Ruminative and reflective forms of self-focus: Their relationships with interpersonal skills and emotional reactivity under interpersonal stress

Self-focus can be divided into adaptive and maladaptive aspects, that is, self-reflection and self-rumination respectively. This study explores how these distinctive forms of self-focus are associated with interpersonal skills required for beginning and maintaining social relationships, and with negative emotional regulation when one experiences interpersonal problems. A survey of 150 undergraduates (Study 1) indicated contrasting cross-sectional associations between self-reflection and self-rumination and interpersonal skills; self-rumination is associated with perceived impaired interpersonal skills, whereas self-reflection is associated with the improved skills. In Study 2, using a four-wave longitudinal design, we investigated the buffering effects of self-rumination and self-reflection on negative emotional reactivity to interpersonal conflicts. Analysis of multilevel models indicated that self-rumination predicts a greater increase in negative affect after one experiences negative interpersonal events, whereas self-reflection had no such effects on the negative affect. These results suggest that self-rumination is associated with perceived impaired interpersonal skills, which could delay problem solving and exacerbate the effect of interpersonal problems, thereby leading to dysphoria. In contrast, self-reflection might contribute to the maintenance of relationships in usual or stable conditions but does not aid emotion regulation or problem solving in difficult or negative situations such as when one experiences interpersonal problems.     

Effects of positive and negative delusional ideation on memory

We investigated the relationship between levels of delusional ideation (whether positive or negative delusions) and the activation and distortion of memory by using pairs of positive and negative adjectives describing personality traits where those adjectives had similar meanings. We presented one of each pair of adjectives in the learning phase. Immediately after the learning phase in Experiment 1, we asked whether each adjective had been presented. Participants with high (positive or negative) delusional ideation were more likely to indicate that they had learned adjectives that they had not actually learned. This finding suggested that non-learned positive (or negative) adjectives that were associated with learned negative (or positive) adjectives were more likely to be activated in participants prone to positive (or negative) delusional ideation. However, in Experiment 2, two forced-choice tests were conducted immediately after the learning phase. In this context, participants, regardless of their proneness to delusional ideation, could almost always correctly distinguish what had and had not been presented, suggesting that the activation of learned items was still stronger than that for non-learned items in the immediate test. As time passed, the proportion of false alarms for positive or negative adjectives was higher in the two forced-choice tests among those with high proneness to (positive or negative) delusional ideation, suggesting that participants with delusional ideation were increasingly likely to depend on internal conditions for retrieval over time. Nous avons examiné la relation entre les niveaux d'idéation illusoire (qu'elle soit positive ou négative) et l'activation et la distorsion de la mémoire, en utilisant des paires d'adjectifs positifs et négatifs à significations similaires décrivant des traits de personnalité. Nous avons présenté un membre de chaque paire d'adjectifs lors d'une phase d'apprentissage. Dans une première expérience, immédiatement après la phase d'apprentissage, nous avons demandé si chaque adjectif avait été présenté. Les participants ayant un niveau d'idéation illusoire (positive ou négative) élevé étaient plus susceptibles d'indiquer qu'ils avaient appris les adjectifs qu'ils n'avaient pas appris. Ce résultat suggérait que les adjectifs positifs (ou négatifs) non appris qui étaient associés à des adjectifs négatifs (ou positifs) appris étaient plus susceptibles d'être activés chez les participants portés à l'idéation illusoire positive (ou négative). Dans une deuxième expérience, deux tests à choix forcés ont été menés immédiatement après la phase d'apprentissage. Dans ce contexte, les participants, indépendamment de leur tendance à l'idéation illusoire, pouvaient presque toujours distinguer correctement ce qui avait été présenté de ce qui n'avait pas été présenté, suggérant que l'activation des items appris était encore plus forte que celle des items non appris dans le test immédiat. Avec le temps, la proportion de fausses alarmes pour les adjectifs positifs ou négatifs était plus élevée dans les deux tests à choix forcés chez les participants portés à l'idéation illusoire (positive ou négative), ce qui suggère que les participants avec idéation illusoire étaient de plus en plus susceptibles de dépendre de leurs conditions internes lors du rappel à mesure que le temps passait. En este estudio se investigó la relación entre los niveles de ideación delusional (tanto delusiones positivas como negativas) y la activación y distorsión de la memoria a través del uso de pares de adjetivos positivos y negativos que describen rasgos de personalidad. Estos pares de adjetivos tenían significados similares. En la fase de aprendizaje se presentó un miembro de cada par de adjetivos. Inmediatamente después de la fase de aprendizaje se realizó el primer experimento, en el cual se preguntó al participanten si es que se le habían presentado cada uno de los adjetivos. Los participantes con elevada ideación delusiva (positiva o negativa) reportaran con una mayor probabilidad haber aprendido adjetivos que en realidad no se les había presentado. Este hallazgo sugiere que adjetivos positivos (o negativos) no aprendidos que estaban asociados con adjetivos negativos (o positivos) aprendidos, tenían una mayor probabilidad de ser activados en participantes propensos a una ideación delusiva positiva (o negativa). En el segundo experimento se llevaron a cabo inmediatamente después de la fase de aprendizaje dos pruebas de decisión forzada. En este contexto se pudo observar que los participantes a pesar de su tendencia hacia una ideación delusional, lograron distinguir en la mayoría de los casos correctamente entre los adjetivos que les fueron presentado y lo que no. Esto sugiere que la activación de los items aprendidos fue mucho más intensa que la de los items no aprendidos en el test. Sin embargo se pudo observar en los participantes de las dos pruebas de decisión forzada que con el paso del tiempo el porcentaje de falso reconocimiento de adjetivos positivos y negativos fue más elevado entre aquellas personas con una alta tendencia hacia una ideación delusional (positiva o negativa). Esto sugiere que en participantes con ideación delusional el reconocimiento de información a lo largo del tiempo probablemente es muy dependiente de condiciones internas.     

The moderating role of positive beliefs about worry in the relationship between stressful events and worry

Some theorists suggest that worry is elevated by positive beliefs when stressful events occur. Although several cross-sectional studies have revealed an association between positive beliefs and worry, few longitudinal studies have been conducted on this topic. Moreover, the effect of positive beliefs as a moderator on worry when stressful events occur has not been investigated. Against this background, the present study conducted a two-wave longitudinal survey to examine the moderating role of positive beliefs. One hundred and ninety-four college students voluntarily completed questionnaires. Hierarchical regression analysis showed a prospective relationship between the experience of stressful events and the subjective report of worry. Moreover, this relationship was moderated by an interaction with positive beliefs; stressful events were a stronger predictor of the extent of worry for individuals with a high level of positive beliefs than for those with a low level of positive beliefs. The moderating role of positive beliefs suggests that the level of positive beliefs amplifies the threat of worry caused by stressful events.     

Trait anxiety and impaired control of reflective attention in working memory

The present study investigated whether the control of reflective attention in working memory (WM) is impaired in high trait anxiety individuals. We focused on the consequences of refreshing—a simple reflective process of thinking briefly about a just-activated representation in mind—on the subsequent processing of verbal stimuli. Participants performed a selective refreshing task, in which they initially refreshed or read one word from a three-word set, and then refreshed a non-selected item from the initial phrase or read aloud a new word. High trait anxiety individuals exhibited greater latencies when refreshing a word after experiencing the refreshing of a word from the same list of semantic associates. The same pattern was observed for reading a new word after prior refreshing. These findings suggest that high trait anxiety individuals have difficulty resolving interference from active distractors when directing reflective attention towards contents in WM or processing a visually presented word.     

SINGLE‐SAMPLE DISCRIMINATION OF DIFFERENT SCHEDULES' REINFORCED INTERRESPONSE TIMES

Food‐deprived rats in Experiment 1 responded to one of two tandem schedules that were, with equal probability, associated with a sample lever. The tandem schedules' initial links were different random‐interval schedules. Their values were adjusted to approximate equality in time to completing each tandem schedule's response requirements. The tandem schedules differed in their terminal links: One reinforced short interresponse times; the other reinforced long ones. Tandem‐schedule completion presented two comparison levers, one of which was associated with each tandem schedule. Pressing the lever associated with the sample‐lever tandem schedule produced a food pellet. Pressing the other produced a blackout. The difference between terminal‐link reinforced interresponse times varied across 10‐trial blocks within a session. Conditional‐discrimination accuracy increased with the size of the temporal difference between terminal‐link reinforced interresponse times. In Experiment 2, one tandem schedule was replaced by a random ratio, while the comparison schedule was either a tandem schedule that only reinforced long interresponse times or a random‐interval schedule. Again, conditional‐discrimination accuracy increased with the temporal difference between the two schedules' reinforced interresponse times. Most rats mastered the discrimination between random ratio and random interval, showing that the interresponse times reinforced by these schedules can serve to discriminate between these schedules.     

Sense of agency over thought: external misattribution of thought in a memory task and proneness to auditory hallucination

Previous studies have suggested that auditory hallucination is closely related to thought insertion. In this study, we investigated the relationship between the external misattribution of thought and auditory hallucination-like experiences. We used the AHES-17, which measures auditory hallucination-like experiences in normal, healthy people, and the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, in which false alarms of critical lure are regarded as spontaneous external misattribution of thought. We found that critical lures elicited increased the number of false alarms as AHES-17 scores increased and that scores of AHES-17 predicted the rate of false memory of critical lures. Furthermore, we revealed that the relationship between AHES-17 scores and the rates of false alarms to critical lures was strictly linear. Therefore, it might be said that individual differences in auditory hallucination-like experiences are highly related to the external misattribution of thought. We discussed these results from the perspective of the sense of agency over thought.     

Perfectionism and Self‐conscious Emotions in British and Japanese Students: Predicting Pride and Embarrassment after Success and Failure

Regarding self‐conscious emotions, studies have shown that different forms of perfectionism show different relationships with pride, shame, and embarrassment depending on success and failure. What is unknown is whether these relationships also show cultural variations. Therefore, we conducted a study investigating how self‐oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism predicted pride and embarrassment after success and failure by comparing 363 British and 352 Japanese students. Students were asked to respond to a set of scenarios where they imagined achieving either perfect (success) or flawed (failure) results. In both British and Japanese students, self‐oriented perfectionism positively predicted pride after success and embarrassment after failure, whereas socially prescribed perfectionism predicted embarrassment after success and failure. Moreover, in Japanese students, socially prescribed perfectionism positively predicted pride after success and self‐oriented perfectionism negatively predicted pride after failure. The findings have implications for our understanding of perfectionism, indicating that the perfectionism–pride relationship not only varies between perfectionism dimensions but may also show cultural variations. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dysfunction of attentional networks for non-emotional processing in negative affect

It is unclear whether negative affect is associated with the impairment of attentional networks for non-emotional processing. Using the attention network test (ANT), which assesses the efficiency of alerting, orienting, and executive attention, we attempted to clarify which attentional networks were related to negative affect, i.e., anxiety, depression, and social anxiety. Forty-three participants completed the self-report questionnaires and the ANT. Negative affect was negatively correlated with orienting efficiency but not executive attention. Our results indicate that people with negative emotionality have an impaired orienting network for non-emotional stimuli. It is suggested that attentional bias for threatening stimuli in negative affect is due to the original impairment of the orienting network.     

Exogenous attention to angry faces in social anxiety: A perceptual accuracy approach

We investigated the interaction between endogenous and exogenous attention for the processing of emotional stimuli in individuals with high social anxiety using accuracy rates. Following the presentation of an endogenous cue at the centre, exogenous cues (i.e., angry and neutral faces) were presented at peripheral locations. Subsequently, non-emotional masked targets were presented, and the participants were instructed to discriminate between the targets. With respect to exogenous attention, high socially anxious people exhibited higher accuracy when the angry face and target appeared on the same side than when they appeared on different sides, whereas low socially anxious people did not exhibit such effects. On the other hand, different abilities of endogenous attention were not observed between high and low socially anxious people. These results suggest that exogenous attention is biased towards threat in high socially anxious people.     

Processing of task-irrelevant natural scenes in social anxiety

In this study, by manipulating perceptual load, we investigated whether socially anxious people process task-irrelevant, non-emotional, natural scenes. When attention was directed to letters and perceptual load was low, task-irrelevant natural scenes were processed, as evidenced by repetition priming effects, in both high and low socially anxious people. In the high perceptual load condition, repetition-priming effects decreased in participants with low social anxiety, but not in those with high social anxiety. The results were the same when attention was directed to pictures of animals: even in the high perceptual load condition, high socially anxious participants processed task-irrelevant natural scenes, as evidenced by flanker effects. However, when attention was directed to pictures of people, task-irrelevant natural scenes were not processed by participants in either anxiety group, regardless of perceptual load. These results suggest that high socially anxious individuals could not inhibit task-irrelevant natural scenes under conditions of high perceptual load, except when attention was focused on people.