NO CLOSURE ON SKEPTICISM

This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure‐based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.     

Predicting your own and others' thoughts and feelings: More like a stranger than a friend

Subjects made predictions about the likely cognitions or affective reactions that they, a well-known other, and a prototypic other, would have to ink-blot and pictorial stimuli. Their responses were categorized using Karniol's (1986) 10 transformation rules. No differences between the targets of prediction were found on any of the measures when ink-blot stimuli were used. For pictorial stimuli, a greater variety of transformation rules was used to make predictions about a well-known other than about self, and a greater variety of transformation rules was used for self than for a prototypic other. Again, for pictorial stimuli, more predictions about a well-known other were made using associations, transformation rules that represent personalized knowledge than about self, and more predictions using associations were made about self than about a prototypic other. Finally, the specific transformation rules used to make predictions about self and a prototypic other were more often the same than were the rules used to make predictions about self and a well-known other. The implications of the findings for the way procedural and declarative knowledge are represented are discussed within the context of the transformation rule model. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.