Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

Book reviews

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Strict embedding of the elementary ontology into the monadic second-order calculus of predicates admitting the empty individual domain

There is given the proof of strict embedding of Leniewski's elementary ontology into monadic second-order calculus of predicates providing a formalization of the class of all formulas valid in all domains (including the empty one). The elementary ontology with the axiom S (S S) is strictly embeddable into monadic second-order calculus of predicates which provides a formalization of the classes of all formulas valid in all non-empty domains.     

The clinical inference process and the role of theory

Perhaps the most challenging and creative aspect of clinical testing is the clinical inference process, the sequential steps the examiner takes in transforming the raw test data into a clinically relevant testing report. Unfortunately, this part of the testing process has received little attention in the testing literature. In this article, the specific steps in the inferential process are outlined. In addition, the ways in which theory enter into the inferential process are also discussed.     

Internal approach to external sets and universes

A problem which enthusiasts ofIST, Nelson's internal set theory, usually face is how to treat external sets in the internal universe which does not contain them directly. To solve this problem, we considerBST,bounded set theory, a modification ofIST which is, briefly, a theory for the family of thoseIST sets which are members of standard sets.We show thatBST is strong enough to incorporate external sets in the internal universe in a way sufficient to develop the most advanced applications of nonstandard methods. In particular, we define inBST an enlargement of theBST universe which satisfies the axioms ofHST, an external theory close to a theory introduced by Hrbaek. HST includes Replacement and Saturation for all formulas but contradicts the Power Set and Choice axioms (either of them is incompatible with Replacement plus Saturation), therefore to get an external universe which satisfies all ofZFC minus Regularity one has to pay by a restriction of Saturation. We prove thatHST admits a system of subuniverses which modelZFC (minus Regularity but with Power Set and Choice) and Saturation in a form restricted by a fixed but arbitrary standard cardinal.Thus the proposed system of set theoretic foundations for nonstandard mathematics, based on the simple and natural axioms of the internal theoryBST, provides the treatment of external sets sufficient to carry out elaborate external constructions.Partially supported by AMS grants in 1993 and 1994 and DFG grant in 1994.Presented byRobert Goldblatt