Paradoxes of moral reparation: Deontic foci vs. circumstances

Conclusion The distinction between deontic focus and deontic circumstance is obvious and essential to the understanding of our reasonings about obligations, permissions, rights, and wrongs. Here we have dealt with the basics. These basics must be developed into a full deontic logic. Fortunately, such a comprehensive deontic logic that includes identity, quantification over individuals, and quantification over properties has already been proposed, and applied to the interpretation of legal texts. It should be an excellent basis for Feldman's intriguing and promising idea of world utilitarianism.     

Optic aphasia, optic apraxia, and loss of dreaming

A 47-year-old man with a left temporo-occipital infarct in the area of the posterior cerebral artery is presented. The neuropsychological examination did not reveal aphasia or gross mental deficits. The patient presented with alexia without agraphia, color agnosia, but few visual perceptual deficits. The main impairment was in confrontation naming; he was incapable of naming objects and pictures, not from lack of recognition (excluding visual agnosia) but from lack of access to the appropriate word (optic aphasia). The patient also exhibited a deficit in the evocation of gesture from the visual presentation of an object (optic apraxia) and a difficulty in "conjuring up" visual images of objects (impaired visual imagery) and loss of dreams. The fundamental deficit of this patient is tentatively explained in terms of visuoverbal and visuogestural disconnection and a deficit of mental imagery.     

Tomberlin,Frege, and Guise theory: A note on the methodology of dia-philosophical comparisons

Conclusion Tomberlin's comparative claims about the superiority of the De Dicto-De Re Account over Guise Theory concerning referential opacity are abortively premature. Nevertheless, he may be right. Yet the order of the day is to develop the De Re-De Dicto Account to the hilt. Not until this is done can any useful dia-philosophical comparison of the two theories yield any fruit. My deep desire is, of course, for the sheer enjoyment of experiencing the world from the perspective of each of the two views, indeed, from the perspective of other views — e.g., Frege's Sense/Referent Theory — that can be developed to the same data-encompassing stage as Guise Theory.     

Disentangling Critical Questions from Argument Schemes

Critical questions have been understood in the framework of argument schemes from their conception. This understanding has influenced the process of evaluating arguments and the development of classifications. This paper argues that relating these two notions is detrimental to research on argument schemes and critical questions, and that it is possible to have critical questions without relying on argument schemes. Two objections are raised against the classical understanding of critical questions based on theoretical and analytical grounds. The theoretical objection presents the assumptions that are embedded in the idea of argument schemes delivering questions to evaluate arguments. The analytical objection, on the other hand, exposes the shortcomings of the theory when critical questions are used to evaluate real-life argumentation. After presenting these criticisms, a new theory of critical questions is sketched. This theory takes into account the dynamics of dialectical discussions to describe the function of critical questions and their implications for evaluating arguments.

     

Behavioral extremity moderates the association between certainty in attitudes about COVID and willingness to engage in mitigation-related behaviors

People generally intend to act more on beliefs and attitudes about which they have greater certainty. However, we introduce a boundary condition to the positive association between certainty and behavioral intentions—behavioral extremity. Uncertainty about a threatening issue like COVID-19 can be disconcerting, and we propose that uncertain people cope in part through increased openness to extreme actions like accepting risky medical treatments and aggression toward those defying mitigation policies. Testing this, we compiled and analyzed all the data on certainty about COVID-19 mitigation policies and willingness to engage in mitigation-related behaviors that our lab collected during the pandemic (6 samples, 20 behaviors, Ns up to 1496). External ratings of the behaviors' extremity moderated certainty-willingness associations: whereas greater certainty was associated with increased willingness to engage in moderate behaviors (the typical result), lower certainty was associated with increased willingness to engage in extreme behaviors, especially among those worried about becoming ill.     

Visual influences on auditory pluck and bow judgments

In the McGurk effect, visual information specifying a speaker’s articulatory movements can influence auditory judgments of speech. In the present study, we attempted to find an analogue of the McGurk effect by using nonspeech stimuli—the discrepant audiovisual tokens of plucks and bows on a cello. The results of an initial experiment revealed that subjects’ auditory judgments were influenced significantly by the visual pluck and bow stimuli. However, a second experiment in which speech syllables were used demonstrated that the visual influence on consonants was significantly greater than the visual influence observed for pluck-bow stimuli. This result could be interpreted to suggest that the nonspeech visual influence was not a true McGurk effect. In a third experiment, visual stimuli consisting of the wordspluck andbow were found to have no influence over auditory pluck and bow judgments. This result could suggest that the nonspeech effects found in Experiment 1 were based on the audio and visual information’s having an ostensive lawful relation to the specified event. These results are discussed in terms of motor-theory, ecological, and FLMP approaches to speech perception.     

Repetition blindness under minimum memory load: Effects of spatial and temporal proximity and the encoding effectiveness of the first item

Repetition blindness (RB) refers to the reduced performance in reporting a repeated as opposed to a nonrepeated item in rapid serial visual presentation. In Experiment 1, we found RB for two-item stimuli in uncertain locations. The magnitude of RB decreased significantly with increases in interstimulus interval, but not with increases in spatial separation, indicating that RB is determined primarily by temporal factors. In Experiment 2, we found RB when subjects were required to report only the second of two successively presented items. The magnitude of RB increased with the duration of the first item, indicating that RB is determined by the encoding effectiveness of the first item. The results of this study collectively indicate that RB is not a memory or a sensory phenomenon, but rather a perceptual phenomenon occurring at the stage of identity encoding. The findings also undermine the arguments (Kanwisher, 1987) that have been offered in favor of the type-token binding failure hypothesis and indicate instead that type-node refractoriness may be the cause of RB.