CHOICES FROM IDENTICAL OPTIONS

Abstract— Many of the decisions that people must make involve selections from arrays of identical options The studies presented explored people's preferences in two contexts choosing one Item from rows of identical items and choosing a route from a series of identical routes The first three studies examined preferences for items in particular positions Whether people were choosing a product from a grocery shelf, deciding which bathroom stall to use, or marking a box on a questionnaire, they avoided the ends and tended to make their selection from the middle For example, when there were four rows of a product in the supermarket, only 29% of the purchases were from the first and last rows, and 71% were from the middle two The last three studies examined whether a similar preference exists in picking a route when all of the available routes are the same length and require same number of turns In solving mazes, planning routes on maps, and walking around campus, people showed the pattern opposite to that found for choosing Items in rows They avoided the middle routes and tended to take either the first or the last one Overall, the last available route was the favorite The notion that these behaviors may minimize mental effort is explored     

Major memory for microblogs

Online social networking is vastly popular and permits its members to post their thoughts as microblogs, an opportunity that people exploit, on Facebook alone, over 30 million times an hour. Such trivial ephemera, one might think, should vanish quickly from memory; conversely, they may comprise the sort of information that our memories are tuned to recognize, if that which we readily generate, we also readily store. In the first two experiments, participants’ memory for Facebook posts was found to be strikingly stronger than their memory for human faces or sentences from books—a magnitude comparable to the difference in memory strength between amnesics and healthy controls. The second experiment suggested that this difference is not due to Facebook posts spontaneously generating social elaboration, because memory for posts is enhanced as much by adding social elaboration as is memory for book sentences. Our final experiment, using headlines, sentences, and reader comments from articles, suggested that the remarkable memory for microblogs is also not due to their completeness or simply their topic, but may be a more general phenomenon of their being the largely spontaneous and natural emanations of the human mind.     

Effect of task length on remembered and predicted duration

Vierordt’s (1868) law states that when estimating the duration of a previous task, people overestimate short durations and underestimate long ones. We examine whether this same pattern holds for remembered and predicted duration for tasks lasting between 1 and 15 min. In support of Vierordt’s law and its extension to future duration estimates, task duration tended to be overestimated for short tasks (less than 2 min) and underestimated for long tasks for both remembered and predicted duration.     

The influence of medical and legal authorities on deaths facilitated by physicians.

This study investigated whether two widely publicized cases of deaths facilitated by physicians were followed by significant peaks in mortality. In March, 1991, Timothy Quill, MD, published a controversial editorial describing the physician-assisted suicide (PAS) of his 45-year-old, female leukemia patient. In a landmark decision in December 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed removal of life support for Nancy Cruzan, a comatose accident victim. Correcting for trends and seasonal fluctuations, the authors examined: (1) U.S. leukemia mortality in the period centered on Quill's editorial, and (2) mortality from accident/coma combinations in the period centered on the Missouri Supreme Court's decision on Cruzan. Female leukemia deaths rose 11.3% above the expected rate (p < .01) just after Quill's article was published. The more closely the decedent matched Quill's patient, the greater the peak, with the largest peak (33.9%) evident for female leukemia patients in their 40s, who were long-term residents of smaller communities (p < .05). Five possible explanations for the findings were assessed, leading to the conclusion that Quill's editorial elicited an increase in mortality. The involvement of physicians in this increase is supported by analysis of the Cruzan case. This showed a mortality peak of 57% for accident/coma patients following the court decision.     

Cognitive-psychology expertise and the calculation of the probability of a wrongful conviction

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Cognitive psychologists are familiar with how their expertise in understanding human perception, memory, and decision-making is applicable to the justice system....     

Gender,Race, and Performance Expectations of College Students

Women often have low performance expectations for themselves but expect other women to succeed. We found minority students think not only that they will do worse than other minority group members, but also that their group will do poorly. Low individual and group success expectations make the results for minorities doubly troubling.     

Positive and negative opinion modeling: the influence of another's similarity and dissimilarity

Modeling research that has focused on the effects of observing similar others appears to have underestimated the influence of observing dissimilar others. Two experiments demonstrated that observing a model express liking for a piece of music induced more favorable opinions of the music (positive modeling) when the model was similar to the participant observer in relevant opinions, and more negative opinions (negative modeling) when the model was dissimilar to the participant in relevant opinions. Of note, this pattern was more pronounced when participants also believed their general backgrounds were dissimilar rather than similar to that of the model. Underlying social comparison processes and the mediational role of participants' liking of the model are considered.     

Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination

There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies (N = 968), we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence moral judgments. Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that explicitly stipulate outcomes. Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non‐moral intuitive probabilities.     

The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005)

People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to out-predict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist.