Addressing two blind spots of commonly used experimental designs: The Highly‐Repeated Within‐Person approach

Two well documented but still neglected blind spots of often‐used study designs limit a researcher's ability to make inferences about psychological phenomenon. First, typical designs focus on effects of conditions at the group level and are not able to assess the extent to which effects characterize each participant in the study. This blind spot can lead to erroneous (or incomplete) conclusions about the effects of manipulations both for a given participant and at the group level. Second, commonly used research designs often use a limited sample of stimuli, constraining conclusions to the particular stimuli. This blind spot can lead to non‐replication when different stimuli are used. We propose that the Highly‐Repeated Within‐Person (HRWP) approach helps mitigate these limitations. Using a study on the effects of anti‐smoking messages, we illustrate how the HRWP approach helps alert researchers when the conclusions at the group level may not apply to all (or any) participant, quantifies the heterogeneity of effects of manipulations across people, and increases confidence regarding the generalizability of the effects. We discuss how the HRWP approach may help conceptualize issues of replicability in a new light.     

When Manipulation Gets Personal

Many accounts of moral responsibility have emerged recently that question the importance of conscious choice for moral responsibility. Instead of this ‘volitional’ requirement, these ‘attributionist’ accounts claim that agents are responsible for their actions when their actions reflect who they are and what they value. This paper argues that attributionist accounts are too quick to dismiss the connection between volition and moral responsibility. By excising conscious control from their accounts, attributionists leave open the undesirable possibility that an agent may fulfil all necessary conditions for moral responsibility even when she is under the conscious control of another person. Through analyzing situations in which attributionist conditions for moral responsibility are met while an agent is controlled by someone else, the link between an agent's volition and her moral responsibility becomes more apparent.     

From conscious experience to a conscious self

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers (2011 Carruthers, P. (2011). The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory (“ISA”), which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer us fresh responses to ISA’s critics, as well as approaches to ethics and free will that are aligned with ISA’s conclusions.