Modern and postmodern challenges to game theory

Equilibrium game theory borrows from neoclassical economics its rationality concept which it immediately puts to work in order to produce the basic results it needs for building an elaborate narrative of social interaction. This paper focuses on some recent objections to game theory's use of rationality assumptions in general, and of backward induction and subgame perfection in particular, and interprets them in the light of the postmodern critique of the grand meta-narratives which social theorists often rely on for social explanation. The paper presents a defence of game theory which seeks to accommodate the postmodern critique. However, it goes on to show that such a defence is illegitimate and claims that the problem lies with the faulty conceptualisation of the main concept on which game theory rests: that of Reason. Having established the nature of the problem, it considers three alternative interpretations (Humean, postmodern and Hegelian) of why the problem resists logical solutions and of its significance for social theory.I am indebted to Bob Sugden for introducing me to rational deviance, to Roberto Finelli for some important associations, to Shaun Hargreaves-Heap for the time we spent arguing about the postmodern condition, and to Joseph Halevi for his dialectical intransigence. Nonetheless, this paper should be blamed entirely on me.     

MORAL RHETORIC IN THE FACE OF STRATEGIC WEAKNESS: EMPERIMENTAL CLUES FOR AN ANCIENT PUZZLE

Moralising is a venerable last resort strategy. The ancient Melians presented the Athenian generals with a splendid example when in a particularly tight corner. In our Western philosophical tradition moral rhetoric is often couched in the form of reasons for action either external to preference and desire (eg. Kant) or internal to the agent's calculus of desire (e.g., Hume, Gauthier). A third tradition dismisses such rhetoric as the last recourse of the weak (e.g., Aristotle, Nietzsche) whereas a fourth calls for an examination of the social context (e.g., Socrates, Marx, Wittgenstein, Habermas). This paper reports on an experiment which throws some empirical light on these debates and offers a surprising twist to the interpretation of the Melians' plea.     

Toward a Theory of Solidarity

Many types of `other-regarding' acts and beliefs cannotbe accounted for satisfactorilyas instances of sophisticated selfishness, altruism,team-reasoning, Kantian duty, kinselection etc. This paper argues in favour ofre-inventing the notion of solidarity as ananalytical category capable of shedding importantnew light on hitherto under-explainedaspects of human motivation. Unlike altruism andnatural sympathy (which turn theinterests of specific others into one's own), orteam-reasoning (which applies exclusivelyto members of some team), or Kantian duty (whichdemands universalisable principlesof action), the essence of solidarity lies in thehypothesis that people are capable ofresponding sympathetically to (or empathising with)a condition afflicting others,irrespectively of who those others are or whetherone cares for them personally. Andwhen that condition is a social artefact, we argue,solidarity turns radical.