The Generality Problem for Reliabilism

Philosophical Studies -     

Factual Evidence without Knowledge

A central function of our evidence is to constrain the epistemic rationality of our propositional attitudes. Our knowledge does this. That fact supports Timothy Williamson's contention that our evidence is identical to our knowledge, ‘E=K’. But it is argued here that some true propositions are evidence without being known. Some of them cannot be known; others are contingently not known. Propositions play the rational role of evidence whenever they are clearly true, whether or not they are known.     

Typing Problems

Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.     

Vindicating the Absent Qualia Objection

Metaphysical functionalism holds that the nature of the mental is its functional role. Proponents of the absent qualia objection to functionalism assert that mental states with essential phenomenal qualities might have had functional duplicates without qualia. Michael Tye has argued that this purported possibility is incoherent. Robert van Gulick has criticized Tye's argument. It is contended here that although van Gulick's criticism does not refute the argument, Tye's argument is unsuccessful. It is also contended that our evidence very strongly supports the possibility of absent qualia.