Prediction accuracy of text recall: Ease, effort and familiarity

Prediction accuracy of text recall was studied in two experiments. Text characteristics (i.e., consistency and distinctiveness) were manipulated in Experiment 1, and familiarity with the reading-task in Experiment 2. The results were also analyzed and discussed in terms of easy processing (Experiment 1), and in terms of increased and more active processing (Experiment 2). Text characteristics did not affect prediction accuracy. However, being familiar with the reading-task led to good and long-lasting prediction accuracy. Thus, subjects reading a school-book text, instructed to learn the contents of it demonstrated reliable memory awareness, both for immediate recall and for delay of one week. It was also suggested that increased processing demands and active reading enhances prediction accuracy.     

Sociolinguistic inference and intercultural coorientation.

We present a model that examines the effects of cultural differences on coorientation (the ability of communicators to accurately encode and interpret the referential and relational meanings of messages). Intercultural coorientation is made problematic by the absence of certain shared communication system knowledge, which in same‐culture interactions is used in the dynamic sociolinguistic negotiation of relational rights and obligations. We propose that the process of sociolinguistic negotiation of meanings relies fundamentally on probabilistic inference and have constructed a model based on Bayes' theorem. The model predicts the effects of the communication situation, communicator stereotypes and prejudice, and some other‐culture speaker errors on conclusions the receiver draws about the message. Using the model, we distinguish between the ethnocentric error of interpreting a communication in terms of one's own culture and the error of not seeing the communication as diagnostic. Among our predictions are: (a) the less diagnostic the communication, the more impact cultural stereotypes will have on attributions; (b) although evidence of sociolinguistic incompetence sometimes causes misunderstanding, it sometimes prevents misunderstanding; (c) multiple consistent features make intentions clearer than would a single cue, but multiple features violating co‐occurrence norms often lead to the attribution of incompetence.     

Synaesthesia: the prevalence of atypical cross-modal experiences

Sensory and cognitive mechanisms allow stimuli to be perceived with properties relating to sight, sound, touch, etc, and ensure, for example, that visual properties are perceived as visual experiences, rather than sounds, tastes, smells, etc. Theories of normal development can be informed by cases where this modularity breaks down, in a condition known as synaesthesia. Conventional wisdom has held that this occurs extremely rarely (0.05% of births) and affects women more than men. Here we present the first test of synaesthesia prevalence with sampling that does not rely on self-referral, and which uses objective tests to establish genuineness. We show that (a) the prevalence of synaesthesia is 88 times higher than previously assumed, (b) the most common variant is coloured days, (c) the most studied variant (grapheme-colour synaesthesia)--previously believed most common--is prevalent at 1%, and (d) there is no strong asymmetry in the distribution of synaesthesia across the sexes. Hence, we suggest that female biases reported earlier likely arose from (or were exaggerated by) sex differences in self-disclosure.     

Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants’ judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion (i.e. positive and negative) influence judgments of learning (JOLs) relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions (Experiment 2). Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion (e.g. anger) was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory.     

The concreteness effect on judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of fluency and beliefs

Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants’ beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants’ beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants’ predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.     

Information processing in patients with first episode major depression

Hammar, Å., Kildal, A. B. & Schmid, M. (2012). Information processing in patients with first episode major depression. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 445–449. Few studies have investigated cognitive functioning in a group of patients experiencing a first episode of depression. The aim of this study was to investigate how patients diagnosed with a first episode of depression perform in effortful and non‐effortful information processing compared to healthy controls. An experimental paradigm based on a visual search test was applied. Thirty‐one patients and thirty‐one healthy controls were included in the study. All patients experienced a severe level of symptom load at the time of testing. Results showed no significant differences between groups under any of the conditions. Findings in the present study indicate that patients with a first episode of depression perform equally to healthy controls in tasks requiring visual attention in both effortful and non‐effortful information processing.     

Book reviews

Mary T. Malone, Women and Christianity, II: The Medieval Period AD 1000–1500 (Blackrock: Columba Press, 2001), ISBN 1–85607–339–4 (pbk), 198 pp.

Nicholas Sagovsky, Ecumenism, Christian Origins and the Practice of Communion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ISBN 0–521–77269–9 (hbk), 221 pp.

John D. Zizioulas, Eucharist, Bishop, Church (trans. Elizabeth Theokritoff; Boston, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001), ISBN 1–885652–43–7 (pbk).

Peter Matheson, The Imaginative World of the Reformation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), ISBN 0–8006–3291–5 (pbk), xiv + 153 pp. Illus.

Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (eds.), Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust (London/NY: Leicester University Press/Continuum, 2002), ISBN 0–7185–0274–2 (pbk), 256 pp.

Paul Freston, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ISBN 0–521–80041–2 (hbk), xiii + 344 pp.     

Explaining the forgetting bias effect on value judgments: The influence of memory for a past test

People often feel that information that was forgotten is less important than remembered information. Prior work has shown that participants assign higher importance to remembered information while undervaluing forgotten information. The current study examined two possible accounts of this finding. In three experiments, participants studied lists of words in which each word was randomly assigned a point value denoting the value of remembering the word. Following the presentation of each list participants engaged in a free recall test. After the presentation of all lists participants were shown each of the words they had studied and asked to recall the point value that was initially paired with each word. Experiment 1 tested a fluency-based account by presenting items for value judgments in a low-fluency or high-fluency format. Experiment 2 examined whether value judgments reflect attributions based on the familiarity of an item when value judgments are made. Finally, in Experiment 3, we evaluated whether participants believe that forgotten words are less important by having them judge whether an item was initially recalled or forgotten prior to making a value judgment. Manipulating the fluency of an item presented for judgment had no influence on value ratings (Experiment 1) and familiarity exerted a limited influence on value judgments (Experiment 2). More importantly, participants’ value judgments appeared to reflect a theory that remembered information is more valuable than forgotten information (Experiment 3). Overall, the present work suggests that individuals may apply a theory about remembering and forgetting to retrospectively assess the value of information.