On Assumptions of, Relations between, and Evaluations of Some Process Dissociation Measurement Models

In this article, we analyze both M. J. Wainwright and E. M. Reingold's (1996) view of the process dissociation measurement models presented by A. Buchner, E. Erdfelder, and B. Vaterrodt-Plunnecke (1995) and their suggestions on that topic. This analysis reveals a number of problems in Wainwright and Reingold's approach. Some of these problems are more subtle than others, but they are nevertheless consequential. Thus, researchers working with the process dissociation procedure should be aware of these problems.     

Word frequency of irrelevant speech distractors affects serial recall

In this study, participants memorized frequent or rare target words in silence or while ignoring frequent or rare distractor words. Distractor words impaired recall performance, but low-frequency distractor words caused more impairment than did high-frequency distractor words. We demonstrate how to solve the identifiability problem for Schweickert's (1993) multinomial processing tree model of immediate recall, and then use this model to show that irrelevant speech affected both the probability with which intact target word representations were available for serial recall and the probability of successful reconstruction of item identities based on degraded short-term memory traces. However, the type of irrelevant speech--low-versus high-frequency words--selectively affected the probability of intact target word representations. These results are consistent with an explanation of the irrelevant speech effect within the framework proposed by Cowan (1995), and they pose problems for other explanations of the irrelevant speech effect. The analyses also confirm the validity of Schweickert's process model.     

Hindsight bias in political elections

Two studies on political hindsight bias were conducted on the occasions of the German parliament election in 1998 and the Nordrhein-Westfalen state parliament election in 2000. In both studies, participants predicted the percentage of votes for several political parties and recalled these predictions after the election. The observed hindsight effects were stronger than those found in any prior study on political elections (using percentage of votes as the dependent variable). We argue that the length of the retention interval between original judgement and recollection is mainly responsible for this difference. In our second study, we investigated possible artifacts in political hindsight biases using a control-group design where half of the participants recalled their predictions shortly before or after the election. Hindsight bias was preserved, reinforcing the results of earlier studies with non-control-group designs. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the hindsight experience (in political judgement and in general) actually consists of three different, partly independent components.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

The proximate memory mechanism underlying the survival-processing effect: Richness of encoding or interactive imagery?

Nairne and collaborators showed that assessing the relevance of words in the context of an imagined survival scenario boosts memory for these words. Although this survival-processing advantage has attracted a considerable amount of research, little is known about the proximate memory mechanism mediating this effect. Recently, Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) argued that it is not survival processing itself that facilitates recall but rather the richness and distinctiveness of encoding that is triggered by the survival-processing task. Alternatively, however, it is also conceivable that survival processing fosters interactive imagery, a process known to improve associative learning. To test these explanations we compared relevance-rating and interactive imagery tasks for survival and control scenarios. Results show that the survival advantage replicates in the relevance-rating condition but vanishes in the interactive imagery condition. This refutes the interactive imagery explanation and corroborates the richness-of-encoding hypothesis of the survival-processing effect.     

Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the representation of truth and falsity in human memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both models presume that during information processing a mental representation of the information is stored along with a tag indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model, true information receives a “true” tag and false information receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two source memory experiments in which participants studied true and false trivia statements from three different sources differing in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and 50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed about the source credibility prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this precue group showed improved source memory for both true and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a 20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.     

G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social,behavioral, and biomedical sciences

G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) was designed as a general stand-alone power analysis program for statistical tests commonly used in social and behavioral research. G*Power 3 is a major extension of, and improvement over, the previous versions. It runs on widely used computer platforms (i.e., Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Mac OS X 10.4) and covers many different statistical tests of thet, F, and χ₂ test families. In addition, it includes power analyses forz tests and some exact tests. G*Power 3 provides improved effect size calculators and graphic options, supports both distribution-based and design-based input modes, and offers all types of power analyses in which users might be interested. Like its predecessors, G*Power 3 is free.     

Determ inants of Positive and Negative Generation Effects in Free Recall

Better retention of self-produced as opposed to experimenter-presented material is called generation effect ; the reverse phenomenon is the negative generation effect. Both are found in intentional-learning experiments in which generating versus reading is manipulated between subjects. The present article presents an overview of those findings and aims at clarifying the conditions under which these effects emerge. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that if cuetarget relations are manipulated within one list, a negative generation effect in free recall can be obtained for all items, no matter which cue-target relation they bear. In Experiment 3, cue-target relations were manipulated between lists. Here, a negative generation effect in free recall was found only in lists in which items were cued with words that mismatched the intertarget relations, whereas a positive generation effect was observed in those lists in which the generation cues matched the inter-target relations. A subsequent cued-recall test demonstrated that in cases of mismatch of relations, participants in the generate condition process cue-target relations at the expense of inter-target relations. The three-factor theory can be integrated with the task-demand account in a transfer-appropriate processing framework to accommodate these findings.     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias.