A case report of pathological rule-governed syllable intrusion

A detailed analysis of a unique speech disturbance, marked by the frequent appearance in the speech stream of a meaningless intrusive syllable, is presented. Following a lengthy thoracic surgery, an American English speaking patient began to speak with non-English prosodic patterns, which evolved to a conspicuous intrusion in his speech of the syllable /sis/. This syllable and its variants were attached to words in a manner which conformed to the regular phonological rules in English (for formation of plural, possessive, and third person singular morphemes). The distribution and frequency of the intrusive syllable are described, and possible explanations for the abnormal occurrence of this particular syllable are discussed.     

Aristotelian contraries

The first version of this paper was delivered as part of Problems and Changes in the Concept of Predication, a conference at the UC Humanities Research Institute organized by Karel Lambert and Alan Code. I am indebted to the other participants for helpful discussion, and to HRI for providing a wonderful environment for the conference.     

The importance of being in earnest

Certain remarks in the Tractatus, taken together with a passage in a letter Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, suggest that at one time Wittgenstein inclined toward a psychologistic theory of language. But textual considerations with regard to the former and a special interpretation of the latter allow us to interpret these statements in a way that is consistent with Wittgenstein's later views.     

Kierkegaard and the ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’

This article discusses the claim made by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling that the story of Abraham involves a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’. It tries to show that this claim is intelligible and plausible when considered within the context of a philosophical position which views morality as a system of duties.     

Analysing Causality: The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual

Using Jim Woodward's Counterfactual Dependency account as an example, I argue that causal claims about indeterministic systems cannot be satisfactorily analysed as including counterfactual conditionals among their truth conditions because the counterfactuals such accounts must appeal to need not have truth values. Where this happens, counterfactual analyses transform true causal claims into expressions which are not true.