Nonrational processes in ethical decision making

Most current ethical decision-making models provide a logical and reasoned process for making ethical judgments, but these models are empirically unproven and rely upon assumptions of rational, conscious, and quasilegal reasoning. Such models predominate despite the fact that many nonrational factors influence ethical thought and behavior, including context, perceptions, relationships, emotions, and heuristics. For example, a large body of behavioral research has demonstrated the importance of automatic intuitive and affective processes in decision making and judgment. These processes profoundly affect human behavior and lead to systematic biases and departures from normative theories of rationality. Their influence represents an important but largely unrecognized component of ethical decision making. We selectively review this work; provide various illustrations; and make recommendations for scientists, trainers, and practitioners to aid them in integrating the understanding of nonrational processes with ethical decision making.     

Boundary Management for Cognitive Behavioral Therapies

In recent years, the scholarship regarding professional boundaries has increased significantly in a variety of areas. Despite many advances in this line of research, less attention has been devoted to the question of boundary maintenance and its relationship to theoretical orientation. In this article we examine these issues for cognitive-behavioral therapies. After a brief historical review of the evolution of the concept of boundaries, we select three procedures integral to cognitive-behavioral practice and discuss how they may create boundary problems for practitioners. We conclude with recommendations for practice.     

Working memory, fluid intelligence, and impulsiveness in heavy media multitaskers

Ophir, Nass, and Wagner (Proceedings of the National Association of Sciences 106:15583–15587, 2009) reported that individuals who routinely engage in multiple forms of media use are actually worse at multitasking, possibly due to difficulties in ignoring irrelevant stimuli, from both external sources and internal representations in memory. Using the media multitasking index (MMI) developed by Ophir et al., we identified heavy media multitaskers (HMMs) and light media multitaskers (LMMs) and tested them on measures of attention, working memory, task switching, and fluid intelligence, as well as self-reported impulsivity and self-control. We found that people who reported engaging in heavy amounts of media multitasking reported being more impulsive and performed more poorly on measures of fluid intelligence than did those who did not frequently engage in media multitasking. However, we could find no evidence to support the contention that HMMs are worse in a multitasking situation such as task switching or that they show any deficits in dealing with irrelevant or distracting information, as compared with LMMs.