Mind and Function in Animal Communication

Functional hypotheses about animal signalling often refer to mental states of the sender or the receiver. Mental states are functional categorizations of neurophysiological states. Functional questions about animal signals are intertwined with causal questions. This interrelationship is illustrated in regard to avian distraction displays. In purposive signalling, the sender has a goal of influencing the behavior of the receiver. Purposive signalling is innovative if the sender's goal is unrelated to the biological function of the signal. This may be the case in some instances of false alarm calling. Biological functionalism differs from philosophical functionalism in its concept of identity and in the specification of relevant inputs and outputs. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Holy Spirit and Unity: Getting out of the Way of Christ

This article argues for a limited pneumatological definition of Christian unity, in favor of a more exclusive christological explanation. It traces some of the theological problems associated with tying Christian unity too closely with the Holy Spirit, by examining the works of three near‐contemporary seventeenth‐century theologians, Bossuet, Baxter and Owen. The pneumatological ‘expansionism’ in each of these writers, still common in contemporary discussions of ecclesial unity, are not only counterproductive but obscure the specific kinds of charismatic gifting demanded by Christian reconciliation.     

The inheritance of Unitatis Redintegratio: critical questions for Anglicans

Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogues have failed to gain practical traction over the past 50 years, and relations between the two groups may well have gone backwards, despite the important opening provided by Unitatis Redintegratio. This article offers an overview of some of the demographic and political reasons for the failure of dialogical ‘reception’, as well as offering some alternative paths forward, based on elements within the decree itself, especially as underlined by Pope John Paul II.     

DIRECTED ACTION AND ANIMAL COMMUNICATION

Human action theory, with its emphasis on intentions and reasons, does little to enhance our understanding of the actions of nonhuman animals. Many animal (and human) actions are directed to objects in the world, including other animals. The notion of directedness can be analysed without attributing intentions or reasons to the agent. An action is directed to object X if and only if: (1) the agent singles out X, either by orientation or by selective performance of the action in the presence of X; (2) the agent recognizes X as a suitable object; and (3) the goal of the action is that X should be in a certain relation to the agent or to some other object. The goal of an action is not necessarily attributable to the agent as the agent's goal in acting. Moreover, an agent can have a goal in acting without understanding how the action achieves the goal. The usefulness of the concept of directed action in the study of animal communication is illustrated with examples from the recent ethological literature.