Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

Empirically based assessment of competence to stand trial: Instrument development and preliminary findings

An instrument was designed to assist mental health professionals in objectively assessing competence to stand trial. Items were empirically derived based on input from multidisciplinary teams of mental health professionals experienced in working with forensic patients in a state hospital. Procedures were adapted from Goldfried and D'Zurella's five-stage behavioral-analytic model for the assessment of social competence. The resulting 15-item audiotaped scale assessed both legal and social competence based on reported responding in jail, in interactions with lawyers, and in the courtroom. Interrater reliability on scoring of responses ranged from .68–.96. High correlations between social and legal competence (.56–.82) demonstrated the likelihood of overlap of these constructs and the importance of directly addressing both. A pilot intervention program was designed from the instrument and implemented with three forensic patients. Failure to demonstrate change in these subjects is briefly discussed, and recommendations for future efforts in this area are made.     

Are curmudgeon personality scales resistant to response distortion?

Curmudgeon personality, which is assessed by having participants evaluate a heterogeneous set of attitude objects, provides an applied value beyond that of more established personality traits. Recent research, for instance, suggests that curmudgeon personality is distinct from the Five Factor Model personality traits and that it predicts unique variance in important criteria, such as job attitudes and well-being. In the current paper we contribute to this literature by testing an explanation of how curmudgeon personality is distinct from other traits—their potential resistance to response distortion. We estimated response distortion for scales of curmudgeon personality and FFM traits across two quasi-experimental studies. As expected, the score shifts between nonapplicant and applicant conditions were smaller for scales of curmudgeon personality compared to scales of emotional stability and conscientiousness. We argue that curmudgeon personality scales may be more resistant to response distortion than are measures of other traits because curmudgeon personality items are semi-implicit and lack an obvious desirable response. The resistance to response distortion should serve as a call to future researchers to test the criterion validity of curmudgeon personality in regard to performance criteria.     

Mini-Review; Stress Genes: An Introductory Overview

Molecular sequence data, made available in the last 15 years or so, have led to the classification of living cells into three phylogenetic domains: Bacteria, Archaea, and Eucarya. All the organisms that have been tested belonging to either domain were capable of mounting a stress response with essentially the same characteristics, regardless of the stressor. The protagonists in the cell's stress response are the stress genes and their protein products. Some of the latter are molecular chaperones. Under physiological conditions, these chaperones aid other cellular proteins to fold properly and achieve a native -functional- configuration, and to translocate from the place of synthesis to the cell's locale in which they will operate. In a stressed cell, the stress proteins that are chaperones protect other molecules from denaturation and help those partially damaged to regain a functional configuration. Thus, cell death is avoided and recovery is enhanced. The study of stress genes and proteins has progressed considerably in organisms belonging to the domains Bacteria and Eucarya. Less is known about the archaeal stress genes. Here, research with an organism from the Archaea is discussed, focusing on the stress genes of the hsp70 (dnaK) locus. Future perspectives for basic and applied research within the health sciences and biotechnology industries are presented.     

Making sense of ‘on denoting’

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided.     

Calibration of probability assessments by professional blackjack dealers, statistical experts, and lay people

The question addressed in this study is whether experts are better calibrated than lay people. We investigated how well people are calibrated when they assess the probabilities of card combinations in the game of blackjack. Three groups of subjects were used: professional dealers, statistical experts, and control subjects. The results showed that experience and statistical expertise do not make people better calibrated in this task. It is argued that the concept of calibration is not wholly appropriate to describe the obtained deviations from the normatively correct responses. This is illustrated by a discriminant analysis performed on the signed deviation scores, which resulted in an almost perfect separation of the three groups, although they were overlapping with respect to calibration.