Too exhausted to go to bed: Implicit theories about willpower and stress predict bedtime procrastination

While most people are aware of the importance of sleep for their health, well-being, and performance, bedtime procrastination is a pervasive phenomenon that can be conceptualized as a case of self-control failure (Kroese et al., Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 2014, 1). Two daily diary studies (N₁ = 185, N₂ = 137) investigated beliefs about willpower and stress as interactive predictors of bedtime procrastination. Beliefs about willpower capture whether people think of their willpower as limited resource that gets easily depleted (limited theory) or as something that remains regardless of previous acts of self-control (non-limited theory). Results show that after a stressful day, people with a limited versus non-limited theory procrastinate more on going to bed, while there is no difference in bedtime procrastination on less stressful days. Thus, ironically, limited theorists who should be more concerned with recovering their resources after a stressful day sleep less the following night.     

Against global method safety

The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe and qualifies as knowledge if and only if it is formed by method M, such that her beliefs in p and her beliefs in relevantly similar propositions formed by M in all nearby worlds are true. This paper argues that global method safety is too restrictive. First, the agent may not know relevantly similar propositions via M because the belief that p is the only possible outcome of M. Second, there are cases where there is a fine-grained belief that is unsafe and a relevantly similar coarse-grained belief (with looser truth conditions) that is safe and where both beliefs are based on the same method M. Third, the reliability of conditional reasoning, a basic belief-forming method, seems to be sensitive to fine-grained contents, as suggested by the wide variation in success rates for thematic versions of the Wason selection task.

     

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE EXTENDED MIND

Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothesis of extended mind? If the extended mind debate is a substantive dispute, then we have only superficial understanding of the extended mind hypothesis. And if we have deep understanding of the extended mind hypothesis, then the debate over this hypothesis is nothing but a verbal dispute.     

Beliefs About Willpower Are Related to Therapy Adherence and Psychological Adjustment in Patients With Type 2 Diabetes

Research suggests that self-control, the ability to forego immediate needs for the sake of future rewards, promotes health behavior. The present study examined the role of beliefs about willpower as predictor of self-control in the context of diabetes. Seventy-nine type 2 diabetes patients reported their beliefs about willpower, therapy adherence (i.e., self-care activities, diet, exercise), and psychological adjustment (i.e., emotional distress, well-being, life quality). Endorsing the belief that willpower is a limited versus nonlimited resource was associated with lower therapy adherence and lower psychological adjustment. How people think about their willpower might be crucial for therapy success in diabetes patients.     

Medical knowledge in a social world: Introduction to the special issue

Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology. While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh questions and new insights into old debates. In addition, the broader purview offered by social epistemology opens up opportunities to address new topics such as the role of consensus conferences, epistemic injustice, the value of medical knowledge, continuing medical education, and industry funding. This article situates and summarizes the contributions to this special issue.

     

Approach and avoidance relationship goals and couples’ nonverbal communication during conflict

Approach relationship goals are pursued in order to achieve desirable outcomes, whereas avoidance relationship goals are pursued to prevent undesirable outcomes in relationships. We investigated how partners’ approach and avoidance relationship goals are related to their nonverbal communication during conflict. A sequential analysis of observational data from 365 couples (28,470 observations) revealed that individuals with more (vs. fewer) approach goals displayed more positive involvement (e.g., head nods, smiles) and less avoidant withdrawal (e.g., shaking head, folded arms). The reverse pattern emerged for avoidance goals. Furthermore, women (but not men) matched their partner's positive involvement to a greater extent the more approach goals and the fewer avoidance goals they pursued. In contrast, approach/avoidance relationship goals were not associated with how much individuals matched their partner's avoidant withdrawal. Results suggest that relationship goals are related to partners’ nonverbal communication and the extent to which women match their partner's positive involvement during conflict.     

Davidson on first‐person authority and externalism

Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind‐body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ‘in the head’ and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once extemalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self‐knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how Davidson would have to go about defending his positive account of privileged self‐knowledge against the principal incompatibilist arguments.     

Remembering without knowing

This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.     

Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-Closeness

Philosophia - The paper makes two points. First, any theory of knowledge must explain the difference between cases of knowledge from falsehood (provided there are any) and Gettier cases where the...