HOW TO TALK TO YOURSELF OR KRIPKE's WITTGENSTEIN's SOLITARY LANGUAGE ARGUMENT AND WHY IT FAILS

Abstract: In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein argues that it is possible for individuals in communities to speak a language and otherwise follow rules, but impossible for a single, conceptually isolated individual to do so. I show that the roots of the argument lie in his general account of the legitimacy of practices, and that he actually argues for two distinct conclusions: (a) solitary individuals cannot have useful practices of rule‐following and (b) solitary individuals cannot place substantive restrictions on their own behavior. I show that if it is, in fact, possible for individuals in communities to use language and follow rules, then both of Kripke's Wittgenstein's anti‐solitary language arguments fails; and, furthermore, that his general account not only fails to exclude the possibility of solitary language‐use and rule‐following, it actually guarantees their possibility.     

No Evidence of Suicide Increase Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States: An Interrupted Time‐Series Analysis of September 11 and Oklahoma City

There is substantial evidence of detrimental psychological sequelae following disasters, including terrorist attacks. The effect of these events on extreme responses such as suicide, however, is unclear. We tested competing hypotheses about such effects by employing autoregressive integrated moving average techniques to model the impact of September 11 and the Oklahoma City bombing on monthly suicide counts at the local, state, and national level. Unlike prior studies that provided conflicting evidence, rigorous time series techniques revealed no support for an increase or decrease in suicides following these events. We conclude that while terrorist attacks produce subsequent psychological morbidity and may affect self and collective efficacy well beyond their immediate impact, these effects are not strong enough to influence levels of suicide mortality.     

Comparisons of developmental modeling frameworks and levels of analysis in cognition: connectionist and dynamic systems theories deserve attention,but don’t yet explain attention

In this article, an investigator who is outside of the connectionist / dynamic systems (CD) tradition, but is sympathetic to many of its theoretical stances, considers whether these are separate approaches and what the two approaches mean for the development of information processing. It is argued that these approaches have not been defined in the target articles of this special issue narrowly enough to make them clearly separate approaches. Rather, they appear to emphasize different aspects of a common approach. It is also suggested that they do not form an overarching theory of development but do form an important theoretical approach at one level of analysis. In particular, one may sometimes, but not always, have to get into nonlinear interactions between faculties of the mind to predict and explain behavior. Finally, an attempt is made to challenge the CD approach to become more global by confronting the issue of how attention and conscious awareness should be represented in these models, and how the development of them may occur. Evidence of changes in automatic and attention-related parameters of processing may provide a scaffolding upon which better CD models can be constructed.     

Logical Foundations for Belief Representation

This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems far natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because—unlike pure indicators—they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the embedding sentence. Therefore, the referent of the quasi-indicator must be represented in such a way that no invalid coreferential claims are entailed. The importance of quasi-indicators is discussed, and it is shown that all four of the above categories of belief reports can be handled by a single representational technique using belief spaces containing intensional entities. Inference rules and belief-revision techniques for the system ore also examined.