Nonconscious goal pursuit in novel environments: the case of implicit learning

Is nonconscious goal pursuit useful in novel environments? The prevalent view of automaticity and control implies that an unconscious mode of goal pursuit can only reproduce formerly learned actions, and therefore that its usefulness in novel environments is very limited. Our results demonstrate that this conclusion is not always warranted, as nonconscious goal pursuit facilitated participants' learning of the structure of completely novel environments. Specifically, two experiments, using markedly different implicit-learning paradigms, demonstrated facilitation of implicit learning when the goal of achievement was primed. We propose that nonconscious goal pursuit can facilitate not only reproductive operations, but also productive ones, and that implicit learning is sensitive to the organism's nonconscious goals.     

Motivation in Mental Accessibility: Relevance Of A Representation (ROAR) as a New Framework

The notion of accessibility of mental representations has been invaluable in explaining and predicting human thought and action. Focusing on social cognition, we review the large corpus of data that has accumulated since the first models of mental activation dynamics were outlined. We then outline a framework that we call Relevance of a Representation (or ROAR for short), the main tenant of which is that not all stimulated representations are in fact activated (i.e., influence thought and action processes). More specifically, we propose that the degree to which a representation is available to processes of thought and action is a function of that representation's motivational relevance. We end by demonstrating how the framework enables re-addressing the notions of accessibility, automaticity and selective attention.     

Relevance-based processing: Little role for task-relevant expectations

This study examined the role of advance expectations in generating relevance-based selection, using a version of cognitive “blindness” that is driven solely by task relevance. With this irrelevance-induced blindness, participants often fail to report a feature of an irrelevant stimulus, even though the levels of perceptual and cognitive load are minimal (i.e., capacity limitations are not met). Hence, with this phenomenon, selection is based solely on task relevance. In two experiments, we examined such relevance-based selection with a new paradigm in which the participants had to report the location of an object appearing on one of two rings. Critically, while in Experiment 1 the participants could form advance expectations regarding the (ir) relevant stimuli, because the location of the relevant ring and the shape and color of the relevant object were known in advance, in Experiment 2 no concrete advance expectations could be formed. This was established by varying randomly, from trial to trial, the shape, color, and location of relevant and irrelevant stimuli. We found strong irrelevance-induced blindness in both experiments, regardless of whether or not advance expectations were formed. These findings suggest that advance expectations, at least with regard to the task-relevant stimulus’ location shape or color, are not necessary for irrelevance-induced blindness to occur; more generally, this implies that such expectations do not play a critical role in selection processes that are based solely on task relevance. We further discuss these findings in the context of Garnerian and Posnerian selection, and their relationship to visual awareness.