Intelligence Level and the Allocation of Resources for Creative Tasks: A Pupillometry Study

This pupillometry study examined the relationship between intelligence and creative cognition from the resource allocation perspective. It was hypothesized that, during a creative metaphor task, individuals with higher intelligence scores would have different resource allocation patterns than individuals with lower intelligence scores. The study also examined the influence of intelligence in language and visuo-spatial domains on the resource allocation mechanism of verbal and visual creativity. The results suggested that individuals with higher intelligence scores allocated more cognitive resources for creative tasks than those with lower intelligence scores but not for non-creative tasks. The findings of this study support the view that creativity requires allocation of several cognitive faculties and may share underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms with intelligence. Domain-specific intelligence did not seem to play a significant role in the same domain, as individuals with higher scores in both domains showed similar resource allocation patterns. However, individuals with higher intelligence scores in the visuo-spatial domain generated more creative metaphorical interpretations in both verbal and visual creative metaphor tasks suggesting its importance in creative cognition.     

Emergent representations, interaction theory and the cognitive force of metaphor

We focus here on the problem of how new representations emerge through a cognitive agent's interaction with the environment. We address this problem within a framework where representation-building mechanisms operate to create new representations against a backdrop of existing representations, and argue that novel and creative metaphors in any language provide a prime example of this phenomenon. Our approach to modeling the emergence of representation integrates ideas from three different streams of research: (1) the interaction theory of metaphor proposed by Black and others to account for the creativity of metaphors; (2) gestalt theories of perception; and (3) contemporary research supporting a constructivist and action-oriented view of perception and cognition. Combining these insights together, we outline our Gestalt projection model, and discuss three different ways in which new representations might emerge through metaphors. Finally, we propose that metaphor may be viewed as a cognitive force through which a cognitive agent asserts its creative spirit onto the environment.     

Rationality and reasoning with metaphors

Traditional accounts of rationality typically preclude metaphorical reasoning. We review research that has highlighted the pervasiveness of metaphors in creative problem solving, jurisprudence and history of science, and argue that any account of rationality must explicitly acknowledge the ontology of representation and include an ontology-changing mechanism. From these considerations, we present an interaction-based view of cognition and examine the problem of rationality in its terms. We argue that rationality is closely related to the attitude of a cognitive agent towards incoherency—by which we do not mean internal inconsistency but operational incongruity in the external world. We conclude that though rationality permits a change of ontology, it requires a healthy respect towards the autonomous structure of the environment.     

The Practice of Psychotherapy in Mexico: Past and Present

This article explores the history of psychotherapy in Mexico and describes past and current practices of psychological services, training, and supervision for Mexican international students in the United States. Sample curricula, texts, and universities in Mexico are listed. Implications for training underscore the importance of collaboration and increased dialogue. Este artículo explora la historia de la psicoterapia en México y describe las prácticas pasadas y actuales de los servicios psicológicos, formación, y supervisión de estudiantes internacionales mexicanos en los Estados Unidos. Se presentan muestras de programas didácticos, textos, y universidades en México. Las implicaciones para la formación subrayan la importancia de la colaboración y un diálogo más profundo.     

Some remarks on the Rationality of Induction

This paper begins with a rigorous critique of David Stove's recent bookThe Rationality of Induction. In it, Stove produced four different proofs to refute Hume's sceptical thesis about induction. I show that Stove's attempts to vindicate induction are unsuccessful. Three of his proofs refute theses that are not the sceptical thesis about induction at all. Stove's fourth proof, which uses the sampling principle to justify one particular inductive inference, makes crucial use of an unstated assumption regarding randomness. Once this assumption is made explicit, Hume's thesis once more survives.The refutation of Stove's fourth proof leads to some observations which relate Goodman's grue paradox with randomness of a sample. I formulate a generalized version of Goodman's grue paradox, and argue that whenever a sample, no matter how large, is drawn from a predetermined smaller interval of a population that is distributed over a larger interval, any conclusion drawn about the characteristics of the population based on the observed characteristics of the sample is fatally vulnerable to the generalized grue paradox.Finally, I argue that the problem of justification of induction can be addressed successfully only from a cognitive point of view, but not from a metaphysical one. That is, we may ask whether an inductive inference is justified or not within the theories or cognitive structures of a subject, but not outside them. With this realization, induction is seen as a cognitive process, not unlike vision, that is useful at times, and yet has its own illusions that may make it a serious obstacle to cognition at other times.     

Approximate Semantic Transference: A Computational Theory of Metaphors and Analogies

In this paper we start from the assumption that in a metaphor, or an analogy, some terms belonging to one domain (source domain) are used to refer to objects other than their conventional referents belonging to a possibly different domain (target domain). We describe a formalism, which is based on the First Order Predicate Calculus, for representing the knowledge structure associated with a domain and then develop a theory of Constrained Semantic Transference [CST] which allows the terms and the structural relationships of the source domain to be transferred coherently across to the target domain. We show how metaphors and analogies can be characterized in CST in such a way that many of their cognitive properties con be explained. We then propose a theory of Approximate Semantic Transference [AST] which is a computational version of CST and is derived from it by replacing the coherency requirement with approximate coherency. We show how AST can be used as a basis for designing models of cognitive processes involved in comprehending metaphors and analogies.