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Hanoch Ben-Yami 《Philosophical Studies》1996,83(3):277-289
Conclusion I have attempted to show that many attributive adjectives can be dealt with within the framework of first-order predicate calculus by the method suggested in this paper. I've also supplied independent reasons for the claim that attributive adjectives that are not responsive to this method require a formal treatment different from the one that the adjectives successfully dealt with by that method require. Thus, if the method I've argued for is sound, then the scope of first-order predicate calculus was shown to be wider than assumed by several logicians. This I take to be of interest from a logical point of view. 相似文献
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Hannóch Ben-Yami 《Synthese》1993,95(2):169-172
Searle's Chinese Room was supposed to prove that computers can't understand: the man in the room, following, like a computer, syntactical rules alone, though indistinguishable from a genuine Chinese speaker, doesn't understand a word. But such a room is impossible: the man won't be able to respond correctly to questions like ‘What is the time?’, even though such an ability is indispensable for a genuine Chinese speaker. Several ways to provide the room with the required ability are considered, and it is concluded that for each of these the room will have understanding. Hence, Searle's argument is invalid. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Hanoch Ben-Yami 《The Philosophical quarterly》1997,47(186):84-89
The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ' S V s that p '. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on beliefs, etc., about non-existing things is also rejected. Last, some sentences ascribing abilities and dispositions have the same grammatical form as some senses that ascribe mental states, so that the attempt to paraphrase the latter would obscure the conceptual relations between the two sorts. It follows that mental states are not relations to propositions. 相似文献
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