On the scholastic or Aristotelian roots of “intentionality” in Brentano

The early Brentano identifies intentionality with intentional inexistence, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano.     

Instructions and reinforcement in the observing behavior of adults and children

Observing responses of college students and children of different ages (4 to 5, 9 to 10, and 13 to 14 years) were studied using two-component schedules of reinforcement. Different frequencies or numbers of points were given in the components and points were backed by either money or instructions about getting points (e.g., “points are for the experimenter's information only”). Stimuli that were either correlated or uncorrelated with the components were contingent on presses on either of two concurrently available levers (observing responses). In each of three experiments, preferences for stimuli were consistent with the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing but inconsistent with the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis. Stimulus preferences were established, eliminated, or reversed by instructions about the significance of getting points not backed with money. Instructions to in effect ignore points with no monetary value eliminated stimulus preference provided that money was not associated with points in other conditions for the same subjects. Stimulus preferences were otherwise independent of monetary point value. Instructions that described reinforcement contingencies promoted more rapid adjustment to the contingencies than occurred without them, and preferences were less variable across sessions within subjects and were on the average more extreme. Although some results involving absolute rates of observing depended upon the age of subjects, stimulus preferences did not. The data suggest that the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing has considerable generality for humans in choice procedures in the laboratory. That monetary value of points did not affect preferences in a graded fashion is consistent with versions of the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis which emphasize reduction in delay to reinforcement over other reinforcement parameters.     

“It's wrong to relax,you have to be on the go,go, go,all the time”: Emotional transformation in a case of emotion-focused therapy for generalised anxiety disorder

Generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) is a highly prevalent, chronic and impairing disorder. The aim of this study was to qualitatively describe the transformation in emotional processing across 16 sessions of a successful emotion-focused therapy (EFT) treatment for GAD. A theoretical framework derived from the EFT model of in-session emotional transformation proposed by Pascual-Leone and Greenberg was used as the basis for qualitative analysis. Additionally, the Classification of Affective Meaning States, the Client-Expressed Arousal Scale-III and the Client Emotional Productivity Scale-Revised were utilised by observer–raters to classify moment-by-moment shifts in client affective-meaning states, emotional arousal and emotional productivity. Results supported the emotion transformation model. The client presented in a state of poorly differentiated but highly aroused distress provoked by identifiable interpersonal and intrapersonal triggers. Emotional and behavioural avoidance provoked by fear of pain was evident. Accessing core pain and responding to attendant needs with compassion and protective anger was shown to facilitate the higher order emotional processing states of grief, relief and agency. Implications are proposed, including that addressing core emotional vulnerability may be a critical intervention in the successful treatment of GAD.     

Judged Person Dangerousness as Weighted Averaging 1

This article reports two experiments requiring subjective evaluative judgments of the potential dangerousness of hypothetical persons. The research operationally fits the paradigm for the study of personality impression formation, and seeks to illuminate the processes by which two offenses combine to evoke a net judgment of dangerousness. The theoretical framework and philosophy adopted is Anderson's information integration and functional measurement theory. In Study 1, all paired combinations of 10 distinctive crimes were each presented as having been committed by the same person on two separate occasions. Subjects judged overall offender dangerousness. In Study 2, judgments of dangerousness were made when the time purportedly elapsing between two crimes was systematically varied over several ranges of up to 41 years. Three key findings emerged. First, judgments of dangerousness result from an averaging process. This result yields paradoxical implications having considerable pragmatic significance. Second, judgments of dangerousness following two sequential criminal acts (one of high and one of low seriousness) are consistently higher when the high seriousness one is the second crime. Third, with certain qualifications discussed in the text, a serious earlier crime appears to elicit an approximately constant magnitude of judged present dangerousness no matter how long ago it was perpetrated. This result implies that subjects infer considerable permanence of criminal predilection to those who have committed a serious crime in the past.     

AN EXPERIENTIALLY DERIVED BASE-RATE ERROR IN HUMANS

Abstract— Two experiments tested college students in a delayed matching-to-sample procedure designed to explore how multiple competitive sources of control interact in determining choice behavior. The primary sources of potential control were the frequency with which each of two colors was correct (base rates) and the accuracy of a sample in predicting the correct choice (accuracy rate). In one experiment, subjects ignored the base rates, and therefore made nonoptimal choices. These results mimicked the well-known base-rate error found in verbal responses to questions. In a second experiment, manipulations to increase subjects' motivation did not alleviate the error significantly. Together, these results suggest that the base-rate error may represent a broad behavioral pattern not restricted to verbal arenas. The results are compared with previous attempts to reconcile behavioral and cognitive lines of experimentation.