How much self-presentation behavior do applicants from the United Arab Emirates exhibit?

Applicants from different cultures vary in their self-presentation behavior during job interviews. This study investigates self-presentation behavior in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the second largest economy in the Arab world. Specifically, it examines self-presentation behavior of applicants from the UAE and compares it to the behavior of American, European, and Chinese applicants from previous studies. The randomized response technique was used to gather self-presentation prevalence data of 111 UAE applicants regarding self-presentation behavior in their last job interview. Prevalence rates were lower than those from the United States and from China but higher than those from Iceland and from Switzerland. Results indicate that though UAE culture values modesty, UAE applicants still engage in distinct self-presentation behavior.     

Medical ethics in Norway: Modern medicine — Traditional morality

In Norway, by tradition a Lutheran country, the puritan ethics of a “moral minority” has a strong influence on the development and manifestations of medical ethics. Those who exert this influence are found primarily among politicians, the clergy, and, last but certainly not least, among nurses and doctors. The focus of interest is not so much on problems of bioethical moral theory or the teaching of bioethics to students, but very much on attitudes and policies with regard to substantive issues traditionally regarded in Norway as burning bioethical issues, such as: medical research ethics, abortion, prenatal diagnosis, euthanasia, definitions of death, and reproductive technologies.     

Beyond principal component analysis: A trilinear decomposition model and least squares estimation

The paper derives sufficient conditions for the consistency and asymptotic normality of the least squares estimator of a trilinear decomposition model for multiway data analysis.     

On the concept of language in some recent theories of meaning

The work on this paper was done in the research project V ra begrepp om spr k supported byHumanistisk-samhälls-vetenskapliga forskningsr det. I am indebted to Per Martin-Löf, Hans Ruin, Pär Segerdahl, and Sven Öhman for valuable comments on a previous version of this paper. Thanks to the comments of the anonymous referee I was able to improve some formulations in the paper.     

The relationship between recognition and cued recall in memory of enacted and nonenacted information

Summary An experiment was conducted to determine whether the processes underlying memory for enacted and nonenacted events are the same or different. The experimental paradigm used was that of recognition failure of recallable information. At study subjects were given verbal commands (e.g., break the match, roll the ball), that they were to remember or enact and remember. At test subjects were first asked to recognize the noun in each command in the absence of the verb and then to recall the noun with the verb present as cue. Half the subjects were given the two tests in the reverse order. The results demonstrate that enactment and nonenactment differ with respect to the degree of dependence/independence between recognition and recall. In the enactment condition recognition and cued recall are completely independent and in the nonenactment condition they are almost completely dependent.     

Differential predictability of preferences and choices

A combined multi-attribute utility and expectancy-value model has repeatedly been found to yield a worse fit to choices than to preference ratings. The present study investigated two possible explanations for this finding. First, people's belief-value structures may change in the choice task as they try to find the best alternative. Second, a difficult choice task may cause the decision maker to use simplifying heuristics. In the first of two experiments, subjective belief-value structures were measured on two occasions separated by about one week. Immediately before the second measurement, different groups of subjects performed a choice task, gave preference ratings, or performed a control task. The results did not support an interpretation of the greater difficulty of predicting choices in terms of changes in belief-value structures. However, the notion of simplifying heuristics received support by the finding that adopting simpler versions of the original model improved the predictions of the choices. In the second experiment, beliefs were measured immediately before or after each of a series of choices or preference ratings. The results indicated that although temporary changes in beliefs may occur, they can hardly provide a full account of the differential predictability of preferences and choices.