Developmental psychology in the real world: A paradigm of parent education

Twenty years ago, William Kessen, Greta Fein and I developed and tested a model of parent education, a model which involved variation in curricular content, didactic approaches, and child outcomes–experimentally contrasted. Our experience yielded some valuable lessons about the extent to which researchers can influence parents' behaviour, and parents their children's development. In the present article I suggest that these lessons might be useful for researchers now as they were for us then. I present some observations about the research that developmental psychologists have done in the intervening two decades and suggest that we could learn much by using such a model of parent education to answer questions about the effets of parents' behaviour on children's development. Carefully done, parent education studies can yield valuable information about many of the questions raised in recent correlational research. Parent training research can suggest hypotheses that can be tested with data collected non-interventively and analysed in causal model analyses–and vice versa. What is more, because one reason for studying parent effects is so that we can offer guidance to parents about rearing their children, this design has a particular advantage; it is both the medium and the message.     

Cross-sex comparisons: A word of caution

A cross-sex difference on one variable is often hypothesized to be related to a gender difference on a second variable. However, caution should be exercised in making such comparative hypotheses. We gathered the expected and actual examination grades for 168 female and 163 male college students. As in prior research, males had higher expectancies than females (p<.05). But analysis of the intrasex regression equations indicated that the relationship of expectancies to performance was different for women than it was for men. Thus, a cross-sex difference in expectancies did not correspond to a parallel difference in grades. This finding highlights the potential hazards of making certain cross-sex comparisons, and we argue for more caution in their application.     

The Effectiveness of Encounter Groups: Implications of Research for Counselling Practice

In the past decade, encounter groups have become a widely recognised technique of intervention for counsellors. Empirical research on encounter groups is confusing. Trends in research are obscured by a diversity of definitions, methodologies and subjects. This review considers the most significant research on the effectiveness of encounter groups, focusing on positive and negative effects, leader behaviour, group characteristics, participant characteristics, and the maintenance of change. Conclusions are drawn relating the research to practice, with some suggested guidelines for use of encounter groups in counselling interventions.     

A preliminary study of Hare's “Research Scale for the Assessment of Psychopathy” in mentally-abnormal offenders

The abbreviated (15-item) version of Hare's Research Scale for the Assessment of Psychopathy (RSAP) was investigated in a sample of male admissions to Broadmoor Special Hospital (N = 50), along with five MMPI measures relevant to psychopathy (Impulsivity, Sociability, Psychopathic Deviate, Anxiety and Sociopathy). Patients were assigned to one of four clinical diagnostic groups: Personality Disorder, Mixed (personality disorder with schizophrenia), Schizophrenia and Affective Disorder. Results indicated that while both psychopathic groups (Mixed and Personality Disorder) showed high scores on almost all RSAP items, the Affective Disorder group showed low scores on almost all items. Results of a discriminant function analysis indicated that Hare's RSAP was superior to the MMPI measures at discriminating between psychopaths and non-psychopaths. Use of the discriminant function to re-allocate patients to criterion groups showed a high hit rate (94%) for psychopathic patients but a hit rate of only 61% for non-psychopathic patients. Half of the schizophrenic patients were mis-allocated to the psychopathic group. The results support the idea of an affective deficit common to psychopaths and schizophrenics, but suggest that psychopaths additionally show a deficit which may be characterized by a lack of goal-directed behaviour.     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

Schedule control of the vocal behavior of Cebus monkeys

The vocal behavior of three Cebus monkeys was maintained by fixed-ratio schedules of response dependent reinforcement at values between fixed-ratio 1 and fixed-ratio 15. In one monkey that was exposed to variable-interval, fixed-interval, and conjunctive fixed-ratio fixed-interval schedules of reinforcement, vocal responding occurred at a low rate, but schedule-appropriate patterns were maintained. The rates and patterns of responding engendered indicated that the vocal operant can be brought under schedule control in the monkey by the use of response-dependent reinforcement.     

Anxiety and the spelling and use in sentences of threat/neutral homophones

The disambiguation of threat/neutral homophones was investigated in high- and low-trait anxiety subjects who had been exposed to either a positive or a negative mood manipulation procedure. Subjects were required first to spell each auditorily presented word and second, to generate and speak a sentence using the word. Difference indices were calculated for the spelling and the sentence usage data, i.e. the number of threat minus neutral interpretations. Examination of these indices revealed that subjects exposed to the negative mood manipulation procedure produced relatively more threat than neutral interpretations (for both spelling and sentence usage) than did subjects exposed to the positive mood manipulation procedure. Multiple regression analyses revealed that both the trait anxiety and mood manipulation variables contributed significantly to the prediction of the difference index on the spelling task. In the analysis of the use of homophones in sentences, only the mood manipulation variable contributed significantly to the prediction of the difference index on the sentence usage task.     

Regendering the U.S. Abortion Debate

This paper originated in a conference presentation with my colleague Michael Tooley, at which we were both asked to re-evaluate articles about abortion that each of us had written over twenty years earlier. While Tooley and I both contended that abortion should be legally unrestricted, there were striking differences in the style and content of our respective arguments. Contemplating these differences has reinforced my own belief in the importance of emphasizing the centrality of gender when discussing abortion. Since gender as we know it is a system of dominance as well as difference (MacKinnon 1987), I take this to mean that contemporary discussions of abortion must address the relationship between abortion access and the social status of women. My early article addressed this relationship to some extent, but the present paper will raise a number of additional gender issues that the early article did not mention.