Stress, self-esteem, and suicidal ideation in late adolescents

The relationships among stress, self-esteem, and suicidal ideation in late adolescents were examined in a group of college students. Multiple regression analysis indicated that both stress and self-esteem were significantly related to suicidal ideation; low self-esteem and stressful life events significantly predicted suicidal ideation. The hypothesis that self-esteem would moderate the effects of life stressors on suicidal ideation was supported at the .06 level. A significant minority of the sample indicated having thoughts severe enough to be classified as clinical suicidal ideation. In general, participants who had experienced negative life events in the 6 to 12 months prior to participating in the study had lower self-esteem than those who had similar stresses within the prior six months. However, the opposite was true for clinical suicidal ideators; those who experienced negative life stressors recently had lower self-esteem than those who experienced negative life events six months to a year in the past.     

Semantic indeterminacy and the realist stance

Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Realism are perhaps the two most ubiquitous and influential doctrines of the Quinean corpus. My concern is to argue against neither in isolation, but against their joint compatibility. Scientific Realism, I argue, when understood as Quine's realistic attitude toward the posits of physical theory, is essentially intentional in character. Thus, Realism requires Intentionality. In Section 1, I provide some necessary exegesis. In Section 2, I attempt to show how this Realism/Intentionality connection arises, surprisingly, within Quine's own mature work to create a tension in his views which he does not himself resolve. In Section 3, I examine the source of the Realism/Intentionality connection more deeply, and respond to possible Quinean objections to my account. In Section 4, I consider the consequences of the connection for various debates in recent analytic philosophy.     

Reexamining models of healthy families

This paper presents the perceptions of members of an alternative family form concerning the strengths of their family type, the functions of family, family models, and traits of a healthy families in general. The concepts presented are the product of a qualitative research study of shared home families.     

Do development and learning really decrease memory? On similarity and category-based induction in adults and children

In a recently published study, Sloutsky and Fisher [Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A.V. (2004a). When development and learning decrease memory: Evidence against category-based induction in children. Psychological Science, 15, 553-558; Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (2004b). Induction and categorization in young children: A similarity-based model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 166-188.] demonstrated that children have better memory for the items that they generalise to than do adults. On the basis of this finding, they claim that children and adults use different mechanisms for inductive generalisations; whereas adults focus on shared category membership, children project properties on the basis of perceptual similarity. Sloutsky & Fisher attribute children's enhanced recognition memory to the more detailed processing required by this similarity-based mechanism. In Experiment 1 we show that children look at the stimulus items for longer than adults. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that although when given just 250ms to inspect the items children remain capable of making accurate inferences, their subsequent memory for those items decreases significantly. These findings suggest that there are no necessary conclusions to be drawn from Sloutsky & Fisher's results about developmental differences in generalisation strategy.     

Deciding between theories of how reasoning develops is hard

Although Sloutsky agrees with our interpretation of our data, he argues that the totality of the evidence supports his claim that children make inductive generalisations on the basis of similarity. Here we take issue with his characterisation of the alternative hypotheses in his informal analysis of the data, and suggest that a thorough Bayesian analysis, although practically very difficult, is likely to result in a more finely balanced outcome than he suggests.