The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited

The hypothesis of extended cognition maintains that cognitive processes sometimes span the brain, body, and world. One of the most prominent types of arguments for this hypothesis begins with observations of the role of certain sorts of bodily and environmental influences on cognitive processes, then concludes that these bodily and environmental influences are themselves cognitive processes. This paper will argue that, while it is widely appreciated that the simplest versions of these “coupling arguments” are fallacious, the advocates of extended cognition still seem to underestimate how prevalent even the simplest forms are in the literature, why they are so pervasive, and how these fallacious arguments might be avoided by greater attention to a plausible theory of what distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes.     

Representations without rules,connectionism and the syntactic argument

Terry Horgan and John Tienson have suggested that connectionism might provide a framework within which to articulate a theory of cognition according to which there are mental representations without rules (RWR) (Horgan and Tienson 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992). In essence, RWR states that cognition involves representations in a language of thought, but that these representations are not manipulated by the sort of rules that have traditionally been posited. In the development of RWR, Horgan and Tienson attempt to forestall a particular line of criticism, theSyntactic Argument, which would show RWR to be inconsistent with connectionism. In essence, the argument claims that the node-level rules of connectionist networks, along with the semantic interpretations assigned to patterns of activation, serve to determine a set of representation-level rules incompatible with the RWR conception of cognition. The present paper argues that the Syntactic Argument can be made to show that RWR is inconsistent with connectionism.The present paper has been improved by conversations with Terry Horgan and John Tienson. Thanks are also due to Gary Fuller, John Heil, Terry Horgan and Bob Stecker for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale

One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.     

The value of cognitivism in thinking about extended cognition

This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.     

Structural changes induced by low-energy electron irradiation in GaSb

Structural changes in GaSb (001) thin films upon low-energy electron (125?keV) irradiation have been studied by in situ transmission electron microscopy. No structural changes were observed for irradiation at room temperature. However, in a sample irradiated at 473?K domains of {110} variant, rotated 90° from each other, were formed in the matrix. The average diameter of the domains was approximately 18?nm in the sample irradiated to a fluence of 4.8?×?10²⁴?electrons/m². It is considered that the domains are pseudo-{110} planes in the matrix formed by electron-irradiation-induced Shockley partial dislocations.     

Walter Pitts and “A Logical Calculus”

Many years after the publication of “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,” Warren McCulloch gave Walter Pitts credit for contributing his knowledge of modular mathematics to their joint project.

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