Creative thinking in adolescents with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).

A widened attentional focus, that is typically associated with ADHD, has been postulated to be accompanied by enhanced creative ability. However, creativity has been only limitedly examined in ADHD. Performance across several creativity measures were investigated in three groups: adolescents with ADHD, those with conduct disorder, and a healthy control sample. The ADHD group exhibited selective cognitive advantages and disadvantages by demonstrating an enhanced ability in overcoming the constraining influence of examples, but a reduced capacity to generate a functional invention during an imagery task. These findings are interpreted with reference to inhibitory control mechanisms and the contextual modulation of creative cognition.     

Conceptual expansion and creative imagery as a function of psychoticism

The ability to be creative is often considered a unique characteristic of conscious beings and many efforts have been directed at demonstrating a relationship between creativity and the personality construct of psychoticism. The present study sought to investigate this link explicitly by focusing on discrete facets of creative cognition, namely the originality/novelty dimension and the practicality/usefulness dimension. Based on Eysenck's conceptualisation of psychoticism as being characterised by an overinclusive cognitive style, it was expected that higher levels of psychoticism would accompany a greater degree of conceptual expansion and elevated levels of originality in creative imagery, but would be unrelated to the practicality/usefulness of an idea. These hypotheses were confirmed in 80 healthy participants who were contrasted based on their EPQ psychoticism scale scores. Our findings suggest that the link between psychoticism and creativity is based on associative thinking and broader but weak top-down activation patterns rather than on goal-related thinking.     

Insight problem solving in individuals with high versus low schizotypy

Insight problem solving requires restructuring of a problem space by stepping out of the framework provided by the commonly activated cognitive schemas and acquiring a new perspective on the problem. Schizotypy has been linked with loosened associative and overinclusive thinking that may be advantageous for this process. The present study tested this hypothesis and found that individuals with a high degree of schizotypy show better performance on a set of insight problems relative to individuals with low schizotypy, but not on a set of incremental problems that required focused goal-related thinking. Results support the notion that schizotypy is associated not only with enhanced abilities in creative processes involved in divergent thinking but also in creative operations during analytical problem solving.     

Can clouds dance? Neural correlates of passive conceptual expansion using a metaphor processing task: Implications for creative cognition

Creativity has emerged in the focus of neurocognitive research in the past decade. However, a heterogeneous pattern of brain areas has been implicated as underpinning the neural correlates of creativity. One explanation for these divergent findings lies in the fact that creativity is not usually investigated in terms of its many underlying cognitive processes. The present fMRI study focuses on the neural correlates of conceptual expansion, a central component of all creative processes. The study aims to avoid pitfalls of previous fMRI studies on creativity by employing a novel paradigm. Participants were presented with phrases and made judgments regarding both the unusualness and the appropriateness of the stimuli, corresponding to the two defining criteria of creativity. According to their respective evaluation, three subject-determined experimental conditions were obtained. Phrases judged as both unusual and appropriate were classified as indicating conceptual expansion in participants. The findings reveal the involvement of frontal and temporal regions when engaging in passive conceptual expansion as opposed to the information processing of mere unusualness (novelty) or appropriateness (relevance). Taking this new experimental approach to uncover specific processes involved in creative cognition revealed that frontal and temporal regions known to be involved in semantic cognition and relational reasoning play a role in passive conceptual expansion. Adopting a different vantage point on the investigation of creativity would allow for critical advances in future research on this topic.     

Can clouds dance? Part 2: An ERP investigation of passive conceptual expansion

Conceptual expansion, one of the core operations in creative cognition, was investigated in the present ERP study. An experimental paradigm using novel metaphoric, nonsensical and literal phrases was employed where individual differences in conceptual knowledge organization were accounted for by using participants’ responses to categorize the stimuli to each condition. The categorization was determined by their judgment of the stimuli on the two defining criteria of creativity: unusualness and appropriateness. Phrases judged as unusual and appropriate were of special interest as they are novel and unfamiliar phrases thought to passively induce conceptual expansion. The results showed a graded N400 modulation for phrases judged to be unusual and inappropriate (nonsense) or unusual and appropriate (conceptual expansion, novel metaphorical) relative to usual and appropriate (literal) phrases. The N400 is interpreted as indexing greater effort to retrieve semantic information and integrate the novel concepts presented through the phrases. Analyses of the later time-window showed an ongoing negativity that was graded in the same manner as the N400. The findings attest to the usefulness of investigating creative cognition using event-related electrophysiology.     

Emotion-induced modulation of recognition memory decisions in a Go/NoGo task: Response bias or memory bias?

In recognition memory tests for words, items with negative emotional meaning are more often classified as “old” compared to neutral items, whether or not they are in fact old. Two accounts for this bias have been offered: One proposes that emotions disrupt retrieval and response monitoring processes (executive control account), the other proposes that emotions cause illusory feelings of remembering (memory bias account). We addressed this issue by varying the target signal in a Go/NoGo variant of a recognition memory task for negative, neutral, and positive words and faces: One group of participants was asked to respond to old items whereas the other group was asked to respond to new items. Results showed that the “Go-for-old” group showed the typical emotion-induced response bias shift for both positive and negative words, while the “Go-for-new” group showed the opposite pattern. Results were nonsignificant for faces, but went into the same direction. The findings are clearly inconsistent with the executive control account and speak for a genuine memory illusion induced by emotional arousal.     

Subconscious Detection of Threat as Reflected by an Enhanced Response Bias

Neurobiological and cognitive models of unconscious information processing suggest that subconscious threat detection can lead to cognitive misinterpretations and false alarms, while conscious processing is assumed to be perceptually and conceptually accurate and unambiguous. Furthermore, clinical theories suggest that pathological anxiety results from a crude preattentive warning system predominating over more sophisticated and controlled modes of processing. We investigated the hypothesis that subconscious detection of threat in a cognitive task is reflected by enhanced “false signal” detection rather than by selectively enhanced discrimination of threat items in 30 patients with panic disorder and 30 healthy controls. We presented a tachistoscopic word–nonword discrimination task and a subsequent recognition task and analyzed the data by means of process-dissociation procedures. In line with our expectations, subjects of both groups showed more false signal detection to threat than to neutral stimuli as indicated by an enhanced response bias, whereas indices of discriminative sensitivity did not show this effect. In addition, patients with panic disorder showed a generally enhanced response bias in comparison to healthy controls. They also seemed to have processed the stimuli less elaborately and less differentially. Results are consistent with the assumption that subconscious threat detection can lead to misrepresentations of stimulus significance and that pathological anxiety is characterized by a hyperactive preattentive alarm system that is insufficiently controlled by higher cognitive processes.     

Mismaking memories: neural precursors of memory illusions in electrical brain activity

Memory illusions--vivid experiences of events that never occurred--could result from inaccuracies either in retrieving memories or in initially storing them. In two experiments, people studied lists of associated words that either did or did not induce later illusory (false) memories of associated but nonpresented lure words. The amplitude of the electrical brain activity during study of words (approximately 500-1,300 ms) that were themselves later correctly remembered reliably distinguished list words that led to such illusory memories from those that did not. This encoding difference associated with subsequent illusory memory (referred to as a DIM)--presumably reflecting item-specific encoding differences--is a neural precursor of memory illusions.     

Intact emotion-induced recognition bias in neuropsychological patients with executive control deficits

In recognition memory tasks, emotionally negative words are judged more often as "old" relative to emotionally neutral words, suggesting a shift in response bias. We wondered whether this bias shift was due to the flexible regulation of executive control during memory retrieval. To address this question, we investigated individuals with high variability in executive control functions. As expected, we observed that emotional word meaning did indeed have a strong influence on the bias toward responding "old," independent of recognition accuracy and overall response bias. However, these effects were uncorrelated with executive control, as measured by the Trail Making Test, and were fully intact, even in a sample of hospitalized neurological patients with severe executive dysfunctions, some of whom had marked damage in fronto-thalamo-striatal networks. Having concluded that the emotion-induced bias must develop on different grounds, we went on to discuss alternative explanations.     

Dissociating prelexical and postlexical processing of affective information in the two hemispheres: effects of the stimulus presentation format

Using a lexical decision task, the authors investigated whether brain asymmetries in the detection of emotionally negative semantic associations arise only at a perceptually discriminative stage at which lexical analysis is accurate or can already be found at crude and incomplete levels of perceptual representation at which word-nonword discrimination is based solely on guessing. Emotionally negative and neutral items were presented near perceptual threshold in the left and right visual hemifields. Word-nonword discrimination performance as well as the bias to classify a stimulus as a "word" (whether or not it actually is a word) were assessed for a normal, horizontal stimulus presentation format (Experiment 1) and for an unusual, vertical presentation format (Experiment 2). Results show that while the two hemispheres are equally able to detect affective semantic associations at a prelexical processing stage (both experiments), the right hemisphere is superior at a postlexical, perceptually discriminative stage (Experiment 2). Moreover, the findings suggest that only an unusual, nonoverlearned stimulus presentation format allows adequate assessment of the right hemisphere's lexical-semantic skills.