Relation between testosterone concentration, sex role identity, and personality among females

Eighty-four undergraduate female students completed Baucom's Masculinity and Femininity Scales, the Bem Sex Role Inventory, and the Adjective Check List. Testosterone concentration was determined from saliva samples provided by the women. The results indicated that sex role type was related to level of testosterone concentration. More specifically, undifferentiated females had much higher levels of testosterone concentration than did the feminine-sex-typed females. Also, females with high levels of masculinity (androgynous and masculine-sex-typed females combined) had somewhat higher testosterone levels than did feminine-sex-typed females. Adjectival correlates indicated that females with higher testosterone concentrations perceive themselves as self-directed, action-oriented, resourceful individuals; women with lower testosterone concentration view themselves as conventional, socialized individuals, possessing a caring attitude coupled with an anxious and dejected mood.     

On Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification in Political Liberalism

Philosophia - Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of Rawls’s view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or idealizing form...     

Kantian Constructivism,the Issue of Scope,and Perfectionism: O'Neill on Ethical Standing

Abstract: Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first‐order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O'Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O'Neill‐type Kantian constructivism can coherently accord this key role to the issue of scope while adhering to the universalist, ‘cosmopolitan’ commitments at its core. The paper argues that this is not so. On the one hand, it shows that O'Neill's attempt to ‘fix’ the scope of practical reasoning supposes, rather than establishes, a view of ethical standing and the scope of practical reasoning. On the other hand, the paper argues that Kantian constructivism should endorse a non‐constructivist, perfectionist view of the good to determine that scope. The paper thereby supports the perfectionist conjecture that Kantian constructivism, in order to defend its universalist commitments, should take refuge in non‐constructivist, perfectionist considerations, and that Kantian constructivism should therefore construe perfectionism as a partial, though uneasy, ally.     

On Justification,Idealization, and Discursive Purchase

Philosophia - Conceptions of acceptability-based moral or political justification take it that authoritative acceptability constitutes validity, or justification. There is no agreement as to what...     

Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons: A Critique

According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, that is, reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of reasonableness that undermines both (i) and (ii): if RGA builds on this idea, RGA is viciously regressive, and a duty of justification to meet RGA is not agent transparent and not adoptable. This result opens the door for alternative conceptions of reciprocity and generality. I suggest that a more promising conception of reciprocity and generality needs to build on an idea of the reasonable that helps to reconcile the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal and general justification with its egalitarian commitments. But this requires downgrading RGA in the order of justification and to determine on prior, substantive grounds what level of discursive influence in reciprocal and general justification relevant agents ought to have.