Self-serving interpretations of flattery: why ingratiation works

Persons who are flattered are more likely to assign credibility to and like the flatterer than observers, presumably because they are motivated by vanity. In existing studies, however, the difference between targets and observers has been confounded with other variables. The present experiments demonstrate that the target-observer difference in judgments of an ingratiator is not affected by these confounding variables, such as cognitive resources, the motive to like one's interaction partner, or to form an accurate impression, or mood. Results further suggest that, whereas cognitive responses to ingratiation are different among participants with high versus low self-esteem, affective responses and judgments of the ingratiator are not qualified by any personality variables.     

Reliability and validity of a twelve-minute walking test for coronary heart disease patients

This study examined the reliability and validity of a 12-min. walking test for coronary heart disease patients. CHD patients (28 men, 18 women) were recruited out of 86 CHD patients of the Martini Hospital Groningen, The Netherlands. 46 CHD patients (age M=66.0 yr., SD=6.8) participated in the reliability study and 24 (age M=62.0 yr., SD=9.2) in the validity study. A test-retest analysis showed a satisfactory Bland-Altman plot and an intraclass coefficient of .98. The Pearson correlation between the score on the test and the VO2 peak was .77. This test gives a reliable and valid assessment of cardiorespiratory fitness of CHD patients.     

Predicting without modeling: a critique of Trabasso and Bartolone (2003)

T. Trabasso and J. Bartolone (2003) used a computational model of narrative text comprehension to account for empirical findings. The authors show that the same predictions are obtained without running the model. This is caused by the model's computational setup, which leaves most of the model's input unchanged.     

Orangutans (Pongo abelii) and a gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) match features in familiar and unfamiliar individuals

Great apes can perceive images as representative of corresponding real-life objects. Coupled with the potential advantages of identifying specific members of one’s species and mounting evidence for individual recognition in other non-humans, it seems likely that great apes would have the ability to identify conspecifics in photographs. The ability of four orangutans and a gorilla to match images of individuals of their own and a closely related but unfamiliar species was examined here for the first time. First, the subjects matched photographs of familiar conspecifics taken at various time points in a delayed matching-to-sample procedure (Experiment 1). Second, they matched different photographs of unfamiliar individuals of a different species (Experiment 2) at above chance levels. These results suggest that the subjects matched photographs by matching physical features, not necessarily by recognizing the identity of the individuals depicted. However, they also quickly learned to select photographs of familiar individuals when these photographs were paired with photographs of unfamiliar individuals of their own species (Experiment 3), and three subjects showed transfer to novel images of familiar and unfamiliar individuals. Thus, the findings support the idea that subjects attended to physical features to identify individuals that they could categorize on the basis of familiarity.     

Spatial representation of magnitude in humans (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Homo sapiens</Emphasis>), Western lowland gorillas (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Gorilla gorilla gorilla</Emphasis>), and American black bears (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ursus americanus</Emphasis>)

The spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect is the tendency for humans to respond faster to relatively larger numbers on the left or right (or with the left or right hand) and faster to relatively smaller numbers on the other side. This effect seems to occur due to a spatial representation of magnitude either in occurrence with a number line (wherein participants respond to relatively larger numbers faster on the right), other representations such as clock faces (responses are reversed from number lines), or culturally specific reading directions, begging the question as to whether the effect may be limited to humans. Given that a SNARC effect has emerged via a quantity judgement task in Western lowland gorillas and orangutans (Gazes et al., Cog 168:312–319, 2017), we examined patterns of response on a quantity discrimination task in American black bears, Western lowland gorillas, and humans for evidence of a SNARC effect. We found limited evidence for SNARC effect in American black bears and Western lowland gorillas. Furthermore, humans were inconsistent in direction and strength of effects, emphasizing the importance of standardizing methodology and analyses when comparing SNARC effects between species. These data reveal the importance of collecting data with humans in analogous procedures when testing nonhumans for effects assumed to bepresent in humans.     

Mimicking disliked others: Effects of a priori liking on the mimicry‐liking link

The sharing of bodily states elicits in mimicker and mimickee corresponding conceptualisations, which facilitates liking. There are many studies showing the relatedness of mimicry and liking. However, the mimicry‐liking link has not been investigated under conditions in which the mimickee is liked or disliked a priori. In two studies, we examined moderating effects of a priori liking on the mimicry‐liking link. Liking was measured via self‐report measures (Studies 1 and 2) and behavioural measures using a virtual environment technology (Study 2). Results showed that when participants intentionally mimicked a disliked person, liking for that person was not improved, whereas when participants mimicked a liked person, liking for that person increased. These effects were shown to be mediated by affiliation. These studies not only provided further evidence of a link between mimicry and liking, but also demonstrated that this relationship is moderated by a priori liking. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human?

Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states - that is, do they possess a 'theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

Comment on Wagner,Elejabarrieta and Lahnsteiner (1995): From sperm and ovum to gender stereotypes

Wagner, Elejabarrieta and Lahnsteiner (1995) conclude that people use gender-stereotypic attributes and sexual metaphors in describing the sperm and the ovum. The conclusion is criticized on the basis of two arguments: (1) the sperm is, in actuality, more active than the ovum and this difference is reflected in subjects' judgements; (2) in their study, the researchers themselves induced (a) the person metaphor and (b) gender categories. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.