infarct in the area of the posterior cerebral artery is presented. The neuropsychological examination did not reveal aphasia or gross mental deficits. The patient presented with alexia without agraphia, color agnosia, but few visual perceptual deficits. The main impairment was in confrontation naming; he was incapable of naming objects and pictures, not from lack of recognition (excluding visual agnosia) but from lack of access to the appropriate word (optic aphasia). The patient also exhibited a deficit in the evocation of gesture from the visual presentation of an object (optic apraxia) and a difficulty in "conjuring up" visual images of objects (impaired visual imagery) and loss of dreams. The fundamental deficit of this patient is tentatively explained in terms of visuoverbal and visuogestural disconnection and a deficit of mental imagery.     

Tomberlin,Frege, and Guise theory: A note on the methodology of dia-philosophical comparisons

Conclusion Tomberlin's comparative claims about the superiority of the De Dicto-De Re Account over Guise Theory concerning referential opacity are abortively premature. Nevertheless, he may be right. Yet the order of the day is to develop the De Re-De Dicto Account to the hilt. Not until this is done can any useful dia-philosophical comparison of the two theories yield any fruit. My deep desire is, of course, for the sheer enjoyment of experiencing the world from the perspective of each of the two views, indeed, from the perspective of other views — e.g., Frege's Sense/Referent Theory — that can be developed to the same data-encompassing stage as Guise Theory.