The illusion of conscious experience

Synthese - Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely...     

Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem

Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion.     

Context dependence in visual feature processing

Summary Dependence in visual feature processing was studied with two identification experiments using briefly exposed stimuli. The basic stimuli consisted of two orthogonal line segments which formed either one of the four angles of a square, and the subject had to identify the location of the horizontal and vertical line segment making up a stimulus. In the first experiment, the two orthogonal line segments were sometimes separated by a gap. In the second experiment, either a 45° diagonal or a 135° diagonal or both were added to the right angles. With the observed response frequencies two forms of independence in feature detection were tested. Feature detection is called state independent if the detection of a feature is independent of the detection of another feature. According to context independence the detection of a feature is independent of the orientation and location of other features in the stimulus. Feature detection was shown to be context dependent whereas the hypothesis of state independence was not rejected, and state independence was unrelated to the size of the gap between the two orthogonal line segments in the first experiment. It was argued that the context effects obtained (context dependence) had occurred early in processing during the automatic activation of representational units corresponding to features before controlled search, interpretation and decision processes became involved.