Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

Strict embedding of the elementary ontology into the monadic second-order calculus of predicates admitting the empty individual domain

There is given the proof of strict embedding of Leniewski's elementary ontology into monadic second-order calculus of predicates providing a formalization of the class of all formulas valid in all domains (including the empty one). The elementary ontology with the axiom S (S S) is strictly embeddable into monadic second-order calculus of predicates which provides a formalization of the classes of all formulas valid in all non-empty domains.     

Internal approach to external sets and universes

A problem which enthusiasts ofIST, Nelson's internal set theory, usually face is how to treat external sets in the internal universe which does not contain them directly. To solve this problem, we considerBST,bounded set theory, a modification ofIST which is, briefly, a theory for the family of thoseIST sets which are members of standard sets.We show thatBST is strong enough to incorporate external sets in the internal universe in a way sufficient to develop the most advanced applications of nonstandard methods. In particular, we define inBST an enlargement of theBST universe which satisfies the axioms ofHST, an external theory close to a theory introduced by Hrbaek. HST includes Replacement and Saturation for all formulas but contradicts the Power Set and Choice axioms (either of them is incompatible with Replacement plus Saturation), therefore to get an external universe which satisfies all ofZFC minus Regularity one has to pay by a restriction of Saturation. We prove thatHST admits a system of subuniverses which modelZFC (minus Regularity but with Power Set and Choice) and Saturation in a form restricted by a fixed but arbitrary standard cardinal.Thus the proposed system of set theoretic foundations for nonstandard mathematics, based on the simple and natural axioms of the internal theoryBST, provides the treatment of external sets sufficient to carry out elaborate external constructions.Partially supported by AMS grants in 1993 and 1994 and DFG grant in 1994.Presented byRobert Goldblatt     

Internal approach to external sets and universes

In this article we show how the universe ofBST,bounded set theory (a modification ofIST which is, briefly, a theory for the family of those sets inIST which are members of standard sets) can be enlarged by definable subclasses of sets (which are not necessarily sest in internal theories likeBST orIST) so that Separation and Replacement are true in the enlargement for all formulas, including those in which the standardness predicate may occur.ThusBST is strong enough to incorporate external sets in the internal universe in a way sufficient to develop topics in nonstandard analysis inaccessible in the framework of a purely internal approach, such as Loeb measures.Presented byRobert Goldblatt     

Criteria for admissibility of inference rules. Modal and intermediate logics with the branching property

The main result of this paper is the following theorem: each modal logic extendingK4 having the branching property belowm and the effective m-drop point property is decidable with respect to admissibility. A similar result is obtained for intermediate intuitionistic logics with the branching property belowm and the strong effective m-drop point property. Thus, general algorithmic criteria which allow to recognize the admissibility of inference rules for modal and intermediate logics of the above kind are found. These criteria are applicable to most modal logics for which decidability with respect to admissibility is known and to many others, for instance, to the modal logicsK4,K4.1,K4.2,K4.3,S4.1,S4.2,GL.2; to all smallest and greatest counterparts of intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD _n; to all intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD _n; to all finitely axiomatizable modal and intermediate logics of finite depth etc. Semantic criteria for recognizing admissibility for these logics are offered as well.The results of this paper were obtained by the author during a stay at the Free University of Berlin with support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in 1992 – 1993.Presented byWolfgang Rauntenberg     

Two types of ball-effector interaction and their relative contribution to soccer kicking

The study attempts a closer examination of the ball-foot interaction at the instant of soccer kicking using high speed videotaping. This allows a detailed biomechanical analysis of the collision. A central question is whether the ball-foot interaction can be modeled as an elastic impact, or as a mixture of ‘impact-like’ and ‘throwing-like’ patterns. The findings prove that the theory of conservation of momentum alone is not adequate for modeling kicking: additional momentum and mechanical energy is supplied to the system during the collision phase because of the muscle work. This is due to the relatively long duration of collision (about 16 ms) and the large ball-foot displacement (about 26.0 cm). More than 50% of the ball's speed and at least 30% of its kinetic energy is imparted to the ball without any contribution of the potential energy of the ball deformation.