Holding One’s Own

There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question.

Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology

Pragmatism’s naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition’s anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must answer the phenomenological tradition’s criticisms of naturalism.     

An Examination of the Relative Impact of Assigned Goals and Self-Efficacy on Personal Goals and Performance Over Time

A model of goal-setting processes was developed that depicted the influence of previous performance, assigned goals, and self-efficacy on personal goals and performance. Three levels of assigned goals were manipulated in a counterbalanced fashion across two performance trials. Assigned goals were hypothesized to have a greater influence than self-efficacy on personal goals for the first trial, whereas efficacy was hypothesized to have a stronger influence than assigned goals on Trial 2 goals. Although the hypothesized model fit fairly well overall, the specific results concerning the relative impact of assigned goal and self-efficacy were not supported. In general, the observed trends indicated the effects were the opposite of what was expected. Potential explanations for these results and recommendations for future research are offered.     

Free Speech Fallacies as Meta-Argumentative Errors

Free speech fallacies are errors of meta-argument. One commits a free speech fallacy when one argues that since there are apparent restrictions on one’s rights of free expression, procedural rules of critical exchange have been broken, and consequently, one’s preferred view is dialectically better off than it may otherwise seem. Free speech fallacies are meta-argumentative, since they occur at the level of assessing the dialectical situation in terms of norms of argument and in terms of meta-evidential principles of interpreting how and why people follow (or fail to follow) argumentative rules. Our plan here is to begin with a brief explanation of meta-argument and meta-argumentative fallacy. We will then turn to the variety of forms of the free speech fallacy, which we will explain as meta-argumentatively erroneous.

     

Introduction

This introduction presents selected proceedings of a two‐day meeting on the regress problem, sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and hosted by Vanderbilt University in October 2013, along with other submitted essays. Three forms of research on the regress problem are distinguished: metatheoretical, developmental, and critical work.     

Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and the meta-exclusivism of religious pluralism

In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by its own meta-exclusivism.     

Two Forms of the Straw Man

The authors identify and offer an analysis of a new form of the Straw Man fallacy, and then explore the implications of the prevalence of this fallacy for contemporary political discourse.     

Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism

I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.