The troublesome explanandum in Plantinga’s argument against naturalism

Intending to have a constructive dialogue with the combination of evolutionary theory (E) and metaphysical naturalism (N), Alvin Plantinga’s “evolutionary argument against naturalism” (EAAN) takes the reliability of human cognition (in normal environments) as a purported explanandum and E&N as a purported explanans. Then, he considers whether E&N can offer a good explanans for this explanandum, and his answer is negative (an answer employed by him to produce a defeater for N). But I will argue that the whole EAAN goes wrong by assuming that R is a qualified explanandum crying out for scientific explanations, since it cannot meet either of the two criteria for any scientifically qualified explanandum: Realizability Criterion and Informativeness Criterion. Hence, EAAN is simply setting a task that E&N, as a scientific theory, will not care at all. Therefore, EAAN cannot substantially shake E&N.     

What Can Artificial Intelligence Learn from Wittgenstein＇s On Certainty？.

Meta-philosophically speaking, the philosophy of artificial intelligence （AI） is intended not only to explore the theoretical possibility of building ＂thinking machines,＂ but also to reveal philosophical implications of specific AI approaches. Wittgenstein＇s comments on the analytic/empirical dichotomy may offer inspirations for AI in the second sense. According to his ＂river metaphor＂ in On Certainty, the analytic/empirical boundary should be delimited in a way sensitive to specific contexts of practical reasoning. His proposal seems to suggest that any cognitive modeling project needs to render the system context-sensitive by avoiding representing large amounts of truisms in its cognitive processes, otherwise neither representational compactness nor computational efficiency can be achieved. In this article, different AI approaches （like the Common Sense Law of Inertia approach, the Bayesian approach and the connectionist approach） will be critically evaluated under the afore-mentioned Wittgensteinian criteria, followed by the author＇s own constructive suggestion on what AI needs to try to do in the near future.     

《逻辑哲学论》论概率和归纳

《逻辑哲学论》虽然注家甚多,此书对于概率和归纳问题的零星讨论却一直没有受到后人的重视,而本文则试图对这些讨论进行尝试性的重构。本文的写作目的是双重的。首先,本人试图揭示早期维特根斯坦的概率理论与他的整个逻辑原子论架构之间的关系,说明他是如何通过“真值根据”这个概念而将日常语言中的概率表述全部还原为真值函项理论的。在此基础上,笔者将说明为何他的这种概率理论缺乏实际的应用价值。其次,本文将讨论维氏将归纳问题和概率问题相互分离的“分离策略”,并尝试重构出他提出该策略的隐蔽动机。在此基础上．笔者将站在认知科学的立场上为这个策略本身提供一些辩护和批评。笔者认为,早期维氏虽然正确地看到了“思维经济原则”对于归纳推理的重要指导意义,并看到了该原则本身是无法被还原为逻辑真理的,却并没有意识到该原则本身可能是一切具有一定智能水准的问题解决系统所必须依赖的问题解决策略。令人遗憾的是,他对“心理学”和“逻辑”所作的简单的二分法阻止了他更为深入地对智能系统的普遍问题解决逻辑作出探究,尽管这种研究的确是可以相容于他的前述“分离策略”的。总而言之,本文认为早期维氏的概率理论的科学价值相当有限;与之相比较,他的归纳观却可能已指出了如何揭示智能系统的普遍认知机制的正确道路,尽管他在《逻辑哲学论》阶段还缺乏对于这条道路的全面自觉。     

What does Fodor��s ��anti-darwinism�� mean to natural theology?

In the current dialogue of “science and religion,” it is widely assumed that the thoughts of Darwinists and that of atheists overlap. However, Jerry Fodor, a full-fledged atheist, recently announced a war against Darwinism with his atheistic campaign. Prima facie, this “civil war” might offer a chance for theists: If Fodor is right, Darwinistic atheism will lose the cover of Darwinism and become less tenable. This paper provides a more pessimistic evaluation of the situation by explaining the following: Fodor’s criticism of adaptationism (as the backbone of Darwinism), viz., his refutation of any counterfactual-supporting laws on the macro-evolutionary level, implies that a law-maker is dispensable on this level. This will either encourage skepticism against the omniscience (at least that concerning the future of macro-evolution) of the Creator, or render the notion of God less appealing.     

如何让电脑真正懂汉语?——一种以许慎的“六书”理论为母型的汉语处理模型

哲学家塞尔曾指出,任何一台处理汉语输入的计算机都不能够像真人那样理解汉语,因为计算机无法获取汉语表达式的语义内容。他的这个论证,既预设了语义学和句法学之间的二分,而且也预设了一种外在论式的语义学观点。上述两个预设在本文中都会受到挑战。首先,本文将采纳一种内在论的(并且是准整体论)的语义学进路:根据此进路,意义完全可以在不直接牵涉到和外部对象的关系的情况下而被带入语义网。此外,本文所试图构建的语义学模型也不是句法驱动的——换言之,在该模型中,并没有任何语义中立的原则可以告知系统,复合语义是如何从"原子"语义中生成的。毋宁说,"原子"语义之间的亲和性,便已然在复合语义的构成中扮演了枢纽性角色。需要指出的是,关于语义融合的语义学难题,绝非当代语言学家和语言哲学家的专利。实际上,它早在东汉学者许慎的"六书"论中就已得到触及。根据许论,只要一个汉字的构件的语义得到了其它汉语表达式的恰当注解,该汉字本身的语义也便可得到确认。在本文中,许慎的"六书"论将以一种可计算的方式而得到系统化的重构,而该重构的技术基础则是王培先生发明的"纳思系统"(非公理化推理系统)。在这种重构基础上,现代汉语中语词的语义复合方式,也可以得到一种新颖的理解。     

How Could Chinese Thinking Modes Integrate into Contemporary Western Epistemology? —A Hybrid Perspective of Both AI and the Confucian Theory of the Rectification of Names

Post-Gettier contemporary epistemology is different from traditional epistemology in the sense that the former is concerned more with the normative dimension of knowledge, while the latter is concerned more with how knowledge is actually formed. Due to the cultural differences concerning how to understand key epistemological terms like “knowledge,” “belief,” and “justification,” the Chinese-speaking philosophical world, analytic thinkers precluded, has long been unable to appreciate the fruits of the post-Gettier epistemology. Two intermediate moves are proposed to take for filling the gap between post-Gettier epistemology and the Chinesespeaking intellectual community: Firstly, the fusion of AI and epistemology is encouraged, hence, such a move would provide a chance to double-check the putative universal applicability of specific conclusions of the post-Gettier epistemology from an engineering perspective; secondly, an algorithmoriented reconstruction of the Confucian theory of the rectification of names is also encouraged to bring new life to some traditional Chinese-based thoughts on the process of epistemic justification.     

Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?

Wittgenstein is widely viewed as a potential critic of a key philosophical assumption of the Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) thesis,namely,that it is in principle possible to build a programmed machine which can achieve real intelligence.Stuart Shanker has provided the most systematic reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian argument against AI,building on Wittgenstein's own statements,the "rule-following" feature of language-games,and the putative alliance between AI and psychologism.This article will attempt to refute this reconstruction and its constituent arguments,thereby paving the way for a new and amicable rather than agonistic conception of the Wittgensteinian position on AI.     

Iki and Contingency: A Reconstruction of Shūzō Kuki’s Early Aesthetic theory

Iki is the key word of Shūzō Kuki’s The Structure of Iki, and it became one of the most widely recognized Japanese aesthetic categories mainly due to this work. However, in The Problems of Contingency, which is Kuki’s most important philosophical work, there is no discussion of iki again, and consequently, most commentators of Kuki fail to see the correlation between his theories of iki and contingency. This article, by contrast, intends to provide a new interpretation of iki in the light of Kuki’s theory of contingency. The specific thesis of this paper is that aesthetic phenomena categorized as subject to the principles of iki are positively evaluated in Japanese culture just because the consciousness of iki is just one form of the consciousness of contingency, in which the awareness of alternatives to the actual situation could produce considerable spiritual entertainment for aesthetic subjects.     

丹尼特的“异类现象学”——新实用主义谱系中一个被忽略的环节

一般认为,"新实用主义"乃经典实用主义的一个后现代主义的变种,它无法在知识论的角度接受心灵表征的客观实在性。本文则认为,反实在论并非是我们发展实用主义的心灵哲学时必然陷入的理论窠臼。如果我们采纳美国哲学家丹尼特主张的"异类现象学"方法,我们就有可能将科学方法和工具主义立场相调和,或在对他人的心灵状态做出本体论承诺时,不必向反实在论投降。     

一个维特根斯坦主义者眼中的框架问题

框架问题的核心命意乃是：在对智能体的行动进行表征之时,如何能够在有效地表征出行动的效果之时,避免对于其非效果的表征？对于符号主义路数的人工智能研究来说,框架问题的确非常棘手,因为它的存在使得对于行动的知识刻画必须引入大量的框架公理,并由此使得系统的计算负荷剧增。从历史上看,人工智能界赖以解决这个问题的基本路径主要有两条。第一条是诉诸于＂关于惯性的常识律＂或缺省逻辑,即在行动表征中预设：没有被表征式牵涉到的＂世界其余部分＂都将保持惯性。另一条路径则采纳了海耶斯的＂素朴物理学＂表征方案,即试图把日常物理学知识全部用谓词逻辑公理化,让系统自动推算出哪些动作会导致哪些结果。本文将论证,这两条道路其实都走不通。在此基础上,本文将从维特根斯坦的《论确定性》中寻找灵感,建立一个关于信念网动力学模型——在这个模型中,某些知识节点的激发只会导致某些与之毗邻的节点的激发,因此,对于特定问题求解路径的表征,就能够避免对于一个更大范围内的知识网络的牵涉。框架问题也有望借助于这个模型得到解决。最后,我将利用＂非公理推演系统＂（NARS）为这个模型提供一种尽量逼真的工程学模拟。