WHAT IS META-COGNITIVE SKILL? KINDLING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN CULADASA AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

ABSTRACT

I explore affinities and tensions between Culadasa’s model of meta-cognitive skill, in his recent The Mind Illuminated, and theories of skill and meta-cognition in contemporary philosophy of psychology. I find that, while there are many assumptions that these different approaches share, for the most part, contemporary philosophy of psychology has ignored the possibility that meta-cognitive skills can be cultivated through practice, as Culadasa persuasively argues. The one exception is Joëlle Proust’s recent The Philosophy of Metacognition. This work defends a model of procedural meta-cognition with some striking similarities to Culadasa’s notion of ‘meta-cognitive introspective awareness’, which he views as an important step in the development of ?amatha. This is noteworthy, as they have clearly arrived at these notions completely independently, drawing on strikingly different kinds of evidence and argument. I conclude with some thoughts on distinctive puzzles that arise for Culadasa’s conception of meta-cognitive skill.     

Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett??s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target??s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS??understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices??and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology.     

The origins of mindreading: how interpretive socio-cognitive practices get off the ground

Synthese - Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through...