Memory and awareness in a patient with multiple personality disorder

We studied an individual with multiple personality disorder in whom each of several personalities claimed to have no direct awareness of the others and to be unable to consciously remember the experiences of other personalities. A broad selection of implicit and explicit memory tests was used to determine the extent to which one personality had access to knowledge acquired by another and the circumstances in which that knowledge would be expressed. The implicit assessment of memory was a necessary but not sufficient condition for demonstrating interpersonality access. The degree of compartmentalization of knowledge in this patient depended largely on whether the interpretation of presented information was likely to differ across personalities.     

On the development of procedural knowledge

Amnesic patients demonstrate by their performance on a serial reaction time task that they learned a repeating spatial sequence despite their lack of awareness of the repetition (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). In the experiments reported here, we investigated this form of procedural learning in normal subjects. A subgroup of subjects showed substantial procedural learning of the sequence in the absence of explicit declarative knowledge of it. Their ability to generate the sequence was effectively at chance and showed no savings in learning. Additional amounts of training increased both procedural and declarative knowledge of the sequence. Development of knowledge in one system seems not to depend on knowledge in the other. Procedural learning in this situation is neither solely perceptual nor solely motor. The learning shows minimal transfer to a situation employing the same motor sequence.     

Implicit motor sequence learning is represented in response locations

Previous work (Willingham, 1999) has indicated that implicit motor sequence learning is not primarily perceptual; that is, what is learned is not a sequence of stimuli. Still other work has indicated that implicit motor sequence learning is not specific to particular muscle groups or effectors. In the present work, we tested whether implicit motor sequence learning would be represented as a sequence of response locations. In Experiment 1, learning showed very poor transfer when the response locations were changed, even though the stimulus positions were unchanged. In Experiment 2, participants switched their hand positions at transfer, so that one group of participants pushed the same sequence of keys but used a different sequence of finger movements to do so, whereas another group pushed a different sequence of keys but used the same sequence of finger movements used at training. Knowledge of the sequence was shown at transfer only if the sequence of response locations was maintained, not the sequence of finger movements.     

Becoming aware of motor skill

Conscious processes have a complex relationship to skilled motor performance. Past work has shown that some types of motor skill can be learned without any contribution from conscious processes. New work indicates that if those unconscious processes are disabled, conscious processes might step in to make up for the deficit.     

What differentiates declarative and procedural memories: reply to Cohen, Poldrack, and Eichenbaum (1997)

CPE claim that procedural and declarative representations differ on two important dimensions: flexibility and compositionality. I have proposed that the apparent flexibility of a memory depends entirely on the transfer conditions. Any retest is, in some sense, a test of flexibility, because something has changed since the original encoding episodic. I have argued that if one changes something that does not provide support to memory performance, the memory will appear flexible, and resistant to changes in the environment. If one changes the very thing that the representation codes, the memory will appear inflexible and easily disrupted by changes in the environment. This principle is equally true for procedural and declarative memory. CPE contend that procedural representations lack compositionality. An ideal test of this claim would examine the representation of a task that is widely agreed to be procedural (e.g. that has been demonstrated to be learned normally by amnesic patients, and in the absence of awareness by neurologically intact subjects). Such experiments appear not to have been conducted, and the fact is that many tasks that are widely agreed to be procedural probably are not compositional. They appear to be, as CPE contend, biases in a processing system; it is hard to imagine how repetition priming could be compositional. Nevertheless, this is not true of all procedural memories. There is a good deal of evidence that motor behaviour is organised hierarchically and has compositionality. There is every reason to think that most if not all motor behaviour is procedural; motor behaviour might be driven by goals that are declarative, but the low-level operations that actually manipulate effectors are closed to consciousness, do not depend on the medial temporal lobe or diencephalon, and would therefore be classified as procedural. CPE framed their theory of differences between procedural and declarative memory systems as an account of the deficit in amnesic patients. They therefore predict that the learning of amnesic patients should not show flexibility or compositionality. There is already at least one study showing learning in amnesic patients that is as flexible as that of control participants (Knowlton & Squire, 1996). There are not, to my knowledge, data on whether the motor skill learning of amnesic patients shows compositionality, but one might expect that it would, given that it does in neurologically intact participants, and given that motor skill learning appears unimpaired in amnesic patients. Thus, the conception of declarative and procedural memory provided by CPE may not provide a complete account of amnesic performance. The anatomic distinction between procedural and declarative memory systems appears quite strong, and there is therefore reason to believe that there are accompanying computational differences. There does not, however, appear to be sufficient evidence to support those differences proposed by CPE.     

Non-declarative sequence learning does not show savings in relearning

Researchers have utilized the savings in relearning paradigm in a variety of settings since Ebbinghaus developed the tool over a century ago. In spite of its widespread use, we do not yet understand what type(s) of memory are measurable by savings. Specifically, can savings measure both declarative and non-declarative memories? The lack of conscious recollection of the encoded material in some studies indicates that non-declarative memories may show savings effects, but as all studies to date have used declarative tasks, we cannot be certain. Here, we administer a non-declarative task and then measure savings in relearning the material declaratively. Our results show that while material outside of awareness may show savings effects, non-declarative sequence memory does not. These data highlight the important distinction between memory without awareness and non-declarative memory.     

Effect of sex and joystick experience on pursuit tracking in adults

Using a joystick, adults (n = 39 males, 40 females in Experiment 1; n = 35 males, 40 females in Experiment 2; and n = 18 males, 18 females in Experiment 3) performed a computerized pursuit tracking task. Contrary to previously reported findings, the males were not more accurate than the females when performance was adjusted for prior perceptual-motor experience. Although no sex differences were found in a speeded tracking task, in an inverted tracking task the males exhibited a significant performance advantage; that advantage remained after several blocks of practice. Because participants' performance was adjusted statistically for prior perceptual-motor experience, the male advantage in inverted tracking was not related to experience. Rather, more proficient inverted tracking performance was associated with higher 3-dimensional mental rotations scores. In sum, sex differences in normal pursuit tracking may be better explained by differences in perceptual-motor experience. Inverted tracking, however, may depend on proficiency with spatial transformations.     

The Neural Basis of Motor-Skill Learning

Recent work indicates that motor-skill learning is supported by four processes: a strategic process that selects new goals of what to change in the environment, a perceptual-motor integration process that adjusts to new relationships between environmental stimuli and the appropriate motor response, a sequencing process that learns sequences of motor acts, and a dynamic process that learns new patterns of muscle activations. These four processes can operate in one of two modes: an unconscious mode, in which one is aware only of the goal of the movement, or a conscious mode, in which one consciously controls detailed aspects of the movement. This article provides an overview of these four processes and two modes, and describes their neural bases.     

Deficit in learning of a motor skill requiring strategy, but not of perceptuomotor recalibration, with aging

We investigated the effect of aging on different aspects of motor skill learning using two computer-presented perceptuomotor tasks. The relationship between visual and proprioceptive feedback was transformed in the first task, which was open to the formation and use of strategies. This task was designed to lead to perceptuomotor adaptation that was then measured by performance on a very similar second task that was not open to the use of strategy task. Older participants showed impaired learning of the strategic task but not of the nonstrategic task. This is in line with the suggestion that the effect of aging on learning and memory may be to reduce working memory resources.     

Ethnicity, Acculturation, and Religiosity as Predictors of Female College Students' Role Expectations

The present study was designed to examine ethnicity, acculturation, and religiosity as predictors of European American and Korean American evangelical female college students' role expectations. Fifty-seven European American and 37 Korean American single women, who ranged in age from 17 to 24 years, completed a demographic questionnaire, a role expectation measure, three religiosity measures, and an acculturation measure. The results indicated a significant negative correlation between fundamentalism and role-sharing expectations for European American women and a significant positive correlation between level of acculturation and role-sharing expectations for Korean American women. The results suggest that fundamentalism is a stronger predictor of role expectations than religious commitment in European American women and that acculturation is a more accurate predictor of role expectations than generation in the United States among Korean American women.